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Abstract
An influential body of research into policing and security has suggested that routine 
policing in Western European democracies has been subject to a process of 
‘securitisation’. Securitisation refers to the identification of ‘existential threats’ which 
require emergency powers and extraordinary counter-measures outwith ‘normal’, 
democratically accountable, government (Weaver, 1996). Such is the preoccupation 
with the threat posed by transnational terrorism that it is argued routine policing is 
increasingly driven by this logic of securitisation (King and Sharp, 2006; Virta, 2008).
However, the extent to which routine policing is actually being securitised remains a 
moot empirical point. This is due in part to the fact that such arguments are based 
primarily on textual analyses which tend to impute action from talk, by inferring policy 
impact on the frontline from policy rhetoric and exhortation. This thesis contends that 
research needs to move beyond a concern with policy elites -  and the ‘textual 
footprints’ of their talk and decisions -  and focus on the action of everyday, local 
police routines, in order to establish the extent, nature and impact of ‘securitisation’.
This research study employs a single, embedded case study approach to examine the 
extent and nature of 'securitisation' of routine policing in one British police force area. 
The research design facilitates the opportunity to move beyond the 
corroboration/falsification of the securitisation thesis in relation to empirical findings 
about actual police routines and practices. It draws on Pollitt’s (2001) propositions 
about the policy process and the implementation gaps between policy ‘talk’, ‘decisions’ 
and ‘actions’ to generate empirical findings, and adapts the securitisation thesis in order 
to build theory about the relationship between securitisation and routine practice.
The research found that empirical evidence of securitisation varies across the three 
policy levels and decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy ‘talk’ and 
‘decision’ to the level of police practice or ‘action’. It is argued that this study has 
developed a robust methodological approach to the empirical capture of routine 
policing that can be replicated in other research sites as a basis for comparison in future 
research.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.0 The Securitisation of Routine Policing?
This research study provides a critical examination of theoretical propositions about 
the securitisation of routine policing. The concept of securitisation was first used by 
the Copenhagen School of International Relations to rethink the re-orientation of 
European Integration around notions of security, in terms of threats to the very 
existence of the European Union (EU) as a working political economy. However, the 
concept has increasingly been applied to wider socio-political contexts. It is now 
commonly argued that recent terrorist events have served as catalysts for shifts in both 
political imperative and public expectation in relation to security policy-making 
generally and policing policy more specifically. In recent criminological thought 
these shifts have been conceptualised in terms of the securitisation of routine policing. 
Securitisation refers to the identification of existential threats which, by definition, 
imply emergency powers and extraordinary counter-measures outwith normal, 
democratically accountable, government (Waever, 1996). Such is the preoccupation 
with the threat posed by transnational terrorism post-11 September 2001, the Madrid 
bombings of 2004 and the 7 July bombings in London in 2005, that it is argued 
routine policing is increasingly driven by this logic of securitisation (King and Sharp, 
2006), and recent research has focused particularly on the increased securitisation of 
community policing (Virta, 2002; 2008). Critics suggest this increasingly securitised 
logic unnecessarily threatens important civil liberties and safeguards of democratic 
oversight of policing in liberal democracies (Loader and Walker, 2001).
The securitisation theory has made important conceptual and normative contributions 
to debates about the governance of security. Waever (1996) highlights the role of 
security actors and referent objects in the securitisation process. The concept of 
security actor relates to the political elites or dominant policy makers of any given 
security setting. The referent objects are alternatively viewed as the object or site that 
is threatened (e.g. the individual or the state) or, the sites or units where security or 
‘securitising’ needs to be carried out. Securitisation theorists reference a diverging
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range of referent objects of security which are seen to operate at the 'human, state and 
global level’ (Waever, 1996: 104). The securitisation thesis as grand theoretical 
narrative has been applied to a range of socio-political contexts, most notably 
migration and asylum (Bigo, 1994; Huysmans, 2000) but there is also an increasing 
body of work that applies the securitisation thesis to the arena of EU policing (Bigo, 
2000; Loader, 2004) and within the UK (King and Sharp, 2006).
The interesting question for empirical research is what securitisation could actually 
mean in terms of routine policing? Securitisation theorists have identified exemplars 
of securitised policing at both the European and national (UK) level. In the EU, 
terrorism has become increasingly identified as an external threat to the internal 
security of Member States (Bigo, 2000; Loader, 2004). The police responses to such 
threats have manifested themselves in developments such as the enhanced cooperation 
between the police forces of member states, and increased emphasis on information 
exchange and intelligence gathering. Some academics who draw on the securitisation 
thesis have noted that the EU’s increasing preoccupation with terrorism and 
associated security concerns is visible in the development of a threat assessment 
industry (Virta, 2008). This observation is informed by the creation and annual 
publication of EU intelligence products such as the Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (OCTA) and EU Terrorism and Threat Assessment (TE-SAT) Reports1.
There is relatively little evidence of empirical research that examines the impact of 
securitisation within the context of contemporary policing in the UK beyond an 
examination of counter terrorism legislation and the development and application of 
special police powers. King and Sharp (2006) focus on the changing police 
environment in England and Wales to illustrate the ways in which security concerns 
are challenging and extending definitions of the proper role of the police and other 
agencies in public security. They identify four possible drivers of securitisation 
within UK policing; the growing police role of the Security Services; the security road 
to the development of Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); government moves 
towards force amalgamation, and a return to local policing but with central direction.
1 These documents are analysed in detail in Chapter Four.
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There is a limited amount of empirical research that has been undertaken on the 
impact of increased security concerns at the frontline of local policing delivery and 
thus readily identifiable exemplars of securitised policing become less tangible as one 
moves from national to local, community policing levels. However, there is an 
important body of work that focuses on the impact of recent discursive and policy 
shifts in the nature of the control of crime, disorder and insecurity at the local, 
community level. This work focuses on the increasing convergence of policing and 
partnership work at the local level, and in particular the rise and impact of community 
safety partnerships (Hughes and Rowe, 2007), and the increased emphasis placed on 
the use of community intelligence in the policing of insecurity (Innes, 2006; Innes et 
al, 2009). The issues raised within the UK also resonate within an international, and 
specifically a European context. Virta (2002; 2008) observes the development of 
local security networks and the use of intelligence-led approaches to community 
policing in Finland and Terpstra (2008) notes the emergence of local security 
networks in The Netherlands. Such work highlights the importance of ‘community’, 
and in particular, the gradual reformulation of the notion of community policing and 
community safety in light of heightened concerns around issues of both national and 
personal security.
This thesis makes a number of observations on the securitisation thesis and its 
previous application within the context of routine policing. The securitisation thesis 
is generated through a methodological approach that focuses on the discourse-analytic 
study of policy rhetoric and various legislative and executive decisions. There is a 
lack of empirical scrutiny of the actions that constitute routine police practice. As a 
consequence there is a tendency to impute action from talk; to infer policy impact on 
the operational frontline from security policy rhetoric and exhortation. The 
securitisation thesis is sustained by a macro-theory that has a tendency to homogenise 
research settings, or, at least generalise and thereby de-contextualise security. This 
necessarily precludes recognition of the pluralistic narratives that frame different geo­
political security spaces and limits accommodation of the ‘empirical particulars’ 
(Garland, 2001: vii) at play within such settings, which are often evident in the form 
of political, organisational and cultural challenges to the implementation of national 
counter policy-making at the level of routine practice. It is suggested that a reliance
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on such a methodological approach has a number of implications for conceptualising 
changes to police practice in terms of securitisation.
1.1 The Research Design
This research study argues that there is a lack of empirical research that interrogates 
suppositions about the securitisation of policing by examining tangible changes to 
routine police practice on the ground. Therefore it is argued that the extent to which 
routine policing is actually being securitised remains a moot empirical point. This 
research seeks to move the empirical debate forward by highlighting how traditional 
approaches to research design and methodological strategies can be applied -  and 
indeed innovated -  in order to explore critically the issue of securitisation within 
routine policing. In doing so, the research study puts forward two propositions. 
Firstly, that it is important to distinguish analytically between different levels of 
policy-making for the purposes of empirical enquiry. Secondly, that academics and 
researchers need to move beyond a concern with policy elites and the ‘textual 
footprints’ of their talk and decisions, to a concern with the action of everyday, local 
police routines.
The aim of this research is to undertake a critical examination of a number of 
important theoretical propositions suggested by securitisation theorists; in particular 
that routine policing is, in fact, becoming securitised in a number of ways. The 
research strategy is adaptive in nature and the research design is underpinned by a 
single case study approach which facilitates the opportunity to both provide a critical 
test of the existing theoretical suppositions, and expand and develop the theoretical 
framework if appropriate. The main research question that drives this thesis is:
To what extent is routine policing becoming increasingly securitised?
In order to operationalise this question for the purposes of empirical enquiry it was 
necessary to devise an appropriate analytical framework. This research draws on 
Christopher Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework of policy convergence within the 
arena of public administration, and the three ‘levels’ that according to him, are 
inherent to policy-making and implementation -  ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Pollitt
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(2001: 938) suggests that in order to make sense of the complexities of the public 
policy-making process it is important to consider and separate out the analytically 
distinct levels of ‘talk’ identified as policy rhetoric and symbolism; ‘decisions’ in the 
form of written policy statements, specific legislation and national programmes, and 
‘action’ conceptualised as policy implementation ‘on the ground’.
Within this research study the conceptual distinctions identified by Pollitt (2001) are 
re-formulated in order to examine the nature of counter terrorism policy within and 
across three empirically distinct research sites -  the EU, the UK and a case study of 
local, routine policing. In general terms policy talk is identified as political or 
policing ideas, symbolism or rhetoric and exhortation; policy decisions are understood 
as concrete manifestations of policy in the form of legislation and/or executive 
programmes and strategies, and policy action is conceptualised as tangible changes to 
routine policing practice. However, a key challenge for this thesis was to find a 
viable, empirical way to operationalise Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework within a 
complex and multi-faceted research setting such as operational policing. The 
analytical framework devised for this research study facilitates the re-formulation of 
the main research question into an operational question which in turn can be used to 
falsify or corroborate arguments that routine policing is being securitised. Thus, the 
main question is operationalised as:
To what extent does security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena o f counter 
terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action ’ on the ground in the form o f tangible 
changes to local policing practice?
The analytical framework facilitates the opportunity to measure empirically the two 
concepts at the centre of this research, namely securitisation and routine policing. 
The research identifies a number of exemplars of securitised ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and 
‘action’ within the context of counter terrorism policy across the three distinct geo­
political spaces or security ‘sites’. These spaces are identified as referent objects of 
security which retain a specific ‘security identity’ (Waever, 1996: 108). In devising 
the analytical framework for this thesis it was important to make two sets of 
conceptual distinctions. Firstly, it was imperative to make a clear and coherent 
distinction between policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’. Secondly, it was vital to link the
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analytical framework with the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis. 
Therefore, it was important to make clear the distinction between these generic 
conceptualisations and ‘securitised’ talk, decision and action. It was particularly 
important to make a coherent distinction between routine police action and 
‘securitised police action’.
This research study considers relevant ‘talk’ (in the form of rhetoric, exhortation or 
symbolic policy) to be securitised -  or at least demonstrate a tendency towards being 
securitised -  if it represents discourse pertaining to an identified existential threat and 
the discussion or debate of the use of extraordinary, emergency measures to counter 
the threat. This thesis proposes that policy ‘talk’ can be distinguished from policy 
‘decision’ by the presence of tangible mechanisms o f enforcement which necessitate 
some form o f organisational and/or institutional compliance. Such powers of 
enforcement might be characterised as government legislation, financial incentive for 
implementation (or conversely, financial penalty for non-implementation) and/or 
organisational compliance mechanisms. Within the context of this thesis such 
enforcement mechanisms are exemplified by concrete ‘legislative decisions’ in the 
form of legally-bestowed powers for the police; concrete ‘institutional decisions’ 
characterised by compliance mechanisms such as ring-fenced, national funding (with 
mandatory evaluation of implementation progress at the end), or the introduction of 
new and specific frameworks of performance assessment in the area of counter­
terrorism and extremism.
A number of examples of securitised decisions are highlighted within this research, 
and most notably at the national, UK level of policy-making. Within the context of 
this research such legislative and executive decisions are considered ‘securitised’ 
because they were created as a direct response to, or strategy for, countering the 
existential threat posed by terrorism or radicalisation. A number of cross- 
government, executive strategies are also conceptualised as securitised decisions, for 
example, the UK’s CONTEST strategy and in particular the Prevent strand of this 
strategy. The Prevent Strategy serves as the primaiy empirical focus of the research, 
in part, because local, routine policing is responsible for its delivery on the ground.
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The analytical concept of ‘action’ within this study expands on Pollitt’s (2001) 
interpretation to facilitate an exploration of tangible changes to routine police 
practice. Within this thesis the two concepts -  action and routine practice -  are 
synonymous with each other and together they serve as one of the empirical 
cornerstones of the research. The concept of routine policing within this thesis has 
been generated by carrying out a quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly 
tasking action plans within the case study force. However, it is important at this point 
to highlight key distinctions between routine policing and securitised policing as it is 
integral to the empirical integrity of this thesis focused as it is on the impact of 
national counter terrorism policies on routine police activity. The research draws in 
part on Brodeur’s (1983) conceptualisations of high and low policing to differentiate 
between the two policing paradigms2. Routine policing can be equated to ‘low’ 
policing in that it is commonly associated with traditional notions of protecting the 
public from everyday volume crime and maintaining public order. It can be argued 
that routine policing becomes ‘securitised’ in some way when it adopts some of the 
‘high’ policing characteristics traditionally associated with specialist units such as 
Special Branch and the Security Services.
The empirical data pertaining to security ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ is generated across the 
three security sites within this research study. However, the main empirical aim of 
this research is to test the theoretical propositions regarding the securitisation of 
routine policing by undertaking an empirical examination of the extent and nature of 
securitisation in one British police force area, including an exploration of the factors 
that shape routine policing. Therefore, the research design is framed around the use 
of a UK police force as a single, embedded case study of policing in practice. There 
are a number of reasons why it determined possible to generalise from the case study 
force to the theoretical propositions about the securitisation of routine policing. The 
force was prioritised as one of twenty-four forces responsible for policing areas with 
higher levels of risk across England and Wales to receive Prevent funding. Moreover, 
the case study Basic Command Unit (BCU) was identified as a Pathfinder BCU. As a 
prioritised, pathfinder area the BCU receives funding for Prevent-related training and 
designated security posts (DSPs). The fact that the case study force and BCU have
2 These conceptualisations are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
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been prioritised by HM Government as areas that are vulnerable to terrorism-related 
phenomena such as extremism and radicalisation suggest that it is reasonable to 
expect to find the securitisation of routine policing.
1.3 Methodological Approaches
The research study incorporates a mixed methodological approach to data generation 
and incorporates both qualitative and quantitative strategies into the research design.
The quantitative data was generated through:
■ quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking ‘Action Plans’.
These action plans were drawn up following the fortnightly tasking meetings that took 
place in the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork for this research (June 
-  November 2008). The aim of the QCA was to:
1. formulate an empirical measure of routine policing practice at the BCU level;
2. ascertain the extent to which counter terrorism policing features in BCU 
operational tasking and routine policing activity.
By undertaking these two objectives it was possible to examine the extent to which 
counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ is evident within routine police activity 
in the case study BCU. This in turn contributes to an examination of the extent to 
which routine policing at the local (neighbourhood) level is becoming increasingly 
‘securitised’.
The qualitative data was generated through:
■ semi-structured interviews with police officers across all ranks within the 
case study force;
■ documentary analysis of relevant counter terrorism policy text across the 
three geo-political research sites,
8
■ non-participant observation of case study meetings, primarily at the BCU 
level.
It is acknowledged that the inclusion of such ‘discursive’ data in a thesis consciously 
designed to advocate the importance of moving beyond ‘talk’ and into the realm of 
tangible ‘decision’ and ‘action’ may, for some, raise questions about the conceptual 
logic of this thesis. However, it was considered important to ask those doing police 
work about the rhetorical impact of securitised ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ on their routine 
practice. In this way the interview research relates to reflections on ‘real’ processes 
and experiences. Moreover, it is argued that the qualitative data included in this 
research study is not simply discourse, but can be interpreted as accounts of decisions 
that have been taken, or evidence in support of including a particular policy within the 
category of ‘decision’ as conceptualised within this thesis. The mixed method 
approach to data generation and analysis was adopted for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the quantitative content analysis provided one way to understand empirically 
the constituent parts of routine policing and the extent to which counter terrorism 
policing is embedded in routine practice. The qualitative research provides the 
opportunity to highlight the enduring challenges to counter terrorism policy 
implementation and delivery at both the level of police strategic decision-making, and 
at the operational, ‘action’ level.
1.4 Thesis Structure
Chapter Two reviews the existing literature on the securitisation thesis that serves as 
the theoretical framework that underpins the research. The chapter charts the origins 
and application of the concept of securitisation within an EU context. The chapter 
then focuses on the existing arguments made about the securitisation of policing 
within the EU, the UK (and Northern Ireland) and the level of community policing. 
The main aims of this chapter are to identify exemplars of securitised policing, or at 
least tendencies towards securitisation and to highlight the methodological approaches 
used to explore the relationship between security and routine policing.
Chapter Three describes the research design and methodological strategies that were 
employed in order to operationalise the critical test of the securitisation thesis within
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the context of routine policing. It focuses on four key areas: 1) the analytical 
framework that underpins the research, 2) the use of a UK police force as a single, 
embedded case study of routine policing in practice, 3) the methodological strategies 
employed to generate the data, and in particular the use of quantitative content 
analysis (QCA) in the formulation of an empirical measure of routine policing, and 
finally, 4) the access issues and ethical considerations inherent to conducting research 
within a setting such as operational policing.
Chapters Four to Six present the results of detailed analyses of the empirical data 
collected during the research study. Chapter Four examines the nature of counter 
terrorism policy ‘talk’ across the three geo-political security settings at the centre of 
the research. Chapter Five examines the ‘decisions’ that have been made within the 
arena of UK counter terrorism policy and the extent to which these national decisions 
are evident within the strategic, decision-making frameworks of the case study police 
force. The specific, empirical focus is on the Prevent strategy which forms an integral 
part of the government’s CONTEST Programme. The aim is to explore the extent to 
which local routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised as a consequence of 
the policy ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter-terrorism. Chapter Six 
consolidates the work of the previous two empirical chapters and focuses on the 
operational research question that drives this thesis, namely to what extent does 
security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena o f counter terrorism policy 
actually translate into ‘action ’ on the ground in the form o f tangible changes to local 
policing practice? The chapter presents the findings from the QCA of the case study 
BCU tasking action plans. The chapter also includes a detailed, qualitative analysis of 
the three main QCA findings. The mixed methodological interrogation of routine 
policing and the inherent challenges to implementing national policy at the 
operational frontline generate a number of implications for conceptualising policing 
change in terms of securitisation.
Chapter Seven presents a discussion of the key findings within the context of the 
securitisation thesis and offers some concluding remarks. One of the aims of the 
chapter is to debate the relative usefulness of applying the securitisation thesis to 
policing in light of the findings generated from the current research. In other words, 
to what extent can securitisation theory adequately account for the policing policy
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making and implementation processes identified within this case study research? In 
light of this critical evaluation the chapter also considers the extent to which 
alternative theoretical perspectives might more effectively account for the findings of 
this research. The work of Garland (2001), and in particular his work on adaptive 
problem-solving is highlighted as a potentially fruitful source of theoretical 
explanation for some of the research findings. The chapter concludes with some final 
reflections on the methodological approaches to researching routine policing and a 
discussion of the ways in which such empirical work can develop in the future.
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Chapter Two: The Securitisation Thesis and its Application to 
Policing
2.0 Introduction
This chapter reviews the existing literature on ‘securitisation’ -  as both a grand 
theoretical narrative and as a thesis applied within the context of routine policing. 
The chapter begins by charting the origins and application of the concept of 
securitisation within an EU context. The chapter is then dedicated to an examination 
of existing arguments made about the securitisation of policing within three 
empirically-distinct settings -  the EU, the UK (and Northern Ireland) and routine, 
community policing. The main aims of this chapter are to identify exemplars of 
securitised policing within each of these empirical settings and to highlight the 
methodological approaches used to generate the suppositions made about the nature 
of routine policing. Therefore, the chapter addresses two key questions. Firstly, to 
what extent have prominent theorists limited their discussions of securitisation to elite 
policy rhetoric and government text? Secondly, what evidence is presented by 
advocates of the securitisation thesis that such policy rhetoric and decisions are 
actually re-shaping policing practice on the ground? By focusing on these types of 
questions it is possible to ascertain the methodological approaches to the generation of 
the securitisation theory, and identify gaps in the current research on securitisation 
within the context of routine policing. This in turn provides justification for the 
research questions and allied methodological approaches that drive the current 
research study.
2.1 Securitisation Theory within a European Context
The development of the securitisation thesis is inherently bound up with the new 
security landscape that evolved within Europe following the end of the Cold War, and 
much of the existing research in this area focuses on the relationship between 
securitisation and asylum and migration policy. It is important to outline briefly this 
security setting before discussing the key facets of the securitisation theory and 
highlighting the empirical data and analytical approaches upon which securitisation 
theorists base their claims.
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Bigo (1994) suggests that the end of the Cold War opened up new fields of security 
linking free movement of persons and abolition of internal borders with police 
activities, strengthening external border controls, and control of migratory flows. As 
a consequence a new internal security field emerged which has been characterised by 
two inter-linked developments:
i) The merging of internal and external security;
ii) The development of a security continuum.
A number of prominent theorists (Zedner, 2003; Flyghed, 2005) suggest that the new 
security landscape altered irrevocably through the erosion of distinctions between 
external and internal threat and the development of a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo, 
1994: 164) which, connected internal and external issues such as border control, 
terrorism, international crime and migration. In other words, activities previously 
dealt with in isolation were brought together under the auspices of ‘internal security’ 
issues culminating in a situation whereby:
...the issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs and other serious 
organised crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine 
immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an 
overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free 
movement of persons within Europe’.
(Bigo, 1994: 164)
Such issues came to be treated together; increasingly prevalent activities now seen as 
‘criminogenic consequences of a world made up of flows and networks rather than 
boundaries and fixed points’ (Loader, 2004: 49). It is argued that such a continuum 
leads to the transfer of illegitimacy from one to the other allowing for extra-control 
measures to be taken against designated problem populations in the name of counter­
terrorism and anti-drug trafficking3. In other words, the collective threat is greater 
than its individual parts as too are the counter-measures devised by security policy­
makers as legitimate power holders. It can be argued that such fundamental shifts in
3 This observation resonates within academic work associated with the securitisation of policing in 
Northern Ireland and the consequential normalisation of special police powers within routine policing. 
This issue is discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.
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the conceptualisation of security served as the basis for the development of the 
securitisation theory within Europe.
Waever (1996) observes security as a practice, a specific way of framing an issue; 
security discourse is characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. 
The notion of securitisation incorporates a number of facets. It is widely understood 
as a process that comprises two component parts, namely the identification of an 
'existential threat’ which in and of itself provides the justification for the development 
of ‘extraordinary means to handle the threat’ (Waever, 1996: 107). The first part of 
the process involves the identification of an activity or socio-political issue that is 
subsequently deconstructed and reformulated as an existential danger or ‘threat’ to 
security, social order and/or control. For Waever (1996:106), something presents as 
an existential threat in so far as if it is not ‘tackled, then everything else will be 
irrelevant (because we will not be here, or not be free to deal with future challenges in 
our own way)’. This process of identification and re-conceptualisation in turn 
justifies the development of extraordinary, emergency powers of executive action to 
deal with the threat. Waever (1996: 107) suggests that the ‘necessity of an existential 
quality (survival) comes from the function of security discourse as lifting issues to an 
urgency and necessity above normal politics. At this point it is observed that 
‘governing slips into emergency management’ (de Lindt and Virta, 2004: 471). Thus, 
the securitisation thesis is often characterised by its reference to the suspension of 
normal standards of due process and democratic oversight within security policy­
making. Securitisation theorists argue that:
‘by labelling something as a security issue, the security ‘actor’ has claimed the 
right to deal with it by extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules 
of the game (for example, in the form of secrecy, levying taxes, or conscripts, 
limitations on otherwise inviolable rights)’.
(Waever, 1996: 106)
Waever (1996: 107) observes security as a ‘self-referential ' practice in that it is the 
process of ‘securitising’ an issue that in turn makes it an issue of concern. Therefore, 
by reconceptualising issues such as asylum and migration into existential threats and 
submitting them to the process of securitisation, they become threats (to social order 
and control). In this way, securitisation is identified as a performative speech act
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(Austin, 1975) whereby in the act of ‘speaking something is done’ (Waever, 1996: 
107). This study interrogates the conceptualisation of security as a ‘speech act’ by 
examining the extent to which security ‘talk’ translates into security ‘decision’ and 
‘action’. Within this context, securitisation theorists highlight the role of security 
actors and referent objects in a given securitisation process. Waever (1996) identifies 
security actors as the political elites or dominant policy makers within a specific 
security setting or unit. In earlier work, Waever (1995) suggests that power holders 
can try to use the instrument of securitisation of an issue to gain control over it or at 
least manage the threat posed by the socio-political issue. This research study argues 
that the securitisation process can also be used by those in (political) power as a tool 
to demonstrate, or least to give the impression, that something is being ‘done’ to 
counter an existential threat. The ‘referent objects’ are conceptualised within the 
securitisation thesis by posing questions such as ‘security for whom?’ and ‘in whose 
name is a designated security operation conducted?’ The referent objects are 
alternatively viewed as the object or site that is threatened by the existential threat, for 
example, the individual or the state or, the ‘sites’ or ‘units’ where security or 
‘securitising’ needs to be carried out, for example, asylum, migration or now -  at least 
within this research -  the policing of terrorism and radicalisation.
Waever (1996) references a diverging range of referent objects of security which are 
seen to operate at the human, state and global level. Waever (1996: 104) references 
Europe as a ‘referent object in a truly original way’ because it can simultaneously be 
viewed as a referent object in its own right, and as a site that incorporates a number of 
discrete referent objects for example the individual, the nation and the state -  all of 
which are tied up in a specific security narrative. Indeed, a number of proponents of 
the securitisation thesis highlight notions of identity as integral aspects of any 
securitising process and as such identity becomes a referent object in its own right. 
Huysmans (2000: 757) refers to security policy, or perhaps more accurately the 
process of securitisation, as a way to ‘mediate belonging’ and that, ‘in security 
practices the political and social identification of a community and its way of life 
develop in response to an existential threat’. Huysmans (2000) explores this notion 
within the context of migration and its conceptualisation as a challenge to the 
protection of national identity and welfare provisions.
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However, securitisation theorists acknowledge that ‘security’ might not mean the 
same thing to all referent objects and that interpretations of security are often 
contingent on the narratives and consequentially, the identities that frame specific 
settings. It is suggested that the security narratives that frame a specific geo-political 
unit are informed by diverging security concerns, experiences and thus priorities. For 
example, Waever (1996) suggests that Europe retains a unique security identity due to 
the diverse range of Member State security priorities and experiences that must be 
negotiated and accommodated into policy-making frameworks. Waever (1996) 
argues that Europe’s ‘identity’ is framed around a security narrative that emphasises 
the need for integration and cohesion; within such a narrative, security is achieved 
through ‘togetherness’, and insecurity is courted through fragmentation. It is 
observed that state identity, for example the UK, might be framed around notions of 
sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty is integral to the current thesis as it is 
associated with notions of policy control, and the power to enforce policy compliance.
The securitisation thesis has been applied to a number of socio-political contexts, 
most notably asylum and migration within the context of the EU (Bigo, 1994; 
Huysmans, 2000). It is argued (Mitsilegas, 2003) that the effect of the securitisation 
of issues such as organised crime and illegal immigration and the consequential EU 
response to it has led in part to the legitimisation of the EU. Bigo (1994) suggests that 
it is asylum and migration discourse that lies at the heart of securitisation processes in 
Europe. Huysmans (2000) undertakes discourse analysis of EU migration policy 
instruments such as Council Regulations, Resolutions, Agreements and Action 
Programmes to examine how migration has developed into a security issue in Western 
Europe. Through this analysis Huysmans (2000) notes the ways in which the 
European integration process has been implicit in the process of securitisation. 
Huysmans (2000) outlines the securitisation of migration due to its identification as a 
danger to public order, cultural identity and domestic and labour market stability 
which, has in turn led to the creation of control-orientated, restrictive migration 
policies:
‘the construction of the internal security field, the restrictive migration policy, 
the privileging of nationals of Member States in the internal market...and the 
idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor feed into the negative
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politicization of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refuges as an illegitimate 
presence and scapegoat’.
(Huysmans, 2000: 770)
Bigo (1994: 161) indicates that Europe’s internal security field represents a ‘European 
work site’ for research. He highlights the role of political science research and the use 
of a number of methodologies including the discourse-analytic study of legal texts 
concerning freedom of movement and European integration. However, Bigo also 
notes work done on the sociology of organisation in relation to the growing links 
between police agencies across Europe and the subsequent development of a 
transnational network of police officials. In researching the European internal 
security setting Bigo (1994) adopts two main hypotheses, one of which is particularly 
pertinent to the current research study. Bigo (1994: 162) proposes, ‘there is a relative 
lack of relationship between terrorism and European reaction against terrorism; 
neither Euro-terrorism nor Middle Eastern threats are at the origin of the creation of 
European structures’. Moreover, he suggests that the answer to increasingly 
transnational acts of terrorism lies at the European level rather than beyond the EU 
borders. Bigo’s (1994: 162) work indicates that the majority of ‘agents involved in 
anti-terrorism agree that the answer to increasingly transnational acts of terrorism lies 
at the European level’ [but] to call this into question would undermine the practical 
justification of the European-level arrangements’. He highlights the development of 
the ‘security continuum’ as a key factor in this situation. According to Bigo (1994) 
the continuum led to a transfer of illegitimacy, which in the name of anti-terrorism 
and anti-drug action allowed for the adoption of measures mainly concerning asylum 
policy and migratory flows.
A dominant theme to emerge from more recent European security research is the 
extent to which the EU and particularly the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ), is now being governed by security. Securitisation theorists (Balzacq and 
Carrera, 2005: 5) have noted a discernible shift in the balance between ‘freedom’ and 
‘security’ and observed a security-led approach to meeting the ‘central concerns of the 
peoples of the States’ in so much as the ‘security of the State predates the freedom of
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the individual’4. Whilst there remains a general consensus that issues such as the 
single market, consumer rights, and the Euro still dominate European debate, threats 
such a illegal migration, the international drugs trade and terrorism ensure that 
security discourses are coming to the forefront of European politics.
The CHALLENGE Project5 explores the implications of new security practices for 
civil liberties, human rights and social cohesion in an enlarged European Union. 
CHALLENGE research has undertaken discourse analysis of EU policy frameworks 
and texts such as The Hague Programme (2005-2010) and associated Action Plans to 
examine mechanisms underpinning the transformation of the EU Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Such mechanisms reflect the securitisation process and include 
the discursive construction of threats and the development of technical tools to 
respond to the threat (Guild et al, 2008). The research suggests that the development 
of a ‘security continuum’ as outlined by Bigo (1994) has legitimised the development 
of ‘normative responses that go beyond traditional configurations and raise 
fundamental dilemmas for the security and liberty of the individual’ (Guild et al, 
2008: 1). The research reinforces existing work (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005) by 
observing that The Hague Programme ‘advocates an expansion, predominance and 
strengthening of the security dimension over the other two rationalities [freedom and 
justice]’ (Guild etal, 2008: 7).
Furthermore, CHALLENGE research notes the increasing ‘extemalisation or extra- 
territorialisation’ of AFSJ-related policies (Guild et al, 2008: 14). The CHALLENGE 
research identifies the joint operations of FRONTEX6 and extraordinary rendition as 
two salient case studies of the increasing ‘extemalisation’ of AFSJ policy. The 
research suggests that such policies carry significant implications for individual
4 This is even illustrated in the ‘freedom’ area of JHA where it can be seen the primary targets of 
border management and visa policy are illegal migration, terrorism, human and drug trafficking -  all of 
which are widely observed as operating on a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 1994).
5 The CHALLENGE (Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security) Programme is an FP6- 
funded project that seeks to facilitate a more responsive and responsible assessment of the rules and 
practices of security, and is examining the implications of these practices for civil liberties, human 
rights and social cohesion in an enlarged Europe.
http://cordis.europa.eu/ft>6/dc/index.cfm?fuseaction=UserSite.FP6ShowEvent&event id=783
6 FRONTEX is an EU agency that was created to coordinate the operational cooperation between 
Member States in the field of border security ('http://www.frontex.europa.eul.
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human rights. In this way the research mirrors work carried out by the IN:EX Project7 
which focuses on the relationship between the EU’s external relations (in terms of 
foreign policy objectives) and the threats to the internal security of the EU. The 
IN:EX programme is beginning to develop a critique of foreign and security policies 
adopted by EU Member States, particularly in the Middle East, and the role of these
o
polices in the generation of security problems in the EU . It is interesting to note the 
dissonance between academic research that alludes to the role of the EU as part- 
author of the security threats it confronts and EU security policy ‘talk’ as identified 
within this thesis which is dominated by an external threat narrative on security 
problems. This relationship is further explored in Chapter Four.
2.1.2 The securitisation o f policing at the EU level
Waever (1996: 103) suggests that ‘Europe, security, integration and identity have 
been tied together in a specific narrative’. He argues that within a European context 
security is synonymous with integration and cohesion. It is possible to see that this 
narrative informs European policing policy characterised as it is by the desire for 
increased cooperation between national police forces leading to a transnational 
network of police officials. However, the move towards increased coordination of 
police agencies across Europe is not a new phenomenon. Bigo (2000: 69) observes 
the 1970s as a ‘watershed for the process of Europeanisation of crime and police 
issues’. It was during this time that TREVI9, an intergovernmental framework for 
policing terrorism, was created. It is argued that subsequent EU policing policies 
were informed by the reconceptualised notions of security initiated by the end of the 
Cold War and previously highlighted in this chapter. Loader (2004) highlights the 
intended impact of key policy agreements on policing within the EU, in particular the 
Schengen Agreement (1990) which was primarily set up to compensate for the 
removal of frontier controls by allowing cross-border ‘hot pursuit’ by police forces. 
The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam in 1992 and 1997 respectively reflected a 
period in EU history that served to further strengthen Brussels-based authority over 
issues pertaining to the free movement of persons (activities including asylum, visa
7 IN:EX Project is funded by the European Union. It examines the social, cultural and political 
challenges produced by the evolving continuum between internal and external security within the EU.
8 See http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article 5120 en.htm
9 TREVI expanded into T2 in 1980; T3 in 1985 and T3 1992 in 1988 (Bigo, 2000)
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application and migration). In addition, it is important to note the significance of the 
EU’s increasing preoccupation with ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ culminating in the 
establishment of the ‘Third Pillar’ of freedom, security and justice, during this period. 
One of the primary aims of this ‘third pillar’ focusing on freedom, security and 
justice, was to enhance cooperation between EU Member State police forces, 
harmonise criminal proceedings, restrict asylum and other forms of migration and 
combat serious organised crime and terrorism (Loader, 2004).
However, when examining the extent to which policing across Europe is subject to 
increased securitisation, it is important to note the nature of European policing. More 
recent policing developments within the EU have been characterised by the drive for 
increased information-brokering and intelligence exchange (Sheptycki, 1998). 
Moreover, the increasingly prominent role of Europol is a further example of the 
increasing importance of enhanced cooperation between EU Member State police 
forces. This organisation, instituted by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) operates as the 
European Union law enforcement organisation. Its aim is to improve the 
effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member 
States in preventing and combating serious international organised crime and 
terrorism, and it coordinates criminal intelligence exchange through an EU-wide 
network of officers10. Further evidence to suggest a definitive move towards long­
term international police force cooperation includes the creation of an Operational 
Task Group of European Chief Police Officers; the establishment of a European 
Police College, and increased efforts to improve police officer language skills and 
transfer expertise. It is suggested that these developments are part of an EU 
enlargement programme, couched by Europe’s political elite very much in security 
terms, and with the primary aim of enhancing the working relations between EU 
member state police forces (Loader, 2004). According to Loader (2004: 57) such 
‘developments in both security policy and police practice are powered by a group of 
European executive bodies driving the formation of stronger ties between Europe’s 
policing forces, and also a transnational policing elite orientated to forging ‘common 
solutions to common security problems’.
10 http://www.europol.europa.eu
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However, there are examples of empirical research that cautions a reliance on ‘grand 
causes, corresponding to grand effects’ (Bigo, 2000: 67) within the context of 
European policing developments. Bigo (2000: 67) examines the changing nature of 
policing within the European security field, and specifically focuses on the ‘liaison 
officer...who maintains flow of information between policing agencies’. He moves 
beyond the discourse-analytic study of text traditionally associated with the work of 
securitisation theorists to examine the sociology of the practices of small groups and 
address themes such as the rationalities for solidarity between the different national 
police forces and security agencies. Bigo (2000: 72) interviewed over one hundred 
police liaison officers across European member states in order to move beyond the 
study of ‘grand causes and effects’ behind police liaison practice and consider what 
the actors say in a serious way...because it is their most ordinary work, that which 
they do everyday...that we note tangible marks of crucial transformations’. The 
research explores a range of analytical themes such as the relationship between liaison 
officers’ experience with their home country police cultures and the practical 
application of intelligence and information-sharing frameworks across a bilateral and 
multilateral police setting. The research concludes that these types of security actors 
can be defined as professionals of threat management and are producers of 
knowledge-power based on (in)security.
A number of theorists (Loader, 2004: 67) have observed European policing as a 
predominantly informationalised activity rather than a practice orientated to the on- 
the-ground delivery of police functions such as arrest, patrol, and public order, but 
towards supporting such practices through the storage and dissemination of 
information’. This has led to observations that European policing is somehow 
peripheral, non-operational, and even largely ‘mythical’ {ibid). However, it is argued 
that there are salient counter-points to such observations. A primary example in this 
regard is the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 2003. It is 
argued that the introduction of the EAW exemplifies a number of the discursive 
themes that have been highlighted in this Chapter thus far. The EAW is a tangible 
example of the logic of securitisation observed within Europe in that it represents the 
widely-noted shift in the nature of EU policy-making -  from an emphasis on freedom 
to an increasingly securitised political agenda and approach to policy-setting. It is 
observed that events such as 11 September 2001, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and
21
the London bombings on 7 July 2005 provided the justification to adopt as a matter of 
urgency security tools such as the EAW. It can be seen as an example of the 
perceived need for extraordinary measures to counter both internal and external 
threats to the collective security of EU Members. The EAW seeks to abolish the 
traditional extradition procedures between Member States and replace them with a 
system of surrender between judicial authorities for acts categorised as serious 
offences. It intends to overcome the existing national frontiers in judicial matters, 
which often undermine judicial cooperation, by bypassing the political aspect of 
extradition and establishing a process which is wholly controlled by the judiciary. A 
report on the progress of the implementation of the EU Counter Terrorism Action 
Plan reveals frequent and effective use of the European Arrest Warrant in the fight 
against terrorism and other forms of major crime (European Council, 2005c). 
However, concerns have been raised regarding the presence of legal loopholes which 
may undermine the effective functioning of the EAW. Seven years after its formal 
adoption within the EU, and despite its direct impact on the status of each individual, 
there is still no parallel judicial framework for protecting the rights of suspects and 
defendants in criminal proceedings in the EU.
In more general terms there are concerns that in the pursuit of terrorists across 
national borders there is a not inconceivable danger that other criminals could be 
pulled into the securitised web of the EAW. Such concerns resonate within 
longstanding debates relating to the use of extraordinary measures to address 
existential threats and the potential ‘normalisation’ of police special powers in times 
of perceived threat to national or in this case European security. Furthermore, there 
have been enduring challenges to the implementation of the EAW at the national level 
which have necessarily undermined its efficiency and credibility as one of the first 
legal instruments implementing the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters formally adopted by the European Council11. Although the EAW 
has been adopted by the majority of Member States the EU does not retain the power 
to compel EU countries to adopt the EAW and there are no formal structures in place 
to penalise Member States for failing to issue and execute a European Arrest Warrant.
11 In 2005 Germany and Poland launched a legal challenge questioning the compatibility of the EAW 
with existing constitutional frameworks. Eventually, the act of incorporating the EAW into German 
law was deemed to be void.
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However, the EAW has been seen to have clear and tangible effects, and represents a 
significant development in the nature of European policing.
2.2 Securitised Policing within a UK Context
2.2.1 The Legacy o f the Past
This research study argues that an important aspect of a critical exploration of the 
pronouncements made about the increased securitisation of routine policing in the UK 
is an examination of the relationship between current counter terrorism policy and the 
historical evolution of counter terrorism policy-making within the context of the 
‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1969 -  199812). It is acknowledged that the socio­
political context within which the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) operated differs 
significantly from the contemporary setting. Moreover, the cultural and 
organisational features that characterised the RUC are inherently different to those 
that shape contemporary policing in England and Wales. Furthermore, the 21st 
Century has witnessed a discemable shift in the nature and motivations behind 
terrorist activity over the last 30 years. The events of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 
2005, which some have argued initiated a reversal of the political threat posed by the 
IRA (Levi, 2007), have altered the terrain on which many of these debates concerning 
police powers and state security take place. However, it is argued that the legacy of 
policing political and sectarian unrest during this period is pertinent to this thesis for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it highlights debates regarding the ‘normalisation’ of 
emergency policy measures and special police powers within mainstream crime 
control and criminal justice process in the UK. Secondly, existing work in this area 
states that the focus of police work has increasingly been on policing ‘people’ rather 
than ‘crime’, and that the contemporary focus has shifted away from suspicion of a 
criminal ‘act’ to the monitoring of suspected individuals or populations (Hillyard, 
1993). This observation is pertinent to debates around securitisation, particularly in 
light of the emphasis placed on ‘referent objects’ of security (Waever, 1996).
12 This time period covers the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
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The policing responses to terrorism remain relatively under studied by academics. 
This is unsurprising in such a sensitive arena where the activities of state agencies are 
shrouded in secrecy (Lustgarten and Leigh, 1994). Nevertheless, within the UK there 
is an important body of work on the policing of terrorism, largely because of 
experiences in Northern Ireland. When documenting the structure and role of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Brewer et al (1988) noted that ‘the general threat 
that terrorism in a wider international context appeared to pose to society necessarily 
changed the definition of the tasks expected of police throughout the UK’ (1988: 9). 
Moreover, it has been widely observed that Northern Ireland ‘served as a testing 
ground for the development of repressive policy measures that eventually would 
transfer elsewhere’ (Mulcahy, 2005: 89). Such a perspective has been sustained for 
many years and is widely recognised as the ‘contagion thesis’ (Hillyard, 1987).
The political dimension of security policy in Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’ 
was reflected in the RUC’s oscillation between civilian and military methods of 
policing. It is widely observed that the emergency situation in Northern Ireland 
blurred the line between normal and counter-insurgency policing which in turn 
offered the potential for extraordinary powers to gradually ‘creep’ into mainstream 
policing. It is suggested that the situation in Northern Ireland at the time epitomised 
the dichotomous quality inherent to most security policy; the protection of civil 
liberties on the one hand and the perceived need to allow deviations from ‘normal’ 
policing to cope with political violence and terrorism on the other. This disjuncture 
can be seen to account for the diverging opinions of the police -  on the one hand seen 
as a political tool in the war against terror, and as implementing a repressive security 
policy under the guise of normal policing on the other hand (Brewer et al, 1988).
In terms of the legislation in operation at the time, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) 1974 extended many of the powers introduced in the NI (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1973. It has been observed that these Acts illustrated the paradox of 
policing Northern Ireland; the official desire to ‘normalise’ political violence while 
introducing special powers implicitly recognising the apparent ‘abnormality’ of the 
situation. During the Troubles, a wide range of executive and police powers were 
executed in order to counter the widespread paramilitary activity. Indeed, the anti­
terrorist legislation of the 1970s had fundamental implications for the Criminal Justice
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System, particularly in Northern Ireland. According to Hillyard (1993) the 
introduction of the PTA in 1974 created a dual system of Criminal Justice in Great 
Britain whereby there were existing powers to deal with the traditional serious crimes 
(reflected later in the form of PACE), and those connected to what was determined to 
be terrorism. During the Troubles myriad strategies were used and included 
internment without trial; the abolition of trial by jury; proscription; interrogation; 
supergrasses; accusations of a ‘shoot to kill’ policy for terrorist suspects, and alleged 
abuse of army and police powers of arrest and stop and search. Some argue that such 
tactics undermined normal police practice and further exacerbated existing divisions 
within a divided society’ (Hillyard, 1997).
Perhaps the most defining yet controversial features of security policy in Northern 
Ireland, particularly during the ‘Militarization Phase’ (1971-1975) was the practice of 
Internment and Detention. The extension of police powers to stop, search and arrest 
granted by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, were extended by 
the PTA 1974, and the Diplock Commission (1972/1973). The new system 
established under the anti-terrorist legislation also had the potential to bring into 
custody and interrogate anyone whether there was evidence against them or not 
because the principal arrest required no reasonable suspicion of an offence. Hillyard 
(1993) states that such special police powers were used for the purposes of 
intelligence gathering, and this is corroborated by work highlighting the development 
of intelligence work during this period, for example, the use of technology and Covert 
Human Intelligence Sources (Kitson, 2005). Ultimately, Hillyard (1993: 7) 
determined that a very different culture developed around PTA arrests leading to 
observations that ‘people drawn into the CJS via PTA were not suspects in the normal 
sense of the word’...and that the counter-insurgency strategies spread into ‘normal’ 
policing in NI and resulted in the systematic oppression of the Northern Irish 
population and ultimately to the construction of the Irish as a ‘suspect community’.
It has been argued that Northern Ireland provided the British state with an arena in 
which new policing strategies and tactics could be deployed and tested first on 
political violence and then on everyday crimes (Hillyard, 1993; 1997). This section 
goes on to explore the legitimacy of this claim by examining the extent to which such 
exemplars of securitised policing are evident within the police service in England and
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Wales. The extent to which policing policies implemented in Northern Ireland 
transferred to mainland Britain is widely contested. However, there is a cogent 
argument to suggest that Northern Ireland was used as a testing ground for a range of 
new technologies and operational tactics that are evident within UK policing. For 
example, there has been increasing emphasis placed on the use of technology to 
prevent terrorism in recent years, particularly in the City of London (Walker and 
McGuiness, 2002). In addition, Geraghty (1998) notes that Britain’s move towards 
intelligence-led policing resonates with the covert surveillance techniques that 
characterised policing strategy in Northern Ireland during the period known as ‘police 
primacy’ (1975-1980). Furthermore, Hillyard (1993) indicates a number of 
similarities which provide a strong argument to suggest that a significant degree of 
policing policy transfer did take place between Northern Ireland and the UK with 
regards to policing and the administration of justice. The first area of similarity is in 
the form of policing. Hillyard observes that British policing has become increasingly 
militarized in practice with the use of crowd control tools (plastic bullets) and stop 
and search strategies. The contemporary application of police force, firearms and 
riot-control remains the subject of continued debate in Britain (Waddington and 
Wright, 2008).
Although Mulcahy (2005) acknowledges the compelling facets of the ‘contagion 
thesis’ propagated by Hillyard (1987), he states that there are a number of important 
issues to take into account when assessing the influence that Northern Ireland policing 
policy has had in Britain. Firstly, and significant in terms of the underlying debate 
concerning policy transfer, the imposition of Direct Rule and subsequent introduction 
of legislation on Northern Ireland by the British Government, indicates that policy 
transfer, particularly during the initial period of political unrest, unequivocally flowed 
from Britain to Northern Ireland. Secondly, by focusing on Northern Ireland as the 
sole source of ‘contagion’ the debate ignores the controversial policing strategies 
endemic to Britain. Thirdly, the ‘thesis’ proposed by Hillyard (1987) assumes that all 
practices ‘admired’ by British forces were actually implemented on the mainland. It 
must be noted that the scale of the conflict and the controversies often associated with 
policing in the province (including aggressive interrogations and miscarriages of 
justice) would have generated significant distrust and opposition in Britain which 
would in turn have inhibited the unequivocal transfer of counter insurgency strategies
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to the mainland. Finally, it is important to note that cross-national security policy 
transfer has proliferated post-11 September 2002 and therefore current British 
policing strategies ‘may well have been influenced by counter terrorist policies from 
significantly further afield than Northern Ireland’ (Mulcahy, 2005: 191-193).
However, it can be argued that many of the fundamental political and societal issues 
confronted by policing during the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ are inherent to the 
challenges faced by those responsible for confronting the contemporary terrorist 
threat. The following review provides a clear exposition of how government 
‘decisions’ about policing terrorism have shaped recent legislation and reviews the 
impact such decisions have had on the nature of routine policing.
2.2.2 Contemporary Police Powers: Learning the Lessons o f the Past?
Since Labour came to power in 1997 there have been five major pieces of security 
legislation: the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000); the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the Terrorism Act 2006, 
and the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. The government also passed more wide-ranging 
legislation that, while not aimed explicitly at countering terrorism, has nevertheless 
had a significant impact on the powers available to the police and security services. 
The definition of terrorism has been systematically expanded with the introduction of 
new Acts. This in turn has provided the police and security services with a more 
permissive mandate in terms of the prevention and investigation of acts deemed to be 
associated with terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) includes the current, 
legislative definition of terrorism in the UK. It significantly broadens the definition of 
terrorism whilst retaining many of the emergency provisions of its predecessors. The 
Terrorism Act 2006 extends the range of terrorism offences, and the issue that has 
arguably initiated the most political and public debate is the inclusion of the reference 
to preaching and the glorification of terrorism.
The proportionality of many of these pieces of legislation is a source of significant 
opposition from many areas, most notably from human rights organisations such as 
Liberty and Amnesty International. It can be seen that the use of broad definitions of 
terrorism risks the possible arrest, charge and ultimately the prosecution of people
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participating in legitimate social movements or political protests. Moreover, a wide- 
ranging definition runs the risk of enveloping non-terrorist crimes into the realm of 
‘extraordinary’ powers granted to the Criminal Justice System when faced with acts 
of a terrorist nature. Thus two salient points emerge when assessing legal definitions 
of terrorism -  both of which apply directly to the police -  the special powers 
legislation bestows on the Criminal Justice System, and the role of discretion in 
applying these powers. The (then) Minister of State, Tony McNulty stated:
‘it is a long-standing policy to prosecute terrorist activity using general 
offences wherever possible and the terrorism specific offences, preventative 
measures and powers are used either where no comparable general offence 
exists or where specific powers or measures are needed to enable them to 
investigate or prevent this special category of crime’.
[cited by Lord Carlile in a lecture at Cardiff University, 29 March 2007]
However, secondary data analysis of statistics compiled from police records by the 
offices of the National Coordinator for Terrorist Investigations appears to challenge 
such assertions. The findings from subsequent analysis appear to lend support to 
academics who contend that certain aspects of policy decision-making are 
increasingly driven by a logic of securitisation (Virta, 2008) and that this logic 
unnecessarily threatens important civil liberties and safeguards of democratic 
oversight of policing in liberal democracies (Loader and Walker, 2001). During the 
period 11 Sept 2001 to 31 March 200813, 1471 terrorism arrests were carried out -  
1286 under S41 of the TA 2000, and 185 under other legislation e.g. PACE. Of the 
1471 terrorism arrests, 521 (35%) resulted in a charge. Of those charged 340 (65%) 
were considered to be terrorism-related. The proportion of those arrested (35%) who 
were eventually charged is similar to that for other criminal offences with 31% of 
those aged 18 and over arrested for indictable offences prosecuted. For a further 9% 
of terrorism arrests some alternative action was taken (e.g. transfer to the immigration 
authorities).
13 Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin (2010).
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Table 2.1 illustrates the outcomes for those arrested under terrorism legislation but 
eventually dealt with by means of alternative action (N=950).
Outcome Number (N)
Cautioned 88
Transferred to Immigration Authorities 13
Transferred to Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI)
5
Dealt with under the Mental Health 
Legislation
16
Other 9
Released without Charge 819
TOTAL 950
Table 2.1: Method of alternative action for terrorism-related arrest
Table 2.1 shows that 819 (56%) of the total number of individuals arrested for 
terrorism-related offences (N=1471) were ultimately released without any charges 
being brought against them. Overall, over 65% of those arrested were either dealt 
with via alternative action or released without charge. Although the charge rate is 
comparable with that of other indictable offences these statistics do raise questions as 
to the appropriate use of terrorism legislation.
An examination of the historical evolution of legislative decisions pertaining to 
counter terrorism, and the subsequent expansion of police powers, appear to reinforce 
notions that policing is subject to increased securitisation. Since the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 1974 the police have been granted wider and more intrusive powers of 
investigation in terrorist cases; in many cases these powers exceed significantly those 
that apply to the prevention and investigation of ‘normal’ crimes. Those relevant to 
this thesis include powers of arrest, search and seizure14; powers of detention; powers 
of stop and search and public order powers.
14 The PTA 1974 extended police powers to stop, search and arrest which had originally been granted 
by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. The power to arrest and search without the 
need for reasonable suspicion remains on the statute books in myriad forms and is broadened with the 
passing of successive legislation despite the supposed ‘temporary’ status of the power.
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Powers of Detention
One of the most defining and yet controversial aspects of security policy in Northern 
Ireland, particularly during the ‘Militarization Phase’ (1971-1975) was that of 
Internment and Detention. The PTA 1974 facilitated the detention of suspects 
without warrant where there was reasonable suspicion that they were involved in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of terrorism. The power of detention now 
manifests in two key forms: pre-charge questioning15 and control orders. Control 
orders were introduced in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 200516. These civil orders 
allow the government to restrict the activities of individuals -  either British citizens or 
foreign nationals -  it suspects of involvement in terrorist-related activity, but for 
whom there is not sufficient evidence to charge. The control orders allow a range of 
restrictions from house arrest and electronic tagging to rules on who individuals may 
contact. Other measures may prohibit individuals from using a mobile phone or the 
internet and impose limitations on their movements. The Terrorism Act 2008 further 
extends the police powers that can be exerted over individuals subject to control 
orders. The Act enables police officers to enter -  by force if necessary -  and search 
the premises of individuals subject to control orders who are reasonably suspected of 
having absconded or of failing to grant access. It also enables a constable to take 
fingerprints and DNA samples from those under control orders, and ensures that full 
use can be made of them in terrorism investigations.
Extended Stop and Search Powers
The power to stop and search has a long yet varied tradition in British policing. It was 
originally a power bestowed on the Metropolitan Police which the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 extended to all forces. The use of this power 
has been the subject of considerable empirical research, predominantly because it is 
widely seen as the epitome of the exercise of police discretionary power particularly 
on the policing frontline (Waddington et al, 2004; Miller et al, 2000). However, it 
has taken on renewed significance due in part to the implementation of recent 
counter-terrorism legislative decisions, the most notable of which is Section 44 of the
15 This debate has been conceptualised as an exemplar of securitised ‘talk’ within this thesis and 
therefore detailed analysis can be found in Chapter 5.
16 At the time of writing the new Coalition Government proposes to abolish Control Orders. We wait 
to see what will take their place and whether this marks a discernible reversal of the securitisation 
process, for example the removal of house arrest, the removal of constraints on mobile phone use, and 
a reduction in the period of detention without trial among other things.
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Terrorism Act 2000. Section 44 grants the police the power to stop and search a 
person or a vehicle without suspicion if the police are operating in a designated area 
under special authorisation from a senior police officer.
The Section 44 power may only be used for the purpose of searching for articles of a 
kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, but there is no need for the 
officer who conducts the search to have grounds to suspect the presence of such 
articles. It is an offence to fail to stop (or to stop a vehicle) when required to by an 
officer exercising powers under Section 44. Such an offence carries a maximum 
penalty of 6 months imprisonment. The Home Secretary must be notified if a senior 
police officer grants an authorization under Section 44 for more than 48 hours. 
Following Home Secretary approval, it can remain in place for up to 28 days. There 
is widespread criticism of this particular police power, and a dominant political and 
public perception that police officers exercise the power to stop and search in a 
discriminatory manner, and disproportionately target members of minority ethnic 
communities (Guardian: 2 June, 2010). More recently, Lord Carlile, QC (2006: 28), 
in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, referenced the 
use of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act and stated that, ‘it could be used less and [I] 
expect it to be used less’. Lord Carlile’s observations are indicative of widespread 
concerns regarding the normalisation of special police powers, and the occurrence of 
incidents such as those noted below have been used as evidence to indicate a gradual 
creep of security policing into the policing of routine crime and disorder.
Public Order Powers
The introduction of the policy of police primacy in Northern Ireland (1975-1980), and 
consequential subordination of the army saw the creation of a number of specialist 
police units to deal with both maintaining public order and combating terrorism 
(DMSUs). Although policing tactics have changed since the ‘Troubles’, some of the 
same criticisms have been levelled at contemporary methods of policing public order. 
The more recent counter terrorism Acts (and those associated with counter terrorism) 
have imposed serious limitations on the public’s right to protest and partake in 
demonstrations. The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Section 132) 
made it an offence to organise, take part in or carry on a demonstration in a public 
place in a designated area unless authorisation has been sought and obtained in
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advance of the event. The Act effectively banned demonstrations from taking place in 
Parliament Square, London without prior police approval. To organise a 
demonstration without notice carries a maximum sentence of 51 weeks imprisonment 
and/or a fine. The controversy over the policing of protests continues to grow in the 
UK, and the recent furore surrounding events at the G20 protests in London in 2009 
and the controversial use of the police tactic of containment or ‘kettling’17 as it is 
more commonly known ensures that the policing of public order is once again under 
scrutiny.
It can be argued that in some instances the legitimate right to demonstrate and to 
protest, which has traditionally been viewed by some as threats to public order, are 
increasingly re-conceptualised as threats to security. This in turn -  if one subscribes 
to the securitisation thesis as applied to policing -  justifies extraordinary, emergency 
powers of executive action with which normal standards of due process and 
democratic oversight can be dispensed. The counter terrorism legislation introduced 
in Northern Ireland and the UK from 1974 to the present day serve as exemplars of 
the concept of ‘decision’ as defined within this thesis18. The special powers granted 
to the Criminal Justice System generally, and the police more specifically are 
irrefutable methods of policy enforcement which in turn necessitate compliance from 
the public. Moreover, the suppositions made about the securitisation of policing do 
appear to be borne out in light of the significant expansion of police powers under 
successive legislative decisions made in the realm of counter terrorism.
Ultimately it is important to balance the use of special powers with the specific risks 
posed by terrorist activity, and to ascertain whether the nature of the crime 
necessitates proportional special laws to assist prevention, disruption and detection. 
However, debates concerning the extent to which special powers have become 
normalised within everyday policing have endured since the political violence in 
Northern Ireland. It can be argued that they take on renewed pertinence as British 
policing confronts the myriad issues associated with the changing nature of the
17 This police tactic is used as a crowd control measure and consists of cordoning off or temporarily 
restricting exit from a designated area.
http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2010/201Q10UNKTP01.pdf
18 See Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of the analytical distinctions made between policy 
‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ in this thesis.
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terrorist threat. The reaction to the State’s role in countering terrorism is often mixed 
as due consideration should be given to the preservation of human rights, and the 
more pragmatic issue of neutralising the threat. It is widely argued that the ‘legal 
response to the outbreak of terrorist activity should be limited to measures that will 
enable the security services and the police to intervene to prevent terrorist attacks and 
to bring criminal charges against those involved with as few derogations from 
ordinary criminal procedures as possible’ (Hadden as cited in Carlile Lecture, 
2007:10).
Lord Carlile (2007: 13), states that ‘authorities should always treat suspects within the 
normal rather than special criminal laws unless their threat and structure operationally 
requires that they should be regarded formally as terrorists’. He goes on to highlight 
the importance of exercising discretion ‘to prosecute or use special powers available 
only against suspected terrorists’ (2007: 19). This is particularly salient as it is 
possible that non-terrorist activities could fall within the definition of terrorism 
currently in operation. The use of any such powers requires significant discretion and 
strict accountability frameworks to be put in place. As such there are a number of 
serious offences, including under the Terrorism Act 2000, which require the consent 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) before a prosecution may take place.
2.3 The Securitisation of UK Policing: A Wider Perspective
There is relatively little empirical research that examines specifically the impact of 
securitisation within the context of contemporary policing in the UK beyond the 
development and application of special powers. However, it is argued that the 
enduring debate regarding police governance in England and Wales serves as a useful 
site for exploring notions of securitisation within routine policing. This section 
references a number of recent analyses of police governance in England and Wales 
and in particular, focuses on the emergence of ‘new localism’ within a broader 
framework of centralisation.
King and Sharp (2006) focus on the changing police environment in England and 
Wales to illustrate the ways in which security concerns are challenging and extending 
definitions of the proper role of the police and other agencies in public security. They
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identify four possible drivers of securitisation within UK policing; the growing police 
role of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS); the ‘security’ road to the 
development of SOCA; government moves towards force amalgamation, and a return 
to local policing but with central direction. These findings draw heavily on European 
notions of security and securitisation as outlined in the previous section, particularly 
in relation to the last two observations regarding shifts in the independence of police 
forces (Walker, 2000; DeFlem, 2002). It is the final two ‘exemplars’ of securitisation 
that resonate most saliently within this research.
King and Sharp (2006: 387) argue that a series of legislative and policy shifts over the 
past fifteen years have ensured a discernible ‘move from local decision-making to a 
centrally proscribed agenda’ which sees all forces required to produce an annual force 
plan that must incorporate the national policing plan formulated by the Home 
Secretary alongside the local police priorities. The suggestion here is that local 
concerns have gradually been replaced by national priorities determined against an 
increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda. King and Sharp (2006) 
highlight the introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) in the UK as a 
pivotal step in recent police policy reform. The NIM classified policing into three 
distinct levels19 which in turn enabled police forces to prioritise and manage their 
activities more effectively (Tregidga, 2003).
In recent years there have been official concerns raised as to the ability of some forces 
in England and Wales to adequately deal with Level 2 crime issues. This issue is 
commonly termed the Level 2 ‘gap’ (HMIC, 2005). In 2005 the Home Office 
commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to review the 
current structure and organisation of the police forces in England and Wales. The 
report by former Chief Constable Denis O’Connor and entitled Closing the Gap 
(HMIC, 2005: 6) identified a changing policing environment characterised by 
‘widespread enterprising organised criminality, proliferating international terrorism 
and domestic extremism; a premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of 
capacity; and an increasingly risk concerned public’. The O’Connor report
19 Level 1 -  policing within Basic Command Unit (BCU) boundaries; Level 2 -  policing across BCU 
and often force boundaries; Level 3 -  policing of national and often international serious and organised 
crime issues.
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recommended a change to the current structure of policing in light of the examination 
of the ‘capacity’ and ‘capability’ of individual forces to adequately deliver protective 
services20. One of the reform proposals was the amalgamation of police forces 
(Tregidga, 2005).
Although, these fundamental police reform proposals were eventually shelved, it is 
clear that successive legislation and government policies have been implemented that 
reflect a long term, strategic trend towards centralisation of the organisation of 
policing in England and Wales. All of the police forces currently existing in England 
and Wales (with the exception of the City of London) have been subject to 
amalgamations and border change over the years. Some took place following the 
Police Acts of 1946 and 1964, and in 1974 the Home Office then consolidated the 
existing forces into 41 area forces. These, with the addition of the City of London and 
the Metropolitan Police make up the 43 Home Office forces currently in operation 
today (Mawby and Wright, 2008). It must also be noted that the debate as to whether 
there should be further force amalgamations has been ongoing for a number of years. 
In 2003 it was argued that there was a need for enhanced performance, and 
adjustment to the challenges of 21st Century criminality and a case was put forward 
for options such as a national police force with regional commanders, and the creation 
of between 10 and 25 ‘super forces’ (Hancock, 2003). Jones (2008) provides further 
examples of the growing moves towards central control. The Police and Magistrates 
Act 1994 allowed the Home Office to set national policing objectives, and the Police 
Reform Act 2002 extends these powers through the creation of a National Policing 
Plan (Jones, 2008). Jones indicates that an expansion of central control has occurred 
alongside an increase in the importance and frequency of the inspection process -  in 
which the HMIC undoubtedly plays an integral role -  and a reduction in the influence 
of local police authorities.
However the establishment of the national Association of Police Authorities (APA) 
and the creation of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs)21 
indicates that there is still at least the potential for local police authorities and
20 Protective Services are placed into seven discrete categories -  one of which is defined as counter 
terrorism and domestic extremism.
21 These are termed Community Safety Partnerships in Wales.
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agencies to provide active input into policy making (Jones, 2008). McLaughlin 
(2007) discusses the ‘new localism’ that has emerged within the broader framework 
of centralisation in England and Wales. McLaughlin (2007: 189) suggests that a 
decade of centrally-imposed managerial reforms had in effect closed off the policy­
making process to locally expressed policing priorities and references a series of 
speeches made by Home Office Ministers in which it is recognised that ‘effective 
solutions to crime and disorder must be made locally’ and that effective local policing 
is now viewed as ‘central to the success or failure of the cross-governmental 
initiatives on neighbourhood regeneration, civil renewal...community cohesion and 
combating violent extremism’. This is further emphasised in the citizen engagement 
agenda pursued by the previous New Labour administration (Casey, 2008), including 
the major reform associated with ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ (2007a), and in the 
Coalition Government’s proposals for ‘Policing in the 21st Century’ (Home Office, 
2010) 12.
Although policing in England and Wales has managed to retain, at least in part, a 
decentralised, local structure, it is clear that tensions remain between local and central 
control of policing. The current situation is widely seen as a compromise with large 
regionally organised forces alongside a series of national police organisations23 that 
are intended to provide both national and international capabilities. The majority of 
these services were established by the Police Act 1997 (Jones, 2008). However recent 
developments such as the enhanced terrorist threat since 7 July 2005 and the Soham 
murders in 2002 have brought this structure into question, in particular the capability 
of small forces to deal with major incidents and provide sustained counter terrorist 
capability. King and Sharp (2006: 387-388) corroborate these observations by stating 
that the post-11 September 2001 security landscape has simply intensified already 
existing processes that reflect a move from local decision-making to a centrally 
prescribed agenda. However, it is pertinent to note that, in line with the work of 
securitisation theorists within Europe, King and Sharp’s (2006) pronouncements are 
generated through the discourse-analytic study of policy text. The methodological
22 At the time of writing the Coalition Government had put forward proposals for locally-oriented and 
accountable Police and Crime Commissioners which if successful will impact significantly on the 
organisation of policing.
23 These include the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the National Crime Squad (NCS), 
and SOCA (Serious and Organised Crime Agency)
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focus of such research does not allow for an empirical interrogation of the impact of 
securitisation on routine police practice.
The final section of this chapter reviews work that examines the impact of recent 
policing policy developments on community policing, both within the UK and across 
Europe. The review focuses on the ways in which neighbourhood policing and 
community safety partnerships are increasingly seen as central to the delivery and 
maintenance of security at the local level.
2.4 The Securitisation of Routine Police Practice: An Empirical Lacuna
There is a discernible lack of empirical work that focuses on the impact of security 
discourse and policies at the local frontline of crime control. There is even less 
evidence of research that investigates the potential impact by shifting the empirical 
focus away from the discourse-analytic study of policy talk and text, to an 
examination of tangible changes to local, operational practice. However, there is an 
important body of work that focuses on the impact of recent discursive and policy 
shifts in the nature of crime control, disorder and insecurity at the community level. 
This work focuses on the increasing convergence of policing and partnership work, 
and in particular the rise and impact of community safety partnerships (Hughes and 
Rowe, 2007), and the increased emphasis placed on the use of community intelligence 
in the policing of insecurity (Innes, 2006; Innes et al, 2009). The issues raised within 
the UK also resonate within an international, and specifically a European context. 
Virta (2008) observes the use of intelligence-led approaches to community policing in 
Finland and Terpstra (2008) notes the emergence of local security networks in The 
Netherlands. Such work highlights the importance of ‘community’, and in particular, 
the gradual reformulation of the notion of community policing and community safety 
in light of heightened concerns around issues of both national and personal security.
In recent years there has been considerable international focus on the effectiveness of 
community-based policing. As Clarke (2006:15) states, ‘community policing can be 
seen as a central vehicle for the development of future operational and strategic 
policing initiatives’. The current research indicates that this is indeed the case within 
a security policy context. In the UK there has been increased political emphasis
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placed on the value of community policing, and the Government’s recent 
Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NPP) (2007a) is an integral facet of the long 
term plan to reform the police service. The policy paper Building Communities, 
Beating Crime (2004a) originally set out the plans for a new neighbourhood policing 
fund to support the development of dedicated neighbourhood teams across the 
country. This paper reflected a discemable attempt by the Government to bring the 
police and partner agencies closer to communities. The policy emphasised the need 
for dedicated, visible neighbourhood police teams, and advocated a ‘citizen focus’ 
which allows for residents to have a say in identifying local problems and setting local 
policing priorities. The overriding aim was to enhance community engagement with 
the police by increasing visibility and contact and by seeking to involve residents in 
policy decisions. Ultimately residents are seen as ‘customers’ or ‘consumers of police 
services’ and the White Paper emphasises the need to increase public satisfaction and 
police responsiveness and accountability. The Government’s plan to ‘revitalise 
neighbourhood and community policing for the 21st Century’ (2004b: 4) is one of a 
number of initiatives that have emerged in the UK over the last few years in response 
to issues such as fear of crime, anti-social behaviour and ‘a lack of trust or 
engagement with the police and other community-based agencies (Tilley, 2008: 311).
The Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NPP) (2006-2008) represents a highly 
localised policing system in which local people are given the opportunity to vote on 
their priorities for police action. In many ways this process amounts to constructing a 
knowledge base about the drivers of insecurity in the neighbourhoods where officers 
are working and providing the opportunity for local people to democratically 
influence how they are policed. This policy marks a significant departure from the 
traditional (tripartite) modes of police governance in the UK and -  in theoiy at least -  
moves the mechanisms of accountability far closer to the public. In this way the NPP 
represents the emergence of a ‘new localism’ within the broader framework of 
centralisation (McLaughlin, 2007). Moreover, further research in this area highlights 
the increasing ‘bifurcation’ between centralised national policing units dealing with 
serious crime, cross border issues (including terrorism) and local policing partnerships 
dealing with volume crime and disorder (Savage, 2007). Alongside the NPP (2006), 
the Home Office implemented the Crime and Disorder Partnership Reform 
Programme (2007b). The two reform programmes brought together the two agencies
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that remain at the forefront of community safety: the police and local authorities. 
There is now a very developed body of literature on policing and community safety in 
England and Wales (see for example, Hughes and Edwards, 2002) and within an 
international context (Crawford, 2009).
Hughes and Rowe (200724) examine the impact of NPP (2007a) and the Crime and 
Disorder Partnership Reform Programme (2007b), and in particular the consequential 
relationship between Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) and routine policing. 
Hughes and Rowe (2007: 325) note that it is ‘increasingly common practice to have 
police officers seconded to work with local authority community safety 
teams...reflecting the duopoly of the local authority and the police in almost all 
CDRPs’. Hughes and Rowe (2007: 325) carried out interviews with CSP actors and 
textual analysis of relevant policy documents to explore the potential outcomes of the 
‘new liaisons resulting from local public policing meeting multi-agency community 
safety partnership processes’. Their research indicates a possible disjuncture between 
programme implementation and actual delivery at the local level. It highlights a 
number of reasons for this including the local political circumstances that characterise 
individual community areas and the pressure to meet national minimum standards. 
Such research resonates within the current study and contributes to pertinent debates 
regarding the extent to which partnerships are conduits for processes of social control, 
such as securitisation and responsibilisation, or whether they are sites of power 
dependence and political competition about what constitutes secure, safer 
communities and how security can be accomplished.
The themes and issues highlighted in UK-based research resonate within an 
international, and specifically a European context. Virta (2002; 2008) examines the 
impact of recent EU security policy developments on community policing in Finland. 
Virta (2008) argues that a number of recent developments at the local community 
level have been motivated by an obligation to serve higher policing purposes and 
national security. Virta (2002; 2008) suggests that community policing has become 
an effective tool for national security and certainly vital for local, neighbourhood 
counter terrorism. She supports this assertion through reference to two main
24 This research article forms part of a Special Issue of Criminology and Criminal Justice on Policing 
Diversity /Policing Communities (2007).
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developments. Firstly, the increased use of intelligence-led, policing strategies within 
routine activity such as the collection and application of community intelligence, and 
secondly, the development of local safety planning networks.
Virta’s (2002) qualitative assessment of the implementation of community policing in 
Finland is based on documentary analysis and interviews with senior police officials 
in charge of implementation. The research (2002: 194) examines the implementation 
of community policing at the operational level and although a number of changes to 
operational strategies and tactics were identified so too were a number of challenges 
to effective policy delivery. These include ‘the lack of crime prevention measures’ 
and ‘few efforts at organisational reforms (decentralisation)’. However Virta (2002: 
195) notes a shift in the systematic, strategic approach to local policing, and in 
particular the development of ‘local security networks’. The developments identified 
by Virta (2002) in Finland reflect the community safety arrangements both in the UK 
and in other European countries (see Terpstra, 2008). Virta (2002: 196) examines the 
construction of the local security networks in Tampere and observes the efforts for 
individuals and agencies to ‘identify themselves as actors in the security field’ and the 
process of negotiation that takes places in terms of establishing security priorities and 
resolutions.
Virta’s later work (2008) more explicitly draws on the securitisation thesis as 
advocated by theorists such as Waever (1996); Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). 
Virta (2008) depicts an EU security landscape characterised by a reconfiguring of the 
concepts of internal/external security; the development of a security continuum, and a 
growing preoccupation with countering terrorism and combating radicalisation and 
recruitment. She identifies a number of exemplars of the securitisation process at the 
local community level, the foremost of which is the integration of national security 
concerns within local policing and community safety frameworks and processes. 
Virta (2008: 37) discusses the increased application of intelligence-led strategies 
within the community policing context, and in particular the emphasis placed on 
‘community intelligence’. It is suggested that more effective use of information and 
intelligence may lead to more effective prevention and better results in crime 
reduction. However, Virta (2008: 36) asserts that such a development is contingent 
on two main factors. The first is that the whole intelligence management process
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needs to be well organised and functioning effectively so that street level information 
and intelligence is assimilated into the production of intelligence products for the 
police and the wider community safety partnership network. The second factor is 
that there needs to be a re-assessment of the imperatives associated with security 
intelligence, and in particular a move away from ‘secrecy’ towards ‘openness and 
transparency’ in order to foster trust and confidence within communities. This is 
especially important within the context of preventing radicalisation and recruitment 
and links into the need for clear and coherent democratic accountability structures.
The debates about the security implications of CSPs also resonate within work that 
has been carried out on local security networks in The Netherlands (Terpstra, 2008). 
Such work supports King and Sharp’s (2006: 213) assertions that there has been a 
gradual shift ‘from government to governance in the control of crime, disorder and 
insecurity’. According to Terpstra (2008) this has resulted, at the local level, in the 
growth of multi-agency networks. The work of Garland (2001; 1996) and his 
observations on the relationship between increased concerns about crime and 
insecurity and the public’s expectations of politicians and the criminal justice system 
resonate throughout Terpstra’s work. Terpstra (2008) highlights many of the 
strategic, ‘adaptive’ responses undertaken by governments and criminal justice 
agencies in order to counter the perceived erosion of States’ sovereign power. 
Terpstra (2008) emphasises the strategy o f ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996). This 
strategy attempts to promote the involvement of other agencies in the prevention and 
control of crime and insecurity. Terpstra suggests that this shift from ‘government to 
governance’ is accompanied by a new discourse that focuses around the concepts of 
community, prevention and partnerships. Terpstra argues that such discursive shifts 
have manifested themselves in tangible changes to practice at the local level in the 
form of the construction of local security networks (LSNs). One of the inherent 
challenges to the development of the local security networks is the often conflicted 
nature of the police role within communities. Terpstra (2008: 223) highlights the 
competing demands placed on the police and in particular their attempts to cooperate 
with the other agencies in the networks whilst simultaneously concentrating on their 
‘core business’ and thus the need to retreat from active participation in the networks.
25 See Chapter Seven for a more extended discussion of Garland’s work.
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However, in line with the previously referenced work on the changing nature of local 
police and partnership activity such observations are not generated through the 
empirical interrogation of action and practice on the frontline.
In addition to the research on CSPs there are clear examples of empirical 
investigations of the impact of security discourse and decisions on police practice in 
the UK. Innes (2006) outlines how counter terrorism strategies and practices in the 
UK have changed in light of recent terrorist events, and explores empirically the 
relative merits of enhancing the role of community policing, and in particular 
community intelligence within existing approaches to counter terrorism. Innes (2006: 
2) suggests that ‘terrorist events can embody both a symbolic and signalling logic 
whereby the violence is directed towards a symbol of social or cultural order and the 
impact of the violence has a direct impact on the ways in which citizens think, feel or 
act in relation to security’. However, Innes also suggests that recent terrorist events 
have had an additional effect relating to concerns as to whether existing 
methodologies for generating intelligence associated with terrorism are suitable in 
light of the risk posed by the contemporary nature of the threat. It is suggested that 
one way to counter this operational uncertainty is to integrate a system of 
neighbourhood policing into the counter terrorism apparatus. Innes (2006) argues that 
such a move would enhance the levels of trust that is often required between police 
and local communities to facilitate the communication of relevant information. This 
in turn has the potential to prove less damaging to democratic institutions than the 
systematic expansion of covert policing strategies through reactionary legislation.
Innes (2006: 3) presents an ‘empirically grounded exploration of some innovative 
police approaches that relate to counter terrorism activity’, and in particular the 
collection and handling of community intelligence. The analysis is informed by 
interviews with police officers involved in intelligence and counter terrorism work in 
three UK police forces -  at both central and local levels. According to Innes (2006) 
all agencies across the policing and security sector make use of intelligence, although 
they define, understand and use it in a variety of ways according to their 
organisational imperatives and concerns. However, community intelligence is 
different in a number of ways when compared to more traditional kinds of crime and 
criminal intelligence. It tends to be open-source rather than acquired from covert
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human sources and is often provided by ordinary members of the public rather than 
those who have connections with criminal activity. Furthermore, whereas criminal 
intelligence tends to target particular individuals, and crime intelligence particular 
incident types, community intelligence covers a range of issues, frequently being used 
by police to build a picture of the contextual risks that a particular community group 
feels concerned about. Indeed, in some ways Innes’ work reinforces the importance 
of ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ as outlined by securitisation theorists such as Waever 
(1996) and Huysmans (2000). These theorists highlighted both as potential ‘referent 
objects’ of security within the securitisation process. Innes’ (2006) research reveals 
that community intelligence can be used to facilitate a better understanding of the 
increasing complexities of collective identity and the intricacies of community 
relations. Thus, according to Innes (2006: 9) community intelligence applied to 
counter terrorism is precisely the type of data that might help police to ‘circumvent 
the intelligence gaps and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established 
methods’. The current research explores both the nature and role of community 
intelligence within the routine practices inherent to the case study police force.
More recently, Innes et al (2009: 102) have examined empirically the benefits of 
community-generated intelligence by adopting an ‘innovative community engagement 
methodology designed to provide police with a rich community intelligence picture of 
the drivers of insecurity in neighbourhoods’. A face to face interview schedule was 
designed to capture information and knowledge about local events, together with 
information on the dynamics of social reaction to the events. The interviews were 
originally conducted by academic researchers but the process was subsequently re­
developed into a computer-assisted personal interviewing software program (CAPI) 
which enabled police staff to carry out the interviews. The Signal Crimes Perspective 
(2004) provides the theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which 
certain incidents tend to initiate changes in how people think or act in relation to their 
individual or collective security. It is interesting to note that in one research setting 
the most important ‘signal’ events revolved around anti-social behaviour and 
incidents traditionally identified as council issues. According to Innes et al (2009), 
the methodological approach has the potential to yield a rich community intelligence 
picture that can be used by officers to better understand the multi-faceted nature of the 
neighbourhoods they police. It is an approach -  operating at the level of practice -
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through which police organisations can better direct their routine activities in ways 
that are more likely to meet the needs of the communities and neighbourhoods they 
police. It addresses the perceived, antithetical nature of the relationship between 
intelligence-led policing and community policing. It seeks to establish a synthesis 
between the two policing paradigms through the construction of what Innes et al 
(2009: 113) term ‘community intelligence-led policing’. Such research argues that 
the creation of such ‘conceptual bridges’ is an effective response to an increasingly 
prevalent and pervasive sense of insecurity that has come to function as one of the 
defining social problems of our age.
2.5 Conclusion
Ultimately, Mythen and Walklate (2005: 380) observe that little coherent attention has 
been paid to the question of terrorism and moreover, highlight the absence of 
‘empirical precision’ in the research that has been carried out thus far. This review of 
existing -  and limited -  literature corroborates both points. There is a lack of 
empirical research that interrogates suppositions about the securitisation of policing 
by examining tangible changes to routine practice on the ground. Furthermore, the 
work that has been done focuses predominantly on the discourse-analytic study of text 
which precludes an empirical interrogation of the impact of the securitisation process 
on the action of everyday police routines. However, the review of literature that 
examines the relationship between security, policing and community safety highlights 
a number of themes and issues that are pertinent to the current research. In particular, 
the debates around police governance resonate within both the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks that underpin this research study. For example, insofar 
as localisation as well as centralisation can be used as a conduit for securitisation, to 
what extent does either tendency help us understand the actual content of police 
practice? To this extent, the notion of ‘routine’ is more helpful as it shifts analytical 
attention to the actual substance of policing. This also implies a research strategy that 
can access this substance. Moreover, it is important to note the impact of CSPs on 
routine policing, and in particular the strategic assessments undertaken by CSPs 
which are important drivers of routine policing26. This research examines the
26 This is suggested by the Quantitative Content Analysis of the Fortnightly Tasking Meetings and 
Action Plans of the case study force which are discussed in Chapters Four to Six.
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prevalence and pertinence of such issues in the examination of the ways in which the 
case study force as security ‘actor’ negotiates social, political and cultural pressures in 
the quest for community security and safety.
Nevertheless, the current research argues that securitisation theorists’ propensity to 
focus predominantly on the discourse-analytic study of text which, precludes an 
empirical interrogation of the impact of the securitisation process on the action of 
everyday police routines, generates a number of implications. In particular, there is a 
tendency to impute or infer changes to practice from policy rhetoric and exhortation. 
It is argued that this has fundamental implications for theoretical suppositions 
regarding the increasingly securitised nature of routine policing. Notwithstanding the 
work of Innes et al (2009) and Virta (2002) much of the research on the securitisation 
of policing leaves a series of questions to address. Such work suggests that an 
increased preoccupation with security and safety in light of recent socio-political 
shifts and terrorist attacks has had a profound impact on routine policing. Yet, where 
is the empirical evidence to support propositions about concrete shifts in policing 
practice? Where is the empirical data to indicate how far new policies have been 
implemented and the extent to which they have become embedded in routine activity? 
The current research seeks to address the empirical ‘gap’ and examine these questions 
by reversing the research focus from a concern with policy elites and the textual 
footprints of their talk and decisions to a concern with the impact on the organisations 
primarily tasked with implementing and delivering the policy responses on the 
ground.
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Chapter Three: Operationalising a Critical Test
3.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of the methodological 
approach that was used to carry out the critical analysis of the securitisation thesis 
within the context of routine policing. The research design and the methodological 
approach to data generation are guided by specific research questions that derive from 
existing theoretical assertions, namely that routine policing is becoming increasingly 
securitised. The research study takes the form of a ‘critical test’ of the securitisation 
thesis within the context of routine policing. However, the theory-research 
relationship that underpins this study is considered to be adaptive rather than 
deductive in nature. A fundamental issue for this research is how to operationalise a 
critical examination of a grand theoretical narrative such as the securitisation thesis 
within the context of a research setting such as routine policing. The main research 
question that drives this thesis is:
To what extent is routine policing becoming increasingly securitised?
However, it was necessary to devise an analytical framework within which to 
operationalise this question for the purposes of empirical enquiry. This research 
draws on Christopher Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework of policy convergence 
within the arena of public administration, and the three ‘levels’ that according to him 
are inherent to policy-making and implementation -  ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. 
The analytical framework devised for this research study facilitates the re-formulation 
of the above research question into an operational question, which in turn can be used 
to adapt arguments that routine policing is being securitised. Thus the main research 
question is operationalised as:
To what extent does security ‘talk and ‘decisions ’ made within the arena o f counter 
terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action ’ on the ground in the form of tangible 
changes to local policing practice?
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The propositions of the securitisation thesis in relation to routine policing are 
examined through a case study of the extent and nature of 'securitisation' in one 
British police force area, including an exploration of the factors that shape routine 
policing. Qualitative methodologies are used to explore the nature and extent of
securitisation within the context of counter terrorism policing, and quantitative 
methods are employed to construct an empirical measure of ‘routine’ policing. The 
chapter is structured around four key methodological aspects of the research design:
i) The analytical framework that underpins the research;
ii) The use of a UK police force as a single-embedded case study of routine 
policing in practice;
iii) The methodological strategies employed to generate the data, and 
particularly those used to generate an empirical measure of routine 
policing,
iv) The access issues and ethical considerations inherent to researching within 
a challenging research setting such as operational policing.
3.1 An Overview of the Research Strategy
The empirical research within this thesis is theoretically-driven rather than inductive. 
However, the overarching research strategy is considered to be adaptive rather than 
deductive in nature. The study takes the form of a critical test of the securitisation 
thesis within the context of routine policing. However, the research design facilitates 
the opportunity to move beyond the corroboration and/or falsification of the 
securitisation thesis in relation to empirical findings about actual police routines and 
practices. The analytical framework, which draws on Pollitt’s (2001) propositions 
about the policy process and the implementation gaps between talk, decisions and 
actions to generate these empirical findings enables the adaptation (Layder, 1998) of 
the securitisation thesis, in order to build theory about:
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a) Securitisation;
b) Routine policing,
c) The relationship between securitisation and routine practice.
The securitisation thesis constructs a rather homogenised narrative of security which 
takes insufficient account of resistance. Securitisation can thus appear to be presented 
as an external fact that is beyond the reach or influence of its target audience; that 
which is subject to the process of securitisation. However, the research design of this 
study is structured around a mixed-methodological approach to data generation. This 
in turn impacts upon the epistemological and ontological assumptions that underpin 
the study. This research study draws upon critical realist approaches to understanding 
the social world. It is argued that there is a reality of routine policing that is separate 
from officers’ description of it; the reality of what officers ‘do’ differs from what they 
‘say’ they do. It is proposed that routine policing can only be truly understood by 
empirically examining the structures and practices that inform it. It is only at this 
point that we can begin to generate an assessment of the extent to which it is, or can 
be ‘securitised’. Therefore, it is also argued that there is an objective reality to routine 
policing that can be measured through the quantitative content analysis of operational 
documents. It is acknowledged that the conceptual distinctions that inform the 
analytical framework of the thesis, and the methodological choice to content analyse 
police documents in order to formulate an empirical measure of routine policing will 
be subject to critical enquiry. It is further acknowledged that this research design and 
the methodological strategies employed within it are but one way in which to generate 
an understanding of concepts such as securitisation and routine policing. However, 
these methods are employed -  and indeed innovated -  in order to advance the 
empirical debates surrounding the relationship between securitisation and routine 
policing.
3.2. A Case Study Approach to Empirical Enquiry
The overarching aim of this research is to analyse empirically the extent to which 
policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ within the arena of counter terrorism translates into action 
in the form of tangible changes to routine police practice. The research explores the 
nature and impact of policy talk and decisions across three analytically distinct
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security settings -  the EU, the UK and one police force in England and Wales. 
However, it is the mid-size police force that serves as a single, embedded case study 
of ‘action’ in the form of routine police practice. A number of different types of case 
study have been identified; these include the unique or extreme case; the ‘typical’ 
case and the longitudinal case study (Yin, 2009). The current research exemplifies 
the ‘critical’ case as it comprises an identifiable theoretical framework and the case is 
chosen on the grounds that it can be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions 
are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant in 
the circumstances. This, in turn, facilitates the opportunity to both provide a critical 
test of the existing theoretical suppositions that underpin the securitisation thesis, and 
expand and develop the theoretical framework if appropriate. A number of design 
principles should be addressed when conducting case study research, namely, how 
well do the data support or challenge the theoretical arguments put forward, and is the 
theoretical analysis incisive? In short, does the theoretical analysis demonstrate 
connections between different conceptual ideas that are developing out of the data?
This study implements a single, embedded case study design and draws on Robert 
Yin’s (2009) case study work and the five core components he identifies as integral to 
this type of research. These include i) the study’s questions; ii) the study’s 
propositions; iii) the study’s unit(s) of analysis; iv) the logic linking the data to the 
propositions, and v) the criteria for interpreting the findings (2009: 27).
3.2.1 The study's questions
According to Yin (2009), it is important to classify the type of research question being 
asked, and he indicates that what and how questions are best suited to case study 
research. Such an observation is reflected in the main research questions of this study 
which support the aim of the thesis; namely to analyse critically the theoretical 
supposition that policing is becoming increasingly securitised at the local level. The 
main research question that underpins this thesis is:
To what extent is routine policing becoming increasingly securitised?
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The analytical framework devised for this research study facilitates the re-formulation 
of this question. The main research question is operationalised as:
To what extent does security ‘talk and ‘decisions ’ made within the arena of counter 
terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action ’ on the ground in the form of tangible 
changes to local policing practice?
By re-formulating the main research question it was also possible to address 
additional empirical and theoretical questions such as:
■ How has the securitisation thesis been applied to policing to date, and what 
distinctions have been drawn between routine and securitised policing?
■ What are some of the challenges facing the implementation and delivery of 
national counter terrorism policies and strategies at the local policing level?
■ What are the implications of policy implementation and delivery ‘gaps’ for 
conceptualising policing change in terms of securitisation?
3.2.2 The Study’s Propositions: Applying Pollitt’s (2001) Conceptual Framework
It is argued that a study’s propositions direct the researcher towards something that 
should be examined within the research (Yin, 2009: 28). Moreover, it is argued that a 
critical case study is closely associated with testing pre-existing theoretical 
propositions rather than the construction of original propositions for the purpose of 
research. This research study is concerned with testing the existing theoretical 
proposition that routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised within the 
context of European and UK counter terrorism policy. The research design facilitates 
the critical ‘test’ of this proposition. Moreover, the analytical framework embodies 
the adaptive nature of the relationship between theory and research throughout this 
thesis. The analytical framework draws on Pollitt’s (2001) propositions about the 
policy process and the implementation gaps between talk, decisions and actions in 
order to a) falsify and/or corroborate the proposition that routine policing is being 
securitised, and b) to adapt such theoretical propositions in light of empirical findings 
regarding the nuanced relationship between securitisation and routine practice. In 
short the analytical framework facilitates the ability to:
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■ Establish a conceptual interpretation of counter terrorism policy ‘talk’, 
‘decision’ and ‘action’;
■ Identify the presence of each analytically distinct concept within the three 
security sites;
■ Analyse the impact of each policy component on the nature of routine 
policing;
■ Examine the challenges facing the implementation of national policing 
policies and strategies at the local level’,
■ Assess the implications of policy implementation gaps for conceptualising 
policing change in terms of securitisation.
This section now goes on to detail the core components of the analytical framework 
that underpins this thesis and highlights the importance of separating out analytically- 
distinct levels of policy for the purpose of empirical investigations into the 
relationship between securitisation and routine policing.
Political scientists have conducted a considerable amount of research in the area of 
public policy-making, and the focus of such work includes, but is not limited to, the 
provision of a general theory of public policy-making (Kingdon, 1995), and the 
uncertainties of the public policy-making process (Stone, 1988). However, little 
research has focused on crime control policy, and certainly even less on security and 
policing policy, specifically in relation to terrorism. Moreover, it is clear that there is 
a lack of empirical research that examines the outcomes of policies once they have 
been operationalised ‘on the ground’. Jones and Newbum (2007: 23) highlight the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of public policy-making by stating that it is 
important to distinguish between different levels of policy, and in particular to draw 
distinctions between policy process and policy substance in order to examine a range 
of different levels ‘ranging from the more symbolic elements such as ideas and 
rhetoric on the one hand to the more concrete manifestations such as policy 
instruments and practices on the other’. An examination of previous research into 
policy formation and policy implementation reveals a tendency to focus on the more 
concrete manifestations of policy in the form of policy statements, legislation and 
regulations. This is perhaps in part because such manifestations of policy are seen to
capture the ‘actual choices of government’ (Bernstein and Cashore, 2000: 70). Jones 
and Newbum (2007) make a number of points that are pertinent to this thesis, 
particularly in relation to notions of policy convergence and transfer. They argue that 
domestic policy making is increasingly open to the influence of institutions, economic 
forces and political/sociological issues operating beyond the borders of nation states. 
This observation resonates within this research due to the empirical focus on three 
conceptually distinct geo-political security spaces -  the EU, the UK and the case 
study police force at the centre of the investigation.
However, this research draws on Christopher Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework 
of policy convergence within the arena of public administration, and the three levels 
that according to him, are inherent to policy-making and implementation -  talk, 
decision and action. Pollitt suggests that in order to make sense of the complexities of 
the public policy-making process it is important to consider and separate out the 
analytically distinct levels of ‘talk’ identified as policy rhetoric and symbolism; 
‘decisions’ in the form of written policy statements, specific legislation and national 
programmes, and ‘action’ conceptualised as policy implementation ‘on the ground’. 
Pollitt (2001) argues that each of the three policy categories is important in its own 
right, and requires separate analysis, although he acknowledges that studies of reform 
talk, as distinct from decision and action, are limited. This observation is 
corroborated in Chapter Two of this thesis which reveals that most of the research 
associated with security policy and policing has focused on the discourse analysis of 
policy talk and decisions. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates the lack of empirical 
work that explores the impact of such securitised talk and decision on routine police 
practice or action. Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework facilitates an appreciation of 
the complexities of public policy making, and more importantly, it provides the 
opportunity to investigate empirically the impact of such talk and decision-making on 
the frontline of operational practice.
Pollitt (2001) argues that, in the realm of public sector management at least, 
convergence has been more visible in the spheres of ‘talk’, and to a certain extent in 
‘decisions’ than in terms of ‘action’ in the form of substantive policy practices or 
outcomes. Moreover, he observes, that in practice, there are often significant gaps 
between these different levels of policy. Pollitt (2001: 934) also notes that ‘a great
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deal of talk can develop around concepts such as New Public Management without 
that signifying an equal amount of action in the same direction’. This observation 
reinforces the work of Brunsson (1989: 231) who suggests that ‘observers of 
organisations are prone to make the mistake of supposing that organisational 
statements and decisions agree with organisational actions’. Both policy theorists 
consider such a divergence between talk, decision and action to be the norm within 
organisational life. However, this point is particularly pertinent within the context of 
policing because the implementation gap is arguably greater than in any other sphere 
of public policy. This is primarily on account of what is known about the institution, 
namely that it is identified as a rational, top down organisation and is characterised by 
significant levels of front-line discretion and an enduring and influential occupational 
culture. Thus, a legitimate hypothesis could be that the distance between ‘talk’ on the 
one hand, and ‘action’ on the other is likely to be greater than in other areas of public 
policy. The analytical framework of this research facilitates both the recognition and 
examination of the extent to which such a proposition resonates within the 
relationship between securitisation and routine policing.
Adapting Pollitt’s Conceptual Distinctions to Counter-Terrorism Policy 
It is clear that many of the observations outlined above resonate strongly within the 
criminal justice policy-making process. This research adopts and expands Pollitt’s 
conceptual distinctions between policy talk, decision and action in order to examine 
the extent to which security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter 
terrorism policy are actually translated into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of 
tangible changes to local policing practice. In general terms policy talk is identified 
as political or policing ideas, symbolism or rhetoric and exhortation; policy decisions 
are understood as concrete manifestations of policy in the form of legislation and/or 
executive agreements and instruments, and policy action is conceptualised as tangible 
changes to routine policing practice.
However, the challenge for this thesis was to find a viable, empirical way to 
operationalise Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework within a complex and multi­
faceted research setting. In particular, it was important to distinguish between talk, 
decision and action in order to establish what is routine about policing and from there 
examine the grounds on which it can be considered ‘securitised’. The research
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identifies a number of exemplars of securitised ‘talk’, decision and ‘action’ within the 
context of counter terrorism policy across three distinct geo-political spaces or 
security ‘sites’ -  the EU, the UK and the case study police Force. Drawing on 
Waever’s (1996: 108) security concepts these three spaces are identified as referent 
objects of security which retain a specific ‘security identity’.
In devising the analytical framework for this thesis it was important to make two sets 
of conceptual distinctions. Firstly, it was important to make a clear and coherent 
distinction between policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’. Secondly, it was vital to link the 
analytical framework with the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis. 
Therefore, it was important to make clear the distinction between these generic 
conceptualisations and ‘securitised’ talk, decision and action. It was particularly 
important to make a coherent distinction between routine police action and 
‘securitised police action’. Ultimately, the analytical framework of this research 
facilitates a nuanced examination of the nature of counter-terrorism policy-making at 
the levels of talk, decision and action, and the inherent challenges to implementation 
and delivery ‘on the ground’.
Distinguishing between Security Policy Talk and Security Policy Decisions 
This research study considers relevant talk (in the form of rhetoric, exhortation or 
symbolic policy) to be securitised -  or at least demonstrate a tendency towards being 
securitised -  if it represents discourse pertaining to an identified existential threat and 
the discussion or debate of the use of extraordinary, emergency measures to counter 
the threat. Within the context of this research the identified existential threat or the 
issue(s) lifted ‘to an ‘urgency and necessity above normal politics’ (Waever, 1996: 
107) -  both within Europe and the UK -  is terrorism and/or radicalisation. Such talk 
can manifest itself within the case study force as verbal or textual reference to the 
changing nature of the terrorist threat, key policy aims and objectives and 
observations on the role of routine policing in countering terrorism and violent 
extremism. Having established a conceptual understanding of policy talk it was 
crucial to construct a coherent, analytical, distinction between policy talk and policy 
decision. In short, it was important to identify the unique elements of a ‘concrete 
policy instrument’ that take it beyond the level of ‘talk’ and into the realm of a 
tangible ‘decision’.
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This thesis proposes that policy ‘talk’ can be distinguished from policy ‘decision’ by 
the presence of tangible mechanisms of enforcement which necessitate some form of 
organisational and/or institutional compliance. Such powers of enforcement might 
be characterised as government legislation, financial incentive for implementation (or 
conversely financial penalty for non-implementation) and/or organisational 
compliance mechanisms. Within the context of this thesis such enforcement 
mechanisms are exemplified by concrete ‘legislative decisions’ in the form of legally- 
bestowed powers for the police; concrete ‘institutional decisions’ characterised by 
compliance mechanisms such as ring-fenced, national funding (with mandatory 
evaluation of implementation progress at the end), or the introduction of new and 
specific frameworks of performance assessment in the area of counter terrorism and 
extremism. An applied distinction between policy talk and decision can be made 
within the context of security policy through reference to the EU’s counter terrorism 
policy framework. Security policies about counter terrorism and radicalisation -  at 
both the international and national level -  incorporate a range of strategies, objectives 
and intervention activities. However, if one applies the analytical framework of this 
thesis to the various programmes and agreements pertaining to counter terrorism and 
radicalisation within an EU context, they remain little more than rhetoric and 
exhortation because they do not have a legally-binding framework for compliance 
attached to them.
They are not ‘decisions’ by virtue of the legal standing of EU level pronouncements 
on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). JHA issues were not formally recognised as an 
area of common interest for Member States until the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ in 1992. 
Moreover, and due in part to Member State interests and associated political 
sensitivities, JHA matters were not brought within the normal decision-making 
process (First Pillar) but were subject to inter-governmental cooperation under the 
Third pillar of the European Union27. The First Pillar is based on the ‘community’ 
method with Member States sharing their sovereignty and working together through 
the EU Institutions. Each EU Institution plays a role in the decision-making process 
whereby the Commission proposes, the Council and Parliament adopt and the Court 
of Justice ensures compliance with Community law. The Second and Third Pillars
27 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated some aspects of JHA into the First Pillar including 
asylum and immigration policy and issues concerning judicial cooperation (Focus, 2006)
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comprise a decision-making process based on intergovernmental cooperation, usually 
requiring unanimity. The Second Pillar deals with the Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the Third Pillar revolves around Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), and pertinent to this research this includes 
issues around counter terrorism and extremism. The Court of Justice has no role28 
and the Commission and Parliament have only limited involvement with these two 
Pillars. Balzacq (2006: 3) identifies the existing policy ‘tools’ under the EC first 
pillar as regulations, directives and decisions whereas, the EU third pillar policies are 
characterised as conventions, positions and frameworks. This observation is 
consistent with the conceptualisation of policy levels within this thesis as the absence 
of a role for the Court of Justice within the Third Pillar ensures that there are no 
mechanisms for compliance with the strategies and initiatives that are introduced 
under the auspices of the PJCC29. Notwithstanding developments under the Lisbon 
Treaty the key point to be made here -  particularly in terms of attempts to analyse 
critically the securitisation thesis in the context of routine policing -  is that to treat all 
decisions as simply alternative discourses consequently undermines an understanding 
of the variegated relations of power associated with different kinds of decision, the 
scope for discretion in terms of their interpretation and implementation, and therefore, 
capacities for resistance. This latter point will be discussed in the final section of 
Chapter Five which discusses the implementation of counter-terrorism policy 
‘decisions’ within the case study force, and the extent to which such decisions play an 
integral role in the conceptualisation of contemporary routine policing.
A number of examples of securitised decisions are highlighted within this research, 
and most notably at the national, UK level of policy-making. Within the context of 
this research such legislative and executive decisions are considered ‘securitised’ 
because they were created as a direct response to, or strategy for, countering the 
existential threat posed by terrorism or radicalisation. Securitised decisions are 
evident in the form of counter terrorism legislation that bestows emergency and
28 This also has a number of implications in terms of democratic accountability as the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) also does not have full competence to review and interpret the policy agreements 
associated with judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police cooperation.
29 It is acknowledged that the Treaty of Lisbon has altered this situation by removing the pillarised 
structure of the EU. However, the pillarised structure still existed during the period of empirical 
research for this thesis and it remains to be seen whether post-Lisbon Treaty policy-making in the EU 
results in equipping the Court of Justice with powers to ensure Member State compliance.
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extraordinary powers on routine police officers such as the power to stop and search 
individuals without reasonable suspicion30. A number of cross-government, executive 
strategies are also conceptualised as securitised decisions, for example, the UK’s 
CONTEST strategy (2003 and 2009) and, in particular the Prevent strand of this 
strategy. It is conceptualised as a securitised decision because it was devised as a 
concrete policy response to the existential threat perceived to be posed by radicalism 
and domestic extremism. Furthermore, it retains a number of compliance 
mechanisms such as ring-fenced, national funding (with mandatory evaluation of 
implementation progress at the end), and the introduction of new and specific 
frameworks of performance assessment in the area of counter-terrorism and 
extremism. This study examines the extent to which such decisions are evident within 
the case study force by analysing discernible shifts in the focus of performance 
assessment or operational tasking priorities at the local (BCU level).
Such analytical distinctions are applied to the analysis of the empirical work 
undertaken for this research and presented in Chapters Four and Five. However, an 
important point to highlight is that this thesis is not suggesting that talk and rhetoric 
are by any means unimportant. Rather, the argument here is that the different 
dimensions of policy are distinct from each other, and it is often misleading and 
unhelpful to conflate them. It is duly acknowledged that talk does indeed have real 
consequences as demonstrated in the influential work on ‘moral panics’ (Cohen, 
1987). Moreover, the levels of policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ often share a symbiotic 
relationship as demonstrated in numerous areas of crime control policy transfer 
between the States and the UK. These include the ‘privatizing punishment’ prisons 
policy; ‘zero-tolerance’ policing policy and ‘three strikes’ sentencing policy (Jones 
and Newbum, 2005; 2007). More specifically, these distinctions are necessary to 
investigate security ‘in action’ (rather than the imputation of security from text) and 
are implied not just in Pollitt’s framework but in political science research 
emphasising the implementation gap between policy formulation and outcomes 
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981).
30 Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
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Action as ‘Routine ’ Police Practice
The analytical concept o f ‘action’ within this study expands on Pollitt’s interpretation; 
that of, ‘practical application of policy on the ground’ to facilitate an exploration of 
tangible changes to routine police practice. In order to investigate evidence of such 
possible change it is important to retain a clear understanding of how routine policing 
is conceptualised within the thesis. Within this thesis the two concepts -  action and 
routine practice -  are synonymous with each other and together they serve as one of 
the empirical cornerstones of the study. The concept of routine policing within this 
thesis has been generated by carrying out a quantitative content analysis (QCA) of 
fortnightly tasking action plans within the case study force. A more detailed 
examination of the methodological approach to conceptualising routine policing for 
the purposes of empirical enquiry is provided later in this chapter. However, it is 
important at this point to highlight key distinctions between routine policing and 
securitised policing as it is integral to the empirical integrity of this thesis focused as 
it is on the impact of national counter terrorism policies on routine police activity. 
Ultimately, it is argued that an effective way to distinguish between routine policing 
and ‘securitised’ routine policing is to separate out ‘crimes’ and (perceived) ‘threats’. 
Traditionally, there has been a social assumption that citizens will not come to the 
attention of the police unless they are involved in a criminal act either as offender, 
victim or witness. The notion that there has to be a crime involved appears constant 
for certain (routine) offences, for example, theft of a motor vehicle (TOMV), burglary 
dwelling (BDW) or some form of assault. These are collectively referred to as serious 
and acquisitive crimes (SAC) and serve as the predominant performance priorities for 
routine policing31 (at both the response and neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) 
levels). However, in some instances, it appears that a demonstrable criminal act is no 
longer a precondition of raising the awareness of the police; in some cases a perceived 
threat, risk or sense of insecurity may now be sufficient. In this way securitised 
policing reflects proactive, intelligence-led methods of policing.
31 The relationship between national performance priorities and the strategic assessments undertaken by 
community safety partnerships as drivers of routine policing are discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter 
Five.
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Furthermore, the research draws in part on Brodeur’s (1983) conceptualisations of 
high and low policing to differentiate between the two policing paradigms32. Routine 
policing can be equated to ‘low’ policing in that it is commonly associated with 
traditional notions of protecting the public from everyday volume crime and 
maintaining public order. It can be argued that routine policing becomes ‘securitised’ 
in some way when it adopts some of the ‘high’ policing characteristics traditionally 
associated with ‘specialist’ units such as Special Branch and the Security Services. 
These include a strategic and tactical emphasis on intelligence collection on 
individuals and groups deemed to be involved in more ‘macro’ crimes that threaten 
national security and thus pose an existential threat to society. There are a number of 
securitised decisions and strategies that offer up the potential for the securitisation of 
routine policing. One of the foremost of these is the Prevent strategy and the 
emphasis it places on the role of neighbourhood policing in developing Key 
Individual Networks (KINS); community profiles; the identification of individuals 
who may be vulnerable to radicalisation (Channel Project) all of which reflect the 
increased emphasis placed on intelligence gathering at the local policing level, and in 
particular the gathering of community intelligence at the neighbourhood policing level 
(Innes, 2006).
3.2.3 The Study’s Unit o f Analysis: A Police Force as Single Case Study
This component is related to the fundamental issue of defining the ‘case’ in case study 
research. The term has associations with a single community, family, person event or 
as in this thesis -  and much notable research before it -  a single organisation 
(Bryman, 2008). As Yin (2009) notes, theoretical sampling (rather than 
representative sampling) has been key to justifying the case study approach to 
empirical enquiry. There are a number of reasons for choosing a single, embedded 
case study research design. The police force is considered a ‘referent object of 
security’ (Waever, 1996) in its own right, and the aim of the research is to provide a
32 It is duly acknowledged that Brodeur’s (1983) conceptualisations have been applied to a policing 
environment that the theorist would historically consider to be characteristic of ‘low’ policing. 
However, Brodeur (2007) has revised his theoretical perspective in light of the events of 11 Sept 2001, 
acknowledging that the resulting police response to the changed nature of the threat has necessarily 
blurred the boundaries between high and low policing. It for this reason that the conceptualisations can 
be usefully -  and, it is argued legitimately -  applied to the routine/securitised policing distinction 
debate.
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detailed elucidation of it within the context of EU and UK counter terrorism 
agreements and policies. The research is interested in the unique features of the force 
and does not seek to generalise to the wider UK policing community. In this regard 
the research is idiographic in nature, contrasting with nomothetic research which is 
concerned with generating statements that apply regardless of time and place 
(Edwards and Hughes, 2005). The empirical aspects of this current research are 
wholly situational and it is acknowledged that the findings are contingent on timing; if 
the research had been undertaken at another point in time in another force -  or indeed 
in the same force -  it is likely that different insights into the impact of counter 
terrorism policy at the local level would have arisen during the course of the research. 
This section details the formulation of a viable, single case study examination of 
routine policing and highlights a number of reasons why it is possible to generalise 
from an investigation of the case study force to the theoretical propositions about the 
securitisation of routine policing.
In April 2008 the Government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 
incorporated the allocation of £180 million to fund ‘ring-fenced’ posts within the 
police service to coordinate the implementation and delivery of the Prevent phase of 
Contest over a three-year period33. The case study Force was prioritised as one of 
twenty-four forces responsible for policing areas with higher levels of ‘risk’ across 
England and Wales to receive Prevent funding in the first year. The funding was 
allocated according to assessments of population, vulnerability and the evaluation of 
intelligence available at the time. It was recognised that the implementation of 
Prevent would be phased throughout the priority forces and that initial investment 
would be targeted at priority BCUs. The case study BCU at the centre of this research 
study was identified as a Pathfinder BCU. As a prioritised, pathfinder area the BCU 
receives funding for Prevent-related training and designated security posts (DSPs)34. 
Furthermore, the Prevent funding facilitates the development of a Prevent Board at 
the Force level and there is BCU representation on that board. The board also 
comprises membership from local authorities and the Police Authority. There is a
33 See Prevent, Progress and Prospects (HMIC, 2008a).
34 However, the flexibility given to forces in relation to the establishment of DSPs has made it difficult 
to identify specific posts within the case study BCU. In general, the BCU often tasked an officer to 
provide strategic or tactical briefings and training updates to officers in addition to regular, routine 
duties.
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clearly identified Prevent Delivery Manager within the BCU. In addition, the case 
study BCU was one of ten BCUs across England and Wales to receive funds to pilot 
the Channel Project. The Channel Project is a police-led, community-based, multi­
agency partnership initiative designed to provide support for people who are 
identified as vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism in particular. It is 
based on a hybrid of multi-agency risk management projects that have been 
successfully used to manage other risks impacting upon people within communities35. 
The fact that the case study force and BCU have been prioritised by HM Government 
as areas that are vulnerable to terrorism-related phenomena such as extremism and 
radicalisation suggest that it is reasonable to expect to find the securitisation of 
routine policing here.
The case study force is considered a mid-size police force within England and Wales 
and includes both large mral areas and a number of urban centres which include major 
governmental institutions, sporting arenas, and international transport links. The 
force covers an area of 812 square miles and is made up of a mixture of densely 
populated urban areas, coastal areas and rural communities. At the time of writing the 
force employed 3252 police officers, supported by 1769 police support staff; 328 
PCSOs and 334 special constables. The force is a member of 7 community safety 
partnerships (CSPs) which cover the force area. The force comprises 6 divisions or 
basic command units (BCUs) and, with the exception of one, each BCU is 
coterminous with its unitary authority and community safety partnership. At the time 
of writing the case study force comprises 70 Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) 
which equates to 456 officers and 327 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) 
dedicated to Neighbourhood Policing36. Every identified neighbourhood within the 
force has a named police contact. In most cases this is a PCSO as they are less likely 
to be abstracted from neighbourhood roles to perform other duties. At the time of 
writing the case study BCU was in the process of developing from Neighbourhood 
Policing to the next stage of combined neighbourhood management, which involves 
the local authority devolving a number of services under a community manager to 
work at a local police sector level.
35 These include Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) for domestic abuse and 
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs).
36 http://www.hmic.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/South% 20W ales/P2B SOW 20080831 .pdf
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However, it is important to acknowledge that a single police force is not a 
homogenous case study setting. The data for this research was generated at a number 
of different research sites throughout the force, and at different organisational levels. 
This had a fundamental impact on the nature (and number) of the study’s units of 
analysis. The nature of the research aims inherent to this study necessitated the 
identification and exploration of multiple units of analysis. The overarching unit of 
analysis for this research is identified as counter terrorism policy, and in particular the 
implementation of the Prevent strand of the UK’s counter terrorism strategy, 
CONTEST (2003; 2009).
However, this analytical unit was explored across different research sites which in 
turn constituted different organisational levels of the case study force. One of the key 
methodological aims of the research was to move beyond the strategic, often 
rhetorical data that is traditionally associated with research into policy implementation 
(i.e. policy ‘talk’). In short I wanted to reverse the empirical focus from a concern 
with policy elites and the ‘textual footprints’ of their talk and decisions, to a concern 
with the action of everyday, local police routines. In order to ascertain the nature of 
counter terrorism policy and its implementation and impact at the sharp end of local 
police practice I had to ‘drill down’ metaphorically through the force -  to collect data 
from within a number of embedded, analytical ‘sub-units’. Diagram 3.1 below 
presents an overview of the different sub-units.
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Force HQ
Individual Officer
Basic C om m and  Unit (BCU)
EU C ounter Terrorism F ram ew o rk
N eighbourhood Policing T eam  (Sector)
N a tu re  and  Impact of UK C ounter Terrorism  Policy (PREVENT)
Diagram 3.1 Case Study Units of Analysis
At this point it is possible to further develop Yin’s (2009) observations on single, 
embedded case study design by focusing on the empirical work undertaken in each 
analytical sub-unit in order to achieve research aims. In order to explore the extent to 
which evidence of ‘securitisation’ was visible within these analytical sites a number 
of ‘empirical pinch-points' were identified which operate at a more micro-level 
within the case study force. These are counter terrorism policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and 
‘action’, which in turn reflect the conceptual framework of the research. The 
identification of the three analytically-distinct aspects of counter terrorism policy and 
‘what counts’ in terms of the empirical pinch-points is discussed in detail in Section
3.1 of this chapter. However it is pertinent to reiterate at this point that these 
empirical pinch-points served simultaneously to narrow the focus of my research and 
in turn ensure that I collected data relevant to my key research questions.
The process of identifying a valid unit of analysis (and indeed related empirical pinch- 
points) incorporates a number of additional considerations.
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i) Variations in the understanding and awareness of the overarching unit of 
analysis within each of the analytical sub-units
It is conceivable (and perhaps should be assumed) that within a single, embedded case 
study setting there is going to be variations in the knowledge of key concepts, 
strategic policies and operational strategies. For example, different aspects of current 
UK counter terrorism policy are going to be understood (and perhaps prioritised) in 
different ways and to varying degrees based on the different areas of responsibility 
and accountability officers and support staff hold within the Force. In other words, 
the nature of the data is contingent on whether the emphasis within each sub-unit 
revolves around policy creation, implementation or delivery. This in turn might have 
an impact on the data generated in terms of the prevalence of the study’s empirical 
pinch-points. For example, evidence of ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ may be more prevalent 
at the Force HQ or senior management level where priority is given to policy 
implementation whereas ‘action’ may be more identifiable at the frontline of police 
practice where, policy delivery is (perhaps) most tangible.
ii) Time boundaries: when to start and finish data collection
The identification of a national policy as a case study unit of analysis necessitates an 
awareness of and capacity to account for a number of inherent issues, and one of the 
most salient for this research was that policy-making and implementation are 
dynamic processes rather than ‘events’. It is important to acknowledge the limitations 
placed on case study research that has a finite timescale; both in terms of data 
collection and the nature of data analysis and subsequent discussion of the 
implications of findings. There will always be pre-existing aspects of policy in place 
in the analytical sub-units prior to the commencement of data collection. This can be 
either understood as policy preparation in anticipation of changes to aspects of 
organisational structure, or phased implementation across a range of departments. 
Moreover, it is often the case that policy implementation and delivery will continue to 
develop after the researcher has left the fieldwork setting. These considerations were 
particularly pertinent to this research; it became clear that the implementation and 
delivery of Prevent was an ongoing phenomenon within the case study force, and it 
would continue apace after I left the fieldwork setting. Given that the primary aim of
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my research was to explore the extent to which local policing is becoming 
increasingly securitised, how important was it that I seek to establish change over 
time? I have come to the conclusion that the aims of my research study -  to analyse 
the nature and impact of current policing policy responses to the evolving 
phenomenon such as transnational terrorism -  can be addressed effectively by the 
single case study design. It is acknowledged that the terrorism threat has ratcheted up 
since data was collected. Equally, however, the UK now has a new government with 
a new set of political perspectives on the legitimate nature of responses to terrorism. It 
is the nature of social science research to operate within the parameters of a world that 
does not stand still, and that must often also accommodate the contingent nature of 
policy-making and implementation.
3.2.4 Linking Data to Propositions and Criteria for Interpreting the Findings
Yin (2009) suggests that the fourth and fifth components of case study research 
foreshadow the data analysis stages of research. He suggests that an effective way of 
linking the data generated to the research propositions is through a process of ‘pattern 
matching’ whereby several pieces of information from the same case (identified in 
this research as key thematic areas) are related to the theoretical propositions inherent 
to research (2009: 34). So one of the main analytical aims of this research is to 
identify empirical evidence to support or contest the theoretical assertion that routine 
policing is becoming increasingly driven by a logic of securitisation. The issue of 
what counts as evidence in this regard has already been addressed by the analytical 
framework of the thesis, which in turn has been reiterated through the above 
discussion of the chosen units of analysis and ‘empirical pinch-points’.
The notion of ‘pattern matching’ is manifest throughout data analysis and the 
subsequent discussion of key findings which, highlight cogent relationships between 
increased securitisation and the analytically distinct levels of counter terrorism policy­
making, implementation and delivery. As understood within the conceptual 
framework of this case study research, there is evidence of a significant increase in 
securitised ‘talk’ (understood as rhetoric and exhortation), and some evidence of 
securitised ‘decision-making (identified as concrete policy instruments with some 
form of compliance mechanism attached to them) operating within the case study
65
police force. However, there is discemibly less empirical evidence of securitised 
‘action’ (identified as counter terrorism related change to routine police practice). 
The possible reasons for this, identified as challenges to national policy 
implementation and delivery are the focus of Chapters Five and Six. However, from a 
methodological perspective, the analytical framework of this thesis, articulated within 
the context of case study research design provides identifiable ways to link the data to 
the research propositions, and clear criteria for interpreting the findings that emerge 
from the study.
3.2.5 Summary
The aim of this research is to test the predominantly discourse-based pronouncements 
regarding securitisation of local policing by undertaking a mixed methodological 
exploration of the extent and nature of 'securitisation' in one British police force area, 
including an exploration of the factors that shape routine policing. The research also 
aims to produce a different kind of study to those that have dominated the field to 
date; a more focused study that attempts to distinguish between different 'levels' of 
policy (talk, decisions, action), and highlight the dangers in conflating them when 
carrying out empirical research. This section has provided a coherent overview of the 
research strategy and provides sound justification for the research design that drives 
the thesis. In doing so it addresses issues of external validity, generalisibility and 
representativeness. The research strategy is characterised by an adaptive approach to 
the theory-research relationship. Furthermore, in adopting a single, embedded case 
study research approach the thesis recognises the fundamental distinctions between 
‘statistical’ generalisation and ‘analytic’ generalisation (Yin, 2009: 38). This research 
makes no attempt to generalise findings in an empirical sense to the wider policing 
population. The research is interested in how the empirical findings can be 
generalised to existing and relevant theory, not the wider policing community in 
England and Wales. Moreover, the research does not make claims to 
representativeness about the extent of securitisation of routine policing in different 
countries or indeed across other UK forces. The decision to use a single police force 
as a case study of routine police practice is justified on the grounds that the case study 
force and BCU have been prioritised by HM Government as areas that are vulnerable 
to terrorism-related phenomena such as extremism and radicalisation and as such is in
66
receipt of funding to implement and delivery Prevent-specific initiatives. Therefore, 
it is considered reasonable to expect to find the securitisation of routine policing here. 
Ultimately the decision to carry out a single case study test of the securitisation thesis 
was based on a combination of pragmatic and analytical factors. However, what is 
perhaps lost in breadth through carrying out a comparative case study is gained in 
depth of insight and analysis. The single case study design provided the opportunity 
to ‘drill down’ through a police force in order to analyse the dynamics and processes 
of securitisation, including the resistance and re-shaping of it in as far as it exists.
3.3 Research Methods
I adopted a mixed methodological approach to data generation and incorporated both 
qualitative and quantitative strategies into the research design.
The quantitative data was generated through:
■ quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking ‘Action Plans’.
These action plans were drawn up following the fortnightly tasking meetings that took 
place in the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork for this research (June 
-  November 2008). The aim of the QCA was to:
i) formulate an empirical measure of ‘routine’ policing practice at the BCU 
level;
ii) ascertain the extent to which counter terrorism policing features in BCU 
operational tasking and routine policing activity.
By undertaking these two objectives it was possible to examine the extent to which 
counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ manifest themselves within routine 
police activity in the case study BCU. This in turn contributes to an exploration of the 
extent to which routine policing at the local (neighbourhood) level is becoming 
increasingly ‘securitised’ within the case study BCU.
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The qualitative data was generated through:
■ semi-structured interviews with police officers across all ranks within the 
case study force;
■ documentary analysis of relevant counter terrorism policy text across three 
geo-political regions: the EU, the UK and the case study police force,
■ non-participant observation of force meetings, primarily at the BCU level.
Fielding and Innes (2006: 138) argue that a characteristic of qualitative research is 
that when it seeks to understand a professional practice it attends at least as much to 
the process involved as to the outcomes. They suggest that qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are complementary and both are needed to get a fuller picture 
(2006: 133). It is argued that the methodological approach employed within this 
study offers the potential to provide a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the 
analytically distinct levels inherent to security policy-making. It also facilitates a 
more meaningful evaluation of the processes inherent to the creation and 
implementation of such policy and in particular the impact of counter terrorism policy 
on routine police practice, which in turn contributes to a critical test of the extent to 
which policing is becoming increasingly securitised.
3.3.1 Qualitative Research Strategies
There is widespread rejection of the idea that researchers can be completely neutral 
collectors of information about the social world. They are instead seen to be ‘actively 
constructing knowledge about that world according to certain principles and using 
certain methods derived from, or which express, their epistemological position’ 
(Mason 2002: 52). However it is important to note that the two qualitative methods 
used for this research originate from different epistemological perspectives. Semi­
structured interviewing and documentary analysis generate different forms of 
knowledge and therefore generate different types of data for analysis. Furthermore it 
is widely acknowledged that different methods provide researchers with different 
lenses on the world. The lens of the interview is verbal -  what people say and mean -  
but its temporal range is ‘biographical’ (Warren 2001: 85). Interviews depend on
68
participants being able to recollect past circumstances or contemplate future 
possibilities. In contrast, the emphasis of documentary analysis is predominantly 
textual. Furthermore, consideration must be given to the language, the ‘intertextuaP 
nature of documents and the author and reader whether they be implied or actual 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 2004). However, it is important to note that no method 
whether it is used in isolation or as part of a collective approach can be said to reveal 
the ‘real truth’. I sought to analyse my interview data with documentary sources 
where possible in order to enhance the legitimacy of the findings. Lilleker (2003) and 
Davies (2001: 75) discuss the usefulness of employing a ‘sociological triangulation 
strategy of multi-methodological research’ when conducting elite interviews. 
However it has also been argued that this analytical approach can increase the 
complexity of analysis. The use of different standpoints for qualitative research 
means that one not only sees the same thing from a different angle, one sees entirely 
different facets of that thing. So, an interviewee may provide additional information 
to that found in a documentary record. Therefore the technique of triangulation when 
used by a qualitative researcher can be seen to be ‘additive as well as corroborative’ 
(Davies, 2001: 75).
3.3.1.1 Semi-structured Interviewing
One of the foremost aims of the semi-structured interviews was to discover the 
various ways in which police officers ‘talk’ about their work and thus provide 
narrative accounts of the ways in which they interpret their role as routine police 
practitioners. It was made clear to research participants at the outset of data collection 
with the case study force that the focus of the research was the nature of routine 
policing, rather than an explicit focus upon the role of counter terrorism policing at 
the local level. In this way it was possible to generate a comprehensive knowledge of 
the core component parts of routine policing according to those working at the 
different ranks within the police force. By taking the discursive focus away from 
terrorism per se but noting down the time it took for interviewees to reference 
terrorism or counter terrorism in some form it was possible to begin to generate an 
objective understanding of the extent to which counter terrorism policies and 
operational strategies play a part in routine police activity. The semi-structured
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interviews were carried out in order to provide a ‘thickly descriptive knowledge’ of 
routine police work.
The use of semi-structured interviews was deemed appropriate for this purpose 
because they retain a ‘complexity-capturing ability’ and thereby facilitate the 
opportunity to look for ‘patterns of interrelationship between many categories rather 
than the sharply delineated relationship between a limited set of them’ (Fielding and 
Innes, 2006: 136). These observations were highly relevant to this study because 
existing research reveals routine policing to be a highly complex aspect of police 
practice characterised by pluralistic narratives of competing demands in the form of 
external, political pressures and internal, organisational imperatives. The notion of 
competing demand resonates within the context of neighbourhood policing where 
officers must negotiate the twin masters of national performance targets and 
community-set priority actions.
Sampling Issues
There were important issues to consider when deciding on the sample for the project. 
There had to be sufficient diversity within the sample to effectively cover all of the 
research objectives. Although I entered the field with a clear idea of the substantive 
areas I intended to cover in the interviews, it was not until I became familiar with my 
research setting that the criteria for selection of the interview sample were finalised. 
As my presence in the research environment increased, the more interview 
opportunities presented themselves. I believe that this in itself reveals that securing 
access to some institutions in some instances, is less about providing information and 
more about establishing relationships with individuals within an institution. The 
research sample also benefited from sustained contact with senior members of the 
Force Command Team and they were in a position to ‘open doors’ and direct me to 
individuals within relevant areas of expertise. It is acknowledged that one of the 
benefits of researching within a hierarchical institution such as the police is that when 
a senior officer permits access to lower ranking members of a team or department it is 
determined that personal accountability for the information provided in interviews lies 
with the commanding officer.
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I carried out 39 interviews across the ranking spectrum of the case study policy force; 
from Chief constable to PCSO. I decided to ‘drill down’ through the ranks of the 
force in order to move beyond the strategic, and often rhetorical data I was generating 
at the level of Force Command to access the perceptions of the lowest ranks, where 
quite uniquely within a hierarchical institution there are the highest levels of 
discretion. It also offered the potential to generate narrative accounts of the impact 
that national policies were having at the sharp end of local police practice. The status 
of my respondents influenced the preparation before each interview, the construction 
of the interview schedule, and the strategies that were employed during the 
interviews. It was important to remember the dynamic nature of the environment I 
was entering when conducting these interviews, and acknowledge both the benefits 
and potential obstacles that such a setting can present to a researcher. Many of the 
interviews provided insights into activities that take place out of the public gaze, 
particularly when I was interviewing those responsible for operational decisions. As 
Berry (2002: 681) observes ‘open-ended questions have the virtue of allowing the 
subjects to tell the interviewer what’s relevant and what’s important rather than being 
restricted by the researcher’s preconceived notions about what is important’. By 
adopting a semi structured, thematic approach to the interviews I was able to draw 
upon the very detailed knowledge that the informants typically possessed in relation 
to routine policing activity. As far as possible I researched the background of each 
informant, or, at the very least made sure that I was aware of their areas of 
responsibility. This ensured that the questions I posed were relevant to their areas of 
expertise. This was crucial given the limited time I usually faced in terms of 
interview length. On occasion, I found that a pre-arranged one hour interview was 
shortened to twenty minutes upon arrival. This occurred both during interviews with 
Force Command officers and frontline staff. In addition I was always aware that I 
would probably have only one chance to interview each individual. For all of these 
reasons it was necessary to be well briefed, develop an expansive interview agenda 
but to be very clear about topic priorities.
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Interview Schedule37
Gerson and Horowitz (2002) believe that successful interviews depend on the prior 
construction of a theoretically informed and user friendly interview schedule. The 
construction of the interview schedule reflects the myriad issues that must be taken 
into consideration when preparing to enter the research setting. Although it was 
intended that each interview would be similar in structure, it was acknowledged that 
they would always differ in terms of content, depending on the rank and functional 
specialism of the interviewee. This was taken into consideration when preparing the 
thematic question areas, and it was acknowledged that no two interviews would reveal 
the same information. The main thematic areas covered during interviews enabled the 
opportunity to explore two of the main research objectives:
1) To ascertain the nature of routine policing within the case study force
■ Demographic nature of the BCU/Sector
■ Specific crime and disorder issues facing the BCU/Sector
■ BCU/Sector priorities
■ Degree of discretion/autonomy retained by BCU/Sector Inspectors in relation 
to priority setting/tasking
■ Nature of performance assessment and tasking at the BCU/Sector level
■ Structure of Neighbourhood Policing Teams and core aspects of 
neighbourhood policing
2) To examine the role of counter terrorism within routine policing
■ Extent to which general concerns about terrorism have filtered down to the 
BCU/Sector level
■ Awareness of counter terrorism policies and operational strategies
■ Counter terrorism training
■ Extent to which counter terrorism affects running of the BCU/Sector or the 
operational conduct of officers
■ Individual thoughts/observations on counter terrorism policing
37 See Appendix A for interview schedule.
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The construction of the interview schedule highlights the complexities of interviewing 
within dynamic research settings. Many of the questions I asked either referred to 
operationally sensitive or politically contested issues. I was always conscious of 
when and how to ask the sensitive questions. I often began each interview with a 
‘grand tour question’ (Spradley 1979) such as, can you tell me about the sector area 
that you police? The responses to such questions often provided a good platform 
from which to move onto more specific topic areas. The use of prompts or probes 
often became useful and served several purposes. They were particularly helpful if an 
informant seemed unwilling or simply unable to comprehensively answer certain 
questions. They were also effective in ensuring that issues pertinent to the research 
questions were alluded to if it appeared that interviewees were moving away from the 
focus of the questions. The questions that specifically related to counter terrorism 
were always asked at the end of interviews.
One of the key advantages of the semi structured interview is its versatility; it is 
possible to retain a degree of flexibility whilst also operating from within a standard 
framework. It is often said that a structured approach may be the most beneficial if 
the responses from informants are to be compared during subsequent analysis. 
However I argue that a semi-structured interviewing technique provides some 
semblance of standardisation which in turn permits a degree of comparability between 
interviews. As Fielding observes when using semi-structured interviews to research 
the police, ‘they were semi-structured by a thematic guide with probes and invitations 
to expand on issues raised’ (cited in May, 2001: 123). I adopted a similar approach 
which facilitated the identification of key themes. This in turn contributed to the 
presentation of my data as I had opted for a thematic approach to data analysis and the 
use o f ‘probes’ often proved useful in obtaining ‘codeable’ answers.
Analysis o f Interviews
I decided that a thematic and iterative approach to data analysis was most suitable for 
this research study. I conducted a total of 39 semi-structured interviews and each 
interview was completely transcribed. This in turn generated a richly-detailed yet 
admittedly, at times, rather cumbersome dataset. The thematic analysis was 
underpinned by a two-stage coding process. Stage 1 was characterised by a manual 
coding process which involved printing out all transcriptions and coding the interview
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data according to broad reference to the analytically distinct concepts that underpin 
this thesis namely, policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Ultimately, Stage 1 
facilitated an examination of the extent to which examples of counter terrorism policy 
‘talk’ were evident within the case study force and the ways in which aspects of the 
interview data could be interpreted as accounts of national policy ‘decisions’ and the 
impact they had on routine policing ‘action’.
Interview data was coded in terms of policy ‘talk’ when reference was made to 
international or national policy rhetoric, exhortation or debate. The aspects of 
interview data that focused on how officers articulate their routine roles and how 
terrorism and counter terrorism was understood by individual officers was also coded 
as ‘talk’. Interview data was coded in terms of policy ‘decision’ when reference was 
made to national legislative or executive decisions such as special police powers or 
the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy and the enforcement mechanisms that 
are attached to such policy decisions. Interview data was also coded in terms of 
policy decision when reference was made to force or BCU-specific strategic 
frameworks and priorities and the impact these have on local decision-making and the 
direction of operational policing activity. Finally, interview data was coded as policy 
‘action’ if it served as a qualitative account of tangible changes to routine policing 
practice as identified through the quantitative content analysis (QCA).
Stage 2 involved the use of the qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) 
package, NVivo. The structure of the interview schedule facilitated both the 
identification of a number of key analytic themes or codes prior to the start of data 
collection and the emergence of unanticipated themes during the process of data 
collection. All of these themes or codes were recorded in NVivo during the course of 
the data collection period. Following the completion of Stage 1 all interview 
transcripts were uploaded to NVivo. At this point the transcripts underwent a 
rigorous coding process. In the first instance, the manual application of the three 
codes ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ to each printed transcript was replicated 
electronically in NVivo. Then, all transcripts were analysed systematically according 
to the pre-determined set of codes identified during the data collection period. This 
coding process revealed a number of analytic issues that ultimately helped to shape 
decisions about the analytic focus of the empirical chapters within the thesis. The
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coding process facilitated an appraisal of the prevalence of themes across the dataset 
and the identification of key, substantive themes within each of the analytically 
distinct areas of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Moreover, the coding process 
highlighted thematic overlaps within the dataset which in turn prompted the 
development of new codes and thus new and relevant themes for analysis and 
discussion in the three empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters Four to Six). 
Ultimately, the code and retrieve facility within NVivo proved helpful in identifying 
the prevalence and salience of analytic themes within what is a relatively large-scale 
dataset.
The salient, analytic themes within policy ‘talk’ were identified as:
■ The different ways in which officers articulated and understood their routine 
work and primary responsibilities;
■ The length of time it took to reference terrorism/counter terrorism,
■ The different ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are articulated 
and understood across police ranks.
The salient, analytic themes within policy ‘decision’ included:
■ The nature and focus of performance assessment,
■ The tension between national and local priorities.
The salient, analytic themes within policy ‘action’ were identified as:
■ The role of intelligence work;
■ The role of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) at the local level;
■ The relationship between Special Branch and routine police officers,
■ The nature of partnership working and community safety structures at the 
local level.
This research duly acknowledges the potential limitations of a coding approach to 
qualitative data analysis, particularly the criticism levelled at CAQDAS that the 
process of fragmenting data risks the loss of both context (Fielding and Lee, 1998) 
and narrative flow (Weaver and Atkinson, 1995). However, it is argued that the 
rigorous coding process facilitates an examination and subsequent depiction of the 
complex nature of both routine policing and counter terrorism policy-making and
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implementation. The interview participants originated from a range of strategic and 
operational departments within the case study force. Therefore, the situational 
contexts, and thus the experiential nature of the data would often differ from interview 
to interview. By adopting a thematic approach to both interviewing and analysis I 
was able to compare and contrast responses and illustrate the key issues that emerged 
from the research setting. However it is important to note the complex and 
multifaceted nature of both the research topic and the empirical research setting. 
There are a significant number of themes that were necessarily passed over due to the 
practical constraints placed on the research. There are a number of specific 
considerations to note when analysing interview data and two are particularly 
pertinent to this research. They are the issues of validity (that data measures what it 
says it measures) and reliability (that results are stable over time). It is important that 
‘interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be 
objective and to tell us the truth’ (Berry 2002: 680; Dexter 1970). I was aware that 
the majority of informants would be operating within an atmosphere where they 
constantly had to justify what they were doing. I was therefore very aware of the 
power of rhetoric.
Ultimately, it is acknowledged that an interview is ‘a social encounter like any other, 
and that it tells the social researcher little about a reality that is ‘external’ to the 
interview’ (May, 2001: 143). It seems more productive to view interview data not as 
‘accurate’ or distorted’ but as a means to discover how people perceive their 
surroundings, or react to events. I acknowledged early on that interviews alone may 
not be an adequate tool for understanding the impact of national counter terrorism 
policy on routine police practice. I therefore anticipated the benefit of corroborating 
the interview data that I generated with documentary analysis. Indeed, mid-way 
through the data analysis stages of this study it became apparent that it was 
appropriate to subordinate the interview data to both the documentary analysis and 
more pertinently, the QCA data. In this way the interview data was often interpreted 
as narrative accounts of policy decisions that have been taken and the ways they have 
impacted upon routine police practice.
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3.3.1.2 Documentary Analysis
There are a number of observations on the role of documentary analysis within 
empirical research that are relevant to this study. It has been suggested that 
documentary analysis is, at worst, often overlooked as a methodological technique 
and, at best, perceived as secondary data inferior to that of ‘oral’ data gathered 
through interviews for example (May 2001; Prior, 2004; Coffey and Atkinson, 2004). 
This is certainly not an accusation that can be levelled at advocates of the 
securitisation thesis. Indeed, it is their reliance on the discourse-analytic study of text 
as a methodological approach to the generation of theoretical suppositions that serves 
as the basis for empirical critique throughout this study. It is widely observed that 
there are inherent risks to a heavy reliance on documentary sources. As Silverman 
(2001) highlights it is important that researchers adopt a realistic approach to the 
‘type’ of documents that are used, and the volume that can be realistically analysed 
within a given timeframe. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that documentary 
sources are not ‘surrogates’ for other kinds of data, and we ‘cannot learn through 
written records alone how an organisation actually operates day by day (Coffey and 
Atkinson: 2004: 58). Moreover, it is crucial that documentary sources are not viewed 
as accurate reflections of any given situation. Rather, they construct their own kinds 
of reality and therefore it is important to treat them as ‘texts’ to be broken down and 
interpreted. As Coffey and Atkinson observe (2004: 61):
‘when organisations generate documentary records they transform diverse 
circumstances and people into documentary forms that can be processed in 
relatively predictable and standardised ways. They can then be used to do the 
sort of work that is currently popular among policy makers: setting 
achievement targets and measuring outcomes. Such political and 
organisational work is impossible without the construction of documentary 
facts and realities’ (2004: 61 emphasis mine).
This observation is undoubtedly pertinent to this research. Specifically, it resonates 
within both the documentary analysis and the quantitative content analysis (QCA) 
undertaken within the case study police force. However, this opening methodological 
critique is in no way intended to suggest that the study of elite policy text is 
unimportant. It merely contributes to the argument put forward by this research; that 
it is important to move beyond a focus on policy elites and the textual footprints of
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their talk and decision in order to interrogate empirically the action of everyday, 
operational routines. This is particularly important when making suppositions about 
the increasingly securitised nature of local police practice.
The documentary analysis undertaken for this research has proven helpful in a number 
of ways. Noaks and Wincup (2004) observe that documentary analysis can be 
particularly useful in tracking trends or shifts in policy. This observation resonates 
strongly within the research study that focuses on security and securitisation. It is a 
discursive arena characterised by a dynamic policy-making framework and current 
scholarship on the concept of securitisation is rapidly evolving at the moment. In the 
absence of existing empirical investigation that focuses on the impact of national 
counter terrorism policy on routine police practice, the analysis of relevance political 
and organisational documents provided an effective starting point from which to 
ascertain key issues and priorities which could be addressed in both the interviews 
and the quantitative content analysis.
The management and analysis of the chosen documents is consistent with the 
approach adopted for the case study interview dataset. The documents were analysed 
thematically and this was informed by a multi-stage selection and coding process. 
Stage 1 involves the selection of documents that covered the three conceptually 
distinct geo-political security settings analysed within this research study -  the EU, 
the UK and the case study police force. The key sampling criterion that guided Stage 
1 was that the chosen documents were published or in operation during the period of 
fieldwork (May -  December 2008). The selected documents (see below) were then 
coded in line with the analytically distinct concepts that underpin this thesis namely, 
policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. It is important to note that the choice of 
documents was based on the same sampling criterion as that guiding the selection of 
the case study force. Therefore, I selected documents within which one might most 
expect to find evidence of securitisation. The sampling criterion is considered an 
important aspect of operationalising a critical test of the securitisation thesis within 
routine policing. If it was discovered that that in fact the policy talk was not as 
‘securitised’ as sometimes is presented, this would already bring into question some 
of the securitisation theorists’ propositions regarding the nature of routine policing 
even before one began to analyse the nature of policy decision and action.
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The documents analysed within this research study are listed below according to their 
identification as exemplars of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ or ‘action’. The documents 
identified as exemplars of policy ‘talk’ are:
■ The EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (Hague Programme 2005 -  2010)
■ The EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (Hague Programme 2005 -  
2010)
■ The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (Hague 
Programme 2005 - 2010)
■ The European Security Strategy (2008)
■ The EU TE-SAT Report (2008)
■ The EU OCTA Report (2008)
■ The UK’s National Security Strategy (2008)
■ The UK’s National Community Safety Plan (2008 -  2011)
■ UK Government Green Papers38
■ UK House of Commons (Hansard) Debates in 2008
■ UK Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (October 2008)39
■ The case study Force Annual Plan (2007 -  2008).
The explicit and selective choice of documents identified as examples of policy ‘talk’ 
reflects the aim of this element of the research. The intention was not to attempt a 
detailed and comprehensive analysis of policy ‘talk’ in counter terrorism policing 
policy. As discussed in the literature review, these kinds of analyses have already 
been undertaken in a rigorous and expert way by a number of securitisation theorists 
and there is little point in replicating such analyses here. As outlined earlier, the 
primary empirical focus is upon the ‘decision’ and ‘action’ dimensions of policy. 
Thus, the analysis of policy ‘talk’ here is intentionally more modest, focusing on a 
selected number of policy texts and documents as exemplars of the kinds of shifts 
discussed by securitisation theorists which can then be a basis for further empirical 
examination in later chapters on ‘decision’ and ‘action’.
38 These include From the Neighbourhood to the National (Home Office, 2008a).
39 These include debates on the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects and the identity card scheme.
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The documents identified as exemplars of policy ‘decision’ are:
■ The UK’s CONTEST strategy and in particular the Prevent Strategy40 (2003 
and 2009)
■ The case study Force Strategic Assessment (November 2007 -  May 2008)
■ The case study Force Control Strategy (2007 -  2008)
■ The case study BCU Strategic Assessment (January -  June 2008)
■ The case study BCU Control Strategy (2008)
■ COMPSTAT (May -  December 2008)
■ HMIC Reports41.
Finally, the documents identified as exemplars of policy ‘action’ are:
■ The case study BCU Fortnightly Tasking and Co-ordinating Group Action 
Plans (June -  November 2008)
These documents serve as the basis of the QCA that formulates the empirical measure 
of routine policing throughout this thesis.
The final stage of the coding process was informed by Stage 2 of the interview data 
analysis process. The key, substantive themes identified within each of the 
analytically distinct areas of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ within the interview 
data were applied to the selected documents. In this way it was possible to compare 
and contrast the empirical data generated from both qualitative methodologies and 
gain a more detailed insight into the relative resonance or dissonance in the nature of 
counter terrorism policy talk, decision and action across the three geo-political 
security settings at the centre of the research study.
Scott (1990) distinguishes between four criteria when undertaking documentary 
analysis. The first of these focuses on authenticity; is the evidence genuine? The 
second point relates to credibility; is the evidence an accurate account, free from
40 Prevent: The Policing Response to the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strategy and 
Delivery Plan. ACPO, April 2008.
41 These include Prevent: Progress and Prospects (HMIC, 2008a).
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distortion? The third criterion is representativeness, and the fourth focuses on 
meaning; is the evidence clear and comprehensible? Scott (1990: 35) stresses that 
quality appraisal is a ‘never-ending process...which must be constantly in need of 
revision as new discoveries and new problems force the researcher to reappraise the 
evidence’. It has been my experience that working with documents is not without its 
methodological and analytical challenges, particularly when working within a 
research setting that is politically sensitive, ‘policy dynamic’ and subject to rapid 
theoretical evolution. It is important for the researcher to draw on their existing 
knowledge of the social context in which documents are compiled when ascertaining 
compliance with the above criteria.
It is equally important that the same methodological rigour is applied to the analysis 
of documentary evidence. As such it is advised that researchers make explicit the 
particular theoretical approach that informs their work (Silverman 2001) and 
‘establish a methodological framework for the analysis of documentary realities’ 
(Coffey and Atkinson 2004: 58). It is clear that documents do not exist in isolation; 
they interact with other documents to generate meaning and any analysis must 
acknowledge such relationships. I therefore embarked on a paper trail in order to 
ascertain the extent of ‘intertextuality’ between the documentary sources (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 2004). This analytical technique proved particularly effective in 
ascertaining the resonance or dissonance within the levels of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ 
and action’ across the three geo-political security settings within the research study. 
By following an ‘organisational decision, an innovation or a problem through a series 
of documents’ (Coffey and Atkinson 2004: 68) I was able to gain an insight into the 
pluralistic narratives about counter terrorism policy and policing at the EU, UK and 
case study force levels and examine the extent to which such narratives actually 
impact on routine policing in the form of tangible changes to practice on the ground.
3.3.2 Quantitative Content Analysis: An Empirical Measure o f Routine Policing
An empirical understanding of the nature of routine policing is fundamental to the 
central argument of this research. This research provides an empirical measure of 
routine police practice by carrying out quantitative content analysis (QCA) of the 
‘action plans’ drawn up following the fortnightly tasking meetings that took place in
the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork (June -  November 2008). 
This section contextualises the fortnightly tasking action plans (FTAs) within the 
wider strategic and operational framework at the BCU level before detailing the 
processes inherent to the application of QCA.
The tasking procedures within the Force (and the BCU) are framed around the 
National Intelligence Model (NIM) which is essentially a comprehensive business 
process to rationalise and systematise the ways in which the police service handles 
information and makes key decisions about the deployment of resources. Two of the 
core components of the NIM are the creation and use of intelligence products and, the 
tasking and coordinating groups which are operational at both Force (Level 2) and 
BCU (Level 1) levels. One of the key intelligence products -  at both Force and BCU 
levels -  is the Tactical Assessment. These documents comprise intelligence retrieved 
and collated by the in-house intelligence databases such as NICHE to provide a clear 
indication of the nature and prevalence of crime and disorder at the BCU level. The 
BCU Tactical Assessment is updated every two weeks and is used to inform decisions 
on the prioritisation of problems and targets, to allocate ownership of problems to 
particular staff or operational departments, and as the basis for the planning of 
operational/tactical responses (Tregidga, 2003: Maguire and John, 2006).
The main users of these Tactical Assessments are the tasking and coordinating groups 
(TCGs) that meet every fortnight to discuss both ongoing and emerging issues at the 
BCU level (i.e. across divisional sectors); undertake informed assessments and 
prioritisation of problems, namely categorised crime and disorder occurrences, and 
plan, coordinate and manage the tactical police response. The meetings also serve as 
an opportunity to review the status of previously allocated operational responses 
(tasks) to certain crime or disorder occurrences. The outcome of these meetings is the 
creation of the fortnightly tasking action plans (FTAs). Those present at the meetings 
represent the core units, departments and teams that comprise operational policing at 
the BCU level. These include the BCU Superintendent (Chair); Neighbourhood 
Police Inspectors42; Bronze (Response) Inspectors, and departments such as 
Community Safety and CID.
42 Sector or Neighbourhood Inspectors are responsible for the delivery of neighbourhood policing.
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The action plans reflect the tactical resolutions devised to counter the fortnightly 
priorities identified within the BCU. They provide information on (among other 
things) the:
■ type of crime and disorder occurrence;
■ nature of the task (tactical resolution) to be carried out;
■ timeframe for completion of the task,
■ officer/department responsible for carrying out the task.
It is possible to categorise the tactical resolutions (tasks) in terms of the three areas of 
priority that are integral to the NIM framework: prevention, intelligence and 
enforcement (CENTREX, 2005). The fortnightly ‘action plans’ were chosen as the 
focus of the QCA because they provide a breakdown of BCU operational activity -  
predominantly at the neighbourhood level. They are ‘dynamic’ documents in that 
they reflect dominant, up to date operational concerns and priorities, and highlight the 
tactics and actions agreed to reduce or prevent the highlighted occurrences. Therefore 
it is argued that they have the capacity to provide a coherent, empirical understanding 
of the nature of routine police activity at the local level. The structural framework of 
each plan is identical which facilitates a comparison of data content over the data 
collection period43. There are 12 FTAs in total: 2 per fortnight over a 6 month period.
Data, Processes and Limitations o f the Dataset 
The overarching aims of the QCA are to:
i) formulate an empirical measure of ‘routine’ policing practice;
ii) ascertain the extent to which counter-terrorism policing features in BCU 
operational tasking and routine policing activity.
By undertaking these two objectives it was possible to examine the extent to which 
counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ is evident within routine police activity 
in the case study BCU. This in turn contributes to an exploration of the extent to
43 See Appendix B for an anonymised version of a Fortnightly Tasking Action Plan.
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which routine policing at the local (neighbourhood) level is becoming increasingly 
‘securitised’ within the case study BCU.
Each fortnightly tasking ‘action plan’ (FTA) was systematically coded using 10 pre­
determined variables44:
1. The date of the FTA
2. The type of crime and disorder occurrence (e.g. autocrime, burglary dwelling)
The crime and disorder occurrences were pre-categorised by the case study BCU and 
the terms were used both on the Fortnightly Tasking Action Plans and the 
corresponding Fortnightly Tactical Assessments. They reflect the BCU priority areas 
during a given fortnightly period.
3. The type of task (e.g. intelligence, prevention, enforcement, administrative)
4. The task number (e.g. 1 of 3 tasks for an occurrence in a fortnight)
5. The total number of tasks per occurrence per fortnight
6. The department/officer assigned to oversee each task
7. The status of task (e.g. ongoing or discharged)
8. Was additional money allocated to the task?
9. How much additional money was allocated?
In relation to variables 8 and 9, each action plan indicates when and where additional 
money had been successfully secured by a particular neighbourhood sector following 
a bidding process overseen by a member of the police management board. The 
allocation of additional money translates as police officer overtime on a particular 
task. This variable proved useful in assessing the level of operational priority 
afforded to each occurrence category.
10. Any additional (qualitative) comments
44 See Appendix C for QCA (SPSS) Codebook.
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The data from each action plan was coded and analysed with the use of SPSS. During 
the analysis stages it was deemed necessary to re-code variables 3 and 6. This was 
undertaken in order to reduce the number of code options within these variables. In 
relation to variable 3 the tasks were originally coded according to the specific nature 
of the task carried out, for example ‘operation implementation’, ‘arrest-related’, 
‘hotspot targeting’). Ultimately, the types of task were re-coded in line with the 
National Intelligence Model (NIM) framework. The NIM identifies prevention, 
intelligence, and enforcement as priority factors associated with the tactical resolution 
of an isolated or ongoing occurrence. The same reduction rationale was employed for 
variable 6; the re-coding process minimised overlap and streamlined both the analysis 
and presentation of results.
The dataset is comprised of 209 ‘cases’ (n=209) that reflect the 209 ‘tasks’ that were 
allocated across the 8 crime and disorder occurrence categories over the 6 month data 
collection period. It is acknowledged that the size and nature of the sample places 
limitations on the type of analysis that can be carried out -  especially as an initial 
examination of the data revealed 88 of the 209 ‘cases’ or ‘tasks’ to be repeat tasks or 
more accurately, updates on ongoing tasks rather than completely new tasks. This 
raises both analytical and substantive implications. On the one hand it serves as a 
finding in itself by indicating that a large proportion of tasks operate over a protracted 
period of time and are subject to regular review. In analytical terms the reduction to 
an already small sample necessarily limits the analysis to univariate or bivariate 
analysis levels. It is important to reiterate that this small-scale QCA is solely 
designed to achieve the objectives as outlined above; the emphasis is on highlighting 
patterns and relationships within the BCU data, rather than identifying correlations or 
causality within the dataset, and there is no intention to generalise the findings from 
this QCA to the wider policing population. Ultimately, it was deemed appropriate to 
undertake the QCA on the total number of tasks referenced throughout the data 
collection period because it gives a comprehensive insight into the multi-layered 
nature of routine level policing by highlighting the range of tasks (immediate 
impact/longer term strategies) identified as the most effective response to a diverging 
range of issues.
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QCA Research Questions
There were a number of areas of enquiry inherent to each of the two QCA aims and 
these have been translated into two quantitative ‘research questions’:
RQ.l. What are the main components of ‘routine’ policing in the case-study 
BCU?
The empirical conceptualisation of routine policing within this thesis has two main 
empirical components:
1) The type of crime and disorder occurrences (criminal/civil) included in the 
fortnightly tasking action plans and;
2) The nature of the tasks (policing activity) identified as the most effective response 
to these occurrences within the fortnightly tasking action plans.
RQ.2. What aspects of routine policing appear to be given the greatest level of 
priority within BCU tasking and operational policing?
To address this question it was first necessary to determine how to quantify the notion 
of ‘priority’, and importantly, how to distinguish it from the generic term used by the 
government, and in turn, police forces to reflect strategic areas of concern. In the 
quantitative section of this research the term ‘priority’ is replaced with the term, 
‘status’. Three variables within the dataset are identified as ‘proxy measures’ of 
status in an attempt to ascertain the level of importance attached to crime and disorder 
occurrences by routine police managers and frontline officers. The three variables are 
the:
■ Number of tasks allocated to each occurrence per action plan;
■ Allocation of additional money/resources to facilitate the tasks,
■ Amount of money allocated to occurrences.
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The final variable was analysed to find out the average spend on occurrence concerns, 
and to discover which occurrences received the greatest amount of additional 
financial support. These proxy measures of status provide one way of interpreting 
empirically the level of priority certain occurrences are granted within the BCU.
The nature of counter terrorism policing, and the extent of the role that it plays in 
routine policing activity forms a specific aspect of the discussion of research 
questions 1 and 2. However, the QCA reveals a number of additional findings 
pertinent to this thesis and outwith of the remit of the first two research questions. 
The QCA dataset facilitates an examination of issues such as the point in time in 
which counter terrorism first became a (regular) feature of fortnightly tasking 
meetings and the action plans generated from them, and whether the role of counter 
terrorism-related activities has increased over time (in this instance over a six month 
period). This data can be analysed in relation to the time at which the Prevent 
Strategy was implemented in Force to ascertain the extent to which policy ‘decision’ 
is manifest within the operational framework of the BCU. Ultimately, the variate 
analysis reveals a series of implicit indications regarding the role of counter terrorism 
policing at the local routine level, and thus can be seen to contribute to an assessment 
of the extent to which routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised.
It is acknowledged that these research questions constitute just one way of 
interpreting the data. The QCA could include a focus on who carries out the tasks, 
what is done in terms of specific activity, and the length of time taken to complete 
tasks. Ultimately, the most notable findings from the QCA are further explored 
through the thematic analysis of the interviews carried out with police officers and 
support staff across the case study force. The mixed method approach to data analysis 
facilitates a rigorous examination of both the evidence of counter terrorism policing at 
the local level, and the enduring challenges to counter terrorism policy 
implementation and delivery at the strategic and frontline (operational) level. 
Ultimately, it is argued that the study has developed a robust methodological 
approach to capturing empirically ‘routine policing’ that can be replicated in other 
research sites as a basis for comparison in future research.
87
3.3.3 Methodological Limitations
It is noted that some of the methodological choices within this research study may 
elicit a degree of criticism. It is recognised that ethnography has been the method of 
choice for investigating policing action in the past (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987; 
Holdaway, 1983; Smith and Gray, 1985; Waddington, 1999). The decision to carry 
out qualitative and in particular quantitative content analysis was informed by the 
main empirical proposition that underpins this thesis, namely that it is important to 
distinguish between different levels of policy for the purposes of empirical enquiry. 
The mixed-method approach to data collection and analysis facilitated an examination 
of each of these analytically distinct areas. However, it is acknowledged that the 
quantitative content analysis (QCA) is only one way of generating a measurement of 
routine policing. An alternative understanding of routine policing could have been 
obtained solely through the use of semi-structured interviews which would have 
focused on what officers say they do. Alternatively, routine policing could have been 
conceptualised through non-participant observation of tasking meetings at the BCU 
level, or indeed through the observation of what officers do on shift. In some ways 
the methodological choices were contingent on practicalities such as access. 
Ultimately, however, this research emphasises the need to move from the policy talk 
dimension to an examination of tangible decisions and operational practice. 
Therefore, it was decided that a quantitative analysis of documented crime and 
disorder occurrences and the operational tasks devised to address them provided the 
most appropriate means by which to understand routine practice.
3.4 Access and Ethics
The issue of access is a central concern for all empirical researchers and the 
challenges of securing it vary according to the nature of the research setting (formal- 
informal), and the degree of control exercised by the actors within that setting. Many 
of those who conduct police research reflect on the implications of being an 
‘outsider’. Reiner (2000) makes reference to the work of Brown (1996) who has 
written extensively on the potential obstacles to securing access when researching 
within the Criminal Justice System. Reiner distinguishes between four possible
permutations. The first he terms the ‘insider insider’. These individuals would most 
likely be police officers conducting police research (see for example, Holdaway 
1983). Such researchers would normally have an advantage in overcoming the initial 
hurdle of formal access. The second typology are deemed ‘outsider insiders’ and 
could be officers who decide to conduct police research after deciding to leave the 
service. In effect they are ‘covert participant observers’. Thirdly, ‘insider outsiders’ 
are non-police researchers who have official roles within police forces or other 
governmental organisations. They may overcome issues of formal access but will 
possibly find it difficult to secure the trust and cooperation of participants. The fourth 
permutation of ‘outsider outsider’ is where I anticipated finding myself. It is 
suggested that academics as ‘outside outsiders’ face the greatest barrier in gaining 
formal access to police forces for the purpose of research. However, according to 
Reiner (2000), such research has proliferated over the last thirty years and may come 
to dominate in the future so clearly the obstacles are not insurmountable.
Silverman (2001) highlights the importance of the initial conduct of a researcher, and 
the consequential impression that is given to prospective ‘gatekeepers’ in securing 
access to research opportunities. I adopted a number of strategies in order to secure 
access, the first of which was a formal letter to the Chief Constable. This letter 
secured a face to face meeting and gave me the opportunity to discuss the feasibility 
of conducting my research within the police force. I was conscious that the sensitive 
nature of my research agenda may have implications for the level of access that I 
would be granted. Although the time and resource concerns that governed the scope 
of the research were clearly outlined, I stated that I would retain a degree of flexibility 
in terms of the substantive research areas in order to incorporate specific areas of 
interest for the force. Although conscious of the need to maintain control of the 
research, I hoped that the end product would prove of some interest and benefit to the 
force. This meeting proved invaluable to both the immediate and longer term access 
to the research setting and I duly acknowledge the considerable support I have 
received from the Force in question.
However, in my experience there are often multiple points of entry into an institution 
and I also benefited from the professional relationships I had previously cultivated as 
both an MSc student and a Research Associate within the Cardiff Centre for Crime,
89
Law and Justice (CCLJ). I was fortunate to have a series of informal conversations 
with officers who were in a position to progress my research both ‘on the ground’ and 
by supporting my letter to the Chief Constable. I completed a number of forms 
outlining my project aims and practical requirements, and secured a meeting with the 
Director of Business Development to discuss access to key informants, and negotiate 
access to certain documents. As part of the process of securing access to the case 
study police force I was obliged to undergo security vetting by MI5. I acquiesced to 
this willingly and received ‘SC Level’ clearance with no security objection some 
months following the submission of comprehensive documentary evidence.
Ethical Considerations
The responsibilities that come with the level of access that was granted in order to 
complete this research study are duly acknowledged. A comprehensive ethical 
framework was devised in order to carry out this research which passed rigorous 
assessment by the Cardiff School of Social Sciences Ethics Committee. Moreover, 
the research abides by the ethical guidelines of the British Society of Criminology45. 
It was made clear that participation in all stages of the research process, particularly 
the interviews was voluntary, and I obtained informed consent prior to all interviews. 
Both the British Society of Criminology (BSC) and the Social Research Association 
(SRA) delineate clearly between written and informed consent. Whilst neither 
Establishment stipulate that written consent must be attained, they both offer a 
framework of principles within which a researcher must operate. I assessed the 
relative merits of these when considering the ethical implications of my research.
It is acknowledged that informed consent must be secured at every stage of the 
fieldwork. However, following consultation with my supervisors it was agreed to 
approach consent as a process and not a specific ‘event’, so that it was negotiated in 
an ongoing way. Where possible, I obtained written consent but there were occasions 
when this was not possible. Indeed, there were some instances where requiring 
written consent were ultimately counter-productive and an obstacle to participation. 
In such cases I relied on the process of ‘informed consent’. In all cases research
45 See www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm.
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participants were provided with full information -  both written and verbal -  regarding 
issues such as:
■ The role of the researcher and the title of research;
■ The independent and impartial nature of the research;
■ The level of security clearance obtained by the researcher;
■ The aims and objectives of the research;
■ How the information was to be used;
■ The voluntary nature of participation;
■ The use of interview transcriptions;
■ Those who will have access to interview transcriptions;
■ The treatment of all transcriptions and documents as anonymous and 
confidential;
■ The secure storage of all transcripts and operational documents,
■ Contact information for questions and queries.
Moreover I assured all gatekeepers and participants of the confidential nature of the 
research, and throughout the duration of the time spent collecting data it was made 
clear that both the privacy of individuals and that of the police force within the project 
would be fully observed and respected. It is acknowledged that it is often difficult to 
disguise the identity of senior level people within certain organisations. However, the 
privacy of individuals and confidential nature of the findings of the research has been 
honoured by implementing standard social science techniques in order to remove the 
identities of participants and places in the writing up of the study. Therefore the 
Force in question has been anonymised, and the research participants are referred to 
by rank or department alone.
In addition, it is understood that operational policing by its very nature is sensitive. 
The sensitivities were undoubtedly exacerbated by the nature of my empirical 
enquiries into the implementation and delivery of counter terrorism policy within the 
case study police force. The access that was granted to confidential documents and 
the meetings attended during the time in the research setting contributed to an 
understanding of some of the specific issues that confront the police on a day to day 
basis. However, a condition of access was that all operationally sensitive data be
removed prior to submission. Therefore the information contained within the 
documents and any field notes, although helpful to the structure of the research, have 
not been directly referred to, or presented within this study. It has also been ensured 
that all recordings and transcripts of interviews and operational documents have been 
stored securely in a locked cabinet.
3.5 Conclusion
This thesis suggests that the extent to which routine policing is actually being 
securitised remains a moot empirical point. This research seeks to move the empirical 
debate forward in a number of ways by highlighting how traditional approaches to 
research design and methodological strategies can be applied -  and indeed innovated 
-  in order to explore critically the issue of securitisation within routine policing. The 
conceptual framework that underpins the study facilitates an empirically rigorous 
examination of the impact of security policy on frontline police activity by 
analytically distinguishing between the policy levels of ’talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. 
In this way it is possible to ascertain the extent to which security ‘talk’, and 
‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy are actually translated 
into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing routines 
and practice. It also offers the potential to recognise and accommodate the pluralistic 
narratives about counter terrorism within and across the three geo-political security 
sites at the centre of this study -  the EU, the UK and the case study police force. The 
methodological approach that drives this research challenges the homogenising 
narrative that characterises much security and securitisation discourse by exploring 
the concepts of security ‘actor’ and the ‘referent object of security’ beyond the macro 
levels of Europe, nation and state that serves as the focus for securitisation theorists. 
Chapters Four to Six present the results generated by the methodological approaches 
to data collection and analysis that underpin this research. It is argued that the 
findings included in these chapters legitimise the two propositions put forward by this 
research study. Firstly, that it is important to distinguish analytically between 
different levels of policy-making for the purposes of empirical enquiry. Secondly, 
that academics and researchers need to move beyond a concern with policy elites and 
the ‘textual footprints’ of their talk and decisions, to a concern with the action of 
everyday, local police routines.
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Chapter Four: The Changing Nature of the Talk
‘As for counter terror ism... it’s right in the middle o f it all...the needle has shifted 
across to prevent and it’s a much greater priority ’.
[Force Command Team]
4.0: Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine the role and nature of the policy ‘talk’ 
associated with both terrorism and counter terrorism, and explore the extent to which 
such talk can be seen to have undergone, or is subject to a process of securitisation as 
understood within the theoretical framework of this thesis. At this stage it is pertinent 
to briefly revisit the conceptual framework of this research in order to consolidate an 
understanding of what constitutes policy ‘talk’ and how one can analytically 
distinguish it from concrete policy ‘decision’46. Within this research policy ‘talk’ is 
conceptualised as political or policing rhetoric and exhortation which is identified in 
the form of EU policy documents; national policy statements and debates or 
consultations and interview data generated within the case study police force. Some 
of these policy instruments are seen to operate at the level of rhetoric and exhortation, 
rather than concrete policy ‘decisions’ on the basis that they lack tangible mechanisms 
of enforcement which, if present, would necessitate some degree of organisational or 
public compliance as a consequence. The ‘powers of enforcement’ identified within 
this research include legislation, financial incentive or penalty and organisational 
compliance mechanisms such as specific frameworks of performance assessment and 
measurement.
The empirical enquiry into the nature of policy talk and the extent to which it can be 
considered ‘securitised’ focuses on the three geo-political areas at the centre of this 
research -  the EU, the UK and the case study Force. The chapter predominantly 
focuses on policy ‘talk’ at the European level, due in large part to the 
conceptualisation of all European counter terrorism policy instruments as talk or 
exhortation rather than policy ‘decision’ within this research. The first section 
provides justification for this empirical conceptualisation and explores the theoretical,
46 See Chapter Three for a more detailed explanation of the conceptual framework that underpins this 
research.
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political and societal motivations for the increased securitisation of the EU policy 
landscape in recent years. The second section focuses on the nature of the policy talk 
at the national level in the UK. It examines the political and societal influences on 
security policy-making in the UK and provides a sense of how debates around 
security and, more specifically, terrorism played out at the national level during the 
period of research. The documentary analysis also provides an opportunity to explore 
whether any discernible shifts in the nature of the talk reflects a ‘securitised 
discourse’ at the level of national security policy debate in the UK or whether it 
merely reinforces the contingent nature of public policy-making more generally. The 
final section examines the nature of both the policy and policing ‘talk’ within the case 
study force. It presents relevant findings from the analysis of selected, publically- 
available force documents and the interviews carried out with police officers across 
the force and within the case study BCU. The nature of the talk generated within the 
case study force is examined in light of the rhetoric and exhortation that characterises 
national policy talk around terrorism and radicalisation. This in turn facilitates an 
assessment of the extent to which national policy talk might be seen to resonate within 
the policing discourse at the routine policing level and thereby whether it can be 
considered to be ‘securitised’ as per the theoretical propositions put forward by 
advocates of the securitisation thesis.
The data presented in the sections on EU and UK policy ‘talk’ are generated from a 
range of policy programmes and agreements that were in operation during the period 
in which fieldwork was undertaken for this research. The list of documents identified 
as policy ‘talk’ and an explanation of the sampling logic that informed the choice of 
documents for analysis is provided in Chapter Three. However, within the context of 
this empirical chapter, it is important to reiterate that the analysis of policy talk is 
intentionally explicit and selective in due acknowledgement of the extensive textual 
analysis that has already been undertaken by a number of prominent securitisation 
theorists. It is argued that there is little utility in replicating such analyses in empirical 
research that focuses on an empirical examination of the extent to which such talk 
resonates within the more concrete dimensions of policy decision and action. Thus, 
the analysis of policy ‘talk’ here is consciously more modest, focusing on a selected 
number of policy texts as exemplars of the kinds of shifts discussed by securitisation 
theorists which, can then be used as a basis for further empirical examination in later
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chapters on ‘decision’ and ‘action’. However, this sampling logic should not be taken 
as an indication that policy talk is merely empty rhetoric and that it has no 
relationship with policy decisions and actions. Indeed, this chapter highlights a 
number of ways in which securitised talk, within the context of counter terrorism 
policy, is important. Moreover, it is clear from other areas of criminal justice policy 
such as policing and sentencing, and the widespread and influential work on moral 
panics (Cohen, 1987) that talk does have real consequences47. Indeed, it is noted that 
tough political rhetoric contributes to a general climate of opinion which places 
sentencers under pressure and may, even in the absence of concrete policy 
mechanisms, result in harsher sentencing practice (Jones and Newbum, 2005). This 
current research study argues that there are different dimensions of policy that are 
analytically distinct from each other and it can be misleading to conflate them as this 
can often lead to the imputation of action from policy rhetoric and exhortation.
4.1: The European Road (map) to Security
This section charts the development and gradual evolution of policy-setting at the EU 
level. It provides instances and justifications of conceptualising EU policy as talk or 
‘exhortation’. However, more than this, it illustrates the discernible shifts in the 
nature of the ‘talk’ -  from an emphasis on freedom to a preoccupation with security -  
and indicates the ways in which, increasingly, securitised talk impacts on the policy 
agreements established within the EU, and the very real potential it has to influence 
policy in light of the decision-making reform proposals inherent to the Lisbon Treaty. 
Balzacq (2008: 76) suggests that given the volume of EU programmes relating to 
counter terrorism and radicalisation in which discourse and ideology are increasingly 
entangled, ‘a focus on the nature and function of policy tools may contribute to an 
understanding of securitisation’. Such a shift in focus could serve a number of useful 
purposes, one of the most pertinent — to this thesis particularly -  that it can reveal how 
policy-makers translate intentions into concrete actions [italics mine]. This thesis 
agrees with the first point but contests the latter. Balzacq (2008) observes that there 
are four main strands to the EU’s policies on counter terrorism: i) the prevention of
47 It is significant to note that the political rhetoric associated with migration and asylum contributed to 
a gradual incorporation of migration policy into the constitutional structure of the EU (Huysmans, 
2000: 755).
\ /
. /
radicalisation; ii) information-sharing; iii) border management, and iv) the protection 
of critical infrastructure. According to Balzacq (2008: 77), in order to ‘render these 
polices concrete, the EU utilises distinct instruments which can be categorised in the 
following ways: regulatory (action plans), incentive (development aid), and capacity 
instruments (information exchange)’. However, if one applies the analytical 
framework of this thesis to the various programmes and agreements pertaining to 
counter terrorism and radicalisation, they remain little more than rhetoric and 
exhortation because they do not have a tangible, legally-binding framework for 
compliance attached to them.
They are not ‘decisions’ by virtue of the legal standing of EU level pronouncements 
on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which fall within the Third Pillar of the EU and in 
this case Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). Any decisions 
(in the generic sense) that are made under this inter-govemmental, third pillar are not 
binding on Member States. Rather the adoption and application of EU provisions 
under this pillar is left to the discretion of Member States. This is in salient contrast 
to the first pillar of the EU which is subject to ‘Community’ law which enforces 
compliance with regulations, directives and decisions. Such a distinction is integral to 
any discussion of the nature of security policy-making because different powers of 
command accompany such decisions. If a member state is not in compliance with a 
regulation or directive issued under EC law, it will be taken to the European Court of 
Justice and penalised. However, if a Member State does not adhere to an agreement 
reached in the inter-govemmental pillars, they will be subject to no such stringent 
sanctions. Thus, certain types of decision at the EU level can be distinguished in 
terms of the powers of enforcement that decision-makers have at their disposal48. 
However, the broader issue here is that ‘talk’ remains important for the way in which 
it ‘frames’ policy, and how it defines and problematises the objects of policy -  in this 
case ‘counter terrorism’. Thus, the analysis of policy talk is important for establishing 
what is included and excluded (but could have been included given what is already 
known about a policy problem) through the definition of governing problems, such as 
counter-terrorism. This type of analytical work has been undertaken on the
48 It is acknowledged that the Treaty of Lisbon has altered this situation by removing the pillarised 
structure of the EU. However, the pillarised structure still existed during the period of empirical 
research for this thesis and it remains to be seen whether post-Lisbon Treaty policy-making in the EU 
results in equipping the Court of Justice with powers to ensure Member State compliance.
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problematisation of transnational organised crime (Edwards and Gill, 2002) and the 
framing of ‘organised crime’ (Edwards and Levi, 2008). And yet, whilst the analysis 
of ‘framing’ sets the parameters to a problem, it cannot explain the relationship 
between routine action and the problem. This in turn validates the importance of 
distinguishing analytically between the talk, the decisions and the action for the 
purposes of empirical enquiry.
The EU field of security and counter terrorism policy is characterised by political 
complexity and ideological uncertainty. The post-cold war landscape, framed by 
increasingly open borders and a consequential concern with both the internal and 
external threats posed by asylum and migration has necessarily altered to reflect the 
enduring threats of organised crime and terrorism. The EU strategies and action plans 
devised to counter these threats provide significant insight into the role of the EU as a 
security ‘actor’ or self-titled ‘producer o f security ’ (European Council, 2007). The 
EU was founded on the principles of Freedom, Security and Justice firmly rooted in a 
shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the 
rule of law (European Council 2005a). However, a significant shift has been noted in 
the balance between these values, specifically in the form of a gradual increase in the 
emphasis placed on issues of security -  particularly in relation to migration and 
asylum policy -  but increasingly in terms of organised crime and terrorism (Guild et 
al, 2010; Balzacq and Carrera, 2006). As Balzacq and Carrera (2006: 5) argue, the 
Hague Programme is dominated by a security-led approach to meeting the ‘central 
concerns of the peoples of the States’ in so much as the ‘security of the State predates 
the freedom of the individual’49. This section presents relevant findings from an 
analysis of relevant policy measures introduced within the EU in the last 10 years 
with a particular focus on the policy programmes and frameworks in operation during 
the period of fieldwork for this current research in 2008. The aim of the documentary 
analysis is to generate insights into the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism 
are framed and understood within an EU context. The analysis of the selected EU 
documents -  identified as policy ‘talk’ -  is focused on two discursive themes, 1) the 
nature of the terrorism threat, and 2) the nature of the response to that threat.
49 This is even illustrated in the ‘freedom’ area of JHA where it can be seen the primary targets of 
border management and visa policy are illegal migration, terrorism, human and drug trafficking -  all of 
which are widely observed as operating on a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 1994).
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4.1.1 The Nature o f the Terrorism Threat from an EU Perspective
A number of the discursive themes that underpin the securitisation thesis resonate 
within key EU security policy talk. These include references to the end of the Cold 
War and the consequential reconfiguration of notions of security and security ‘actors’. 
The European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003: 2) references the end of the Cold War as 
a significant turning point for European conceptions of security:
‘The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which 
the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of 
trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of 
democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have 
perceived globalisation as a cause of frustrations and injustice. These 
developments have also increased the scope for non-state actors to play a part 
in international affairs. In much of the developing world, poverty and disease 
cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. In many 
cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict’.
It is seen to be the burgeoning frustration and insecurity in countries beyond the EU 
borders that characterise the challenges and threats to the EU. The ESS (2003: 3) 
highlights terrorism as the primary threat to the European Union; a threat that has 
evolved in the face of the political and social transformations inherent to globalisation 
to be ‘more diverse, less visible and less predictable’. Moreover, within a European 
context terrorism is framed as both an internal and external threat to security. This is 
exemplified through reference to violent religious extremism...within our own society 
and the connections made with organised crime which retains an important external 
dimension (ESS, 2003: 3-4). In many ways the ‘openness’ of the EU environment is 
observed as the source of its vulnerability to external threats and challenges.
4.1.2 The Response to the Terrorism Threat
The evolution in the nature of the terrorist threat has ensured a reframing of the 
response to the threat. In the post-Cold War era traditional notions of ‘self- 
defence...based on the threat of invasion’ (ESS, 2003: 7) have been replaced by an 
emphasis on multi-lateral cooperation, pre-emption and prevention:
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‘Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective, multilateral 
system. The response to terrorism requires a mixture of intelligence, police, 
judicial and military instruments. We need to develop a strategic culture that 
fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention. We are stronger 
when we act together’.
The ESS (2003) articulates the need for collective responsibility and mutual solidarity 
in the face of international threats. The strategy references a number of policy 
implications including the need for a robust strategic framework for countering threats 
such as terrorism. Such a framework includes the development of mechanisms for 
improved intelligence sharing between Member States and common threat 
assessments which are in turn seen as the basis for common action.
The Hague Programme (2005-2010) incorporates a detailed ‘Action Plan’ for the 
continued development of Freedom, Security and Justice as set out in the Tampere 
Programme (1999-2004). The Hague Programme retains ten core objectives. The 
majority of these objectives revolve around migration, asylum and rights and 
citizenship. However, the second core objective focuses ‘the fight against terrorism: 
working towards a global response. It has been suggested that the ten objectives that 
form the cornerstone of the Hague Programme successfully translate into ‘concrete 
policy instruments’ due to the inclusion of key actions and measures that are to be 
taken in order to ensure their adoption and application (Balzacq 2008). However, this 
is contested within the conceptual framework of this thesis. It is acknowledged that 
the objectives focused around asylum and migration management translate into 
concrete policy ‘decisions’ on account of the transfer of policies on immigration, 
asylum and free movement of persons to the realm of Community competence under 
the EC first pillar as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. However, EU counter 
terrorism and policing policy ‘agreements’ remained within the remit of the inter- 
govemmental EU third pillar and thus function at the level of policy ‘talk’.
The EU Strategy on Combating Terrorism (European Council, 2005b) reflects the 
policy talk that underpins the European Security Strategy (2003). It highlights the 
increased openness of the European environment as a conduit for freedom and 
prosperity but also as a site for exploitation. Moreover, the response to terrorism is 
framed in similar terms and it is noted that, ‘concerted and collective European action,
99
in the spirit of solidarity, is indispensible to combat terrorism’ (2005b: 2). The EU 
Action Plan on Combating Terrorism covers four work strands -  Prevent, Protect, 
Pursue and Respond -  which are articulated as a ‘comprehensive and proportionate 
response to the international terrorist threat’ (EU Council, 2005b: 3). The Protect 
strand aims to protect citizens and infrastructures and reduce vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks through the development of threat and risk assessments and the protection of 
critical infrastructure, transport security and border control. The Pursue work-stream 
seeks to investigate and impede terrorist activity through information gathering, 
analysis and exchange, undermining terrorists’ movement and activities, and 
enhancing police and judicial cooperation. The Respond work area focuses on 
minimising the consequences of a terrorist attack by increasing the capacity and 
capability to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist incident. The Prevent strand of the 
EU counter terrorism strategy focuses on tackling the issues associated with 
radicalisation and recruitment within and beyond the EU. The measures to be 
undertaken as part of Prevent fall into a range of categories which include focusing on 
environments conducive to incitement and recruitment for example prisons, and 
places of religious training and worship.
The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (EU Council, 2005d) 
was devised alongside the counter terrorism strategy. This strategy emphasises the 
importance of developing a more sophisticated understanding of radicalisation; the 
process of indoctrination and recruitment. This Strategy provides clear empirical 
examples of the ways in which the notion of terrorism and radicalisation ‘prevention’ 
is framed within an EU context. The Strategy (2005) emphasises the need to disrupt 
behaviour, limit activities, prevent access and establish a strong legal framework (EU 
Council, 2005). Although the Strategy alludes to the role of community policing in 
preventing radicalisation (but provides no details of its role in such work) there is no 
mention of the role of local communities in the prevention of radicalisation. 
Ultimately, the EU policy documents referenced thus far serve as key exemplars of 
the ways in which both terrorism and counter terrorism are framed within an EU 
context. The policy acknowledges that the immediate challenge of combating 
radicalisation and recruitment lies with the Member States at a national, regional and 
particularly the local level. However, it stresses that ‘work at the pan-European level 
can provide an important framework to help coordinate national policies’ (EU
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Council, 2005b: 8). In correspondence between the Presidency and the European 
Council (November, 2005), it is made clear that the EU can contribute in four main 
ways that cut across the four counter terrorism work-streams. The EU retains a 
strategic commitment to:
1. Strengthening national capabilities
This involves using best practice and sharing knowledge in relation to the collection 
and analysis of information and intelligence.
2. Facilitating European cooperation
This involves developing and evaluating mechanisms to enhance cooperation between 
the police and judicial authorities across Member States.
5. Developing collective capability 
This centres on maintaining EU level capacity to make collective policy responses in 
relation to the terrorist threat and to make full use of EU bodies such as Europol, 
Eurojust and Frontex50.
4. Promoting international partnership 
This includes working with agencies and institutional bodies beyond the EU to further 
develop the international consensus in relation to terrorism counter terrorism.
[Council of the European Union, November 2005: 4]
The EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism (2006) was devised alongside the EU 
Strategy on Combating Terrorism (2005). This detailed plan builds on the Action 
Plan (2001) in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings in March 2004. The Action 
Plan (2006) incorporates seven EU strategic objectives:
1. To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to 
combat terrorism;
2. To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources;
50 FRONTEX is an EU agency that was created to coordinate the operational cooperation between 
Member States in the field of border security (http://www.frontex.europa.eu~).
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3. To maximise the capacity within EU bodies and member States to detect, 
investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks;
4. To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems 
of border control;
5. To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to deal 
with the consequences of a terrorist attack;
6. To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment 
into, terrorism,
7. To target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries 
where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs 
to be enhanced.
The Action Plan (2006) includes a list of measures to be addressed within the four 
work-streams of the Strategy on Combating Terrorism (Objectives 3 -  6). This 
enabled the progress to be monitored on a regular basis by the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, with regular follow-up and updates from the Counter 
Terrorism Coordinator and the European Commission (European Council, 2005). 
Ultimately it is designed to be a ‘living document providing a snapshot of the progress 
made towards the realisation of the targets established’ (EU Council, 2006). The 
Action Plan also includes information on the competent body responsible for delivery 
of the measure, the deadline for completion of the measure and the progress made on 
completing the measure. The analysis within this thesis focuses on Objectives 3 and 6 
which retain a focus on the Pursue and Prevent strands of the EU Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism (2005). There are a number of consistent themes that emerge 
from an analysis of these two objectives which in turn provide an insight into how the 
notion of counter terrorism is framed within an EU context. The priority measures 
within Objective 3 revolve around the development and implementation of framework 
decisions on issues such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), money laundering 
and the freezing and confiscation of assets from crime, and measures dedicated to 
promoting and ensuring the use of existing EU bodies such as Europol and Eurojust. 
Furthermore, priority emphasis is placed on:
‘Improving mechanisms for cooperation for the sharing of expertise on 
protective, investigative and preventative security policies between police and
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security services...[reaching a] decision on the implementation of specific 
measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism [and] 
ensuring that law enforcement agencies (security services, police, customs 
etc.) cooperate with each other and exchange all information relevant to 
combating terrorism as extensively as possible.’
[Measures 3.3-3.32: EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, 2006].
The measures within Objective 6 emphasise the need to:
‘develop long term strategies to address the issues which contribute to 
recruitment including ‘extreme religious or political belief and socio-economic 
status...[and] promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between 
Europe and the Islamic World’.
[Measures 6.2 -  6.4: EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, 2006].
It is clear that within an EU context effective counter terrorism is synonymous with 
international dialogue, a robust legislative framework and a coordinated national 
police response characterised by tangible mechanisms for intelligence exchange and 
cross-border cooperation. In this way the counter terrorism strategies and action plans 
remain much more a strategic commitment to developing an integrated and coherent 
approach to tackling terrorism and extremism. There is no mention of the role of 
local policing in achieving any of the priority objectives and no reference to how 
progress or performance within the four work-streams -  Prevent, Protect, Pursue and 
Respond -  is to be measured by the European Council. The European security 
policies stress the crucial role of the police in relation to counter terrorism, but, as 
some observe, ‘the expected role of local policing and community policing in 
particular in the implementation of such policies is not very clear’ (Virta, 2008: 33). 
For example, there are no guidelines about how the police should include European 
internal security issues in local strategies, practices and daily police work. It is 
observed that progress in this area will remain slow due to the subsidiary principle 
which dictates that the EU cannot intervene in the arena of local politics and policing, 
which is the area where local routine policing practices can be most beneficial to the 
prevention of radicalisation and recruitment (Virta, 2008). Indeed, some EU-based 
academics observe that there are ‘still no coherent and ranked set of policy objectives 
or agreement at which level action should be taken in various policy areas and 
through what kind of co-ordination mechanism’ (Edwards and Meyer, 2008:10). This 
was most readily identified in the area of community policing where cooperation was
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seen to remain limited to exchange of information on a limited scale. In this way it is 
interesting to note the extent to which the EU approach to prevention and the priority 
attached to it contrasts with the strategies that underpin the UK approach to 
countering radicalisation and extremism (see Chapter Five).
4.1.3 The Impact o f ‘Talk ’ on Threat Assessment
Notwithstanding the lack of tangible progress in relation to the implementation of 
action plan measures across the EU, it is argued that the nature of the talk around 
terrorism and counter terrorism emanating from within the EU at this time contributed 
to a proliferation in the ‘threat assessment industry’ (Virta, 2008: 24). During the 
time the Hague Programme (2005 -  2010) was in operation, new intelligence products 
were developed to inform framework decisions in relation to countering terrorism. 
Arguably the most significant intelligence products are the EU Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report (TE-SAT) and the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(OCTA) which are viewed as, ‘important awareness tools for decision makers at 
European Level’ (TE-SAT Report, 2008: 5). It is clear that the policy talk inherent to 
EU counter terrorism strategies and action plans resonates within intelligence 
products such as TE-SAT. In the introduction to TE-SAT 2008, the Director of 
Europol observes that:
‘the transnational nature of the [terrorism] threat requires an EU-wide 
response. In order to effectively meet the challenges of counter terrorism in 
the EU, the member states must continue to develop robust cooperation and 
coordination mechanisms to facilitate information exchange and to assist in 
our understanding of the challenges that face us’.
[TE-SAT 2008: 5]
The TE-SAT report was established as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism 
Working Party (TWP) to the European Parliament in the aftermath of the 11 
September attacks in 2001. The report is generated by Europol51 on an annual basis 
and provides an overview of terrorism and terrorist activity across the EU. An 
analysis of the aims of the TE-SAT report (2008) and the nature of the data it collects
51 The TE-SAT 2007 is the first official ‘Europol’ TE-SAT as it is the first report to be published after 
the European Union delegated to Europol the power to approve the final version of the report.
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reveals much about the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are framed and 
understood within an EU context. It is a situational, trend report in that it describes 
the outward manifestations of terrorism and provides information on how terrorism or 
more specifically, terrorist attacks are changing and developing. However, it is as 
significant to note the areas not included in the reports. TE-SAT (2008) does not 
attempt to analyse the root causes of terrorism or assess the effectiveness of counter 
terrorism measures adopted across the EU despite the admission that ‘they form an 
important part of the phenomenon’ (TE-SAT 2008: 6). Furthermore, although data is 
collected on activities identified as extremism, there is no reference to radicalisation 
or recruitment.
It is made clear that TE-SAT (2008: 6) ‘is an EU report and as such aims at providing 
an overview of the situation in the EU rather than describing the situation in 
individual member states’. However, the report reinforces the lack of an EU-wide 
definition of terrorism by relying on individual Member States’ definitions of 
terrorism offences. This renders the report unable to distinguish between national and 
transnational terrorism as ‘it is often difficult to determine whether such typology is 
appropriate in all cases’ (TE-SAT, 2008: 6). It is argued that this culminates in a 
rather disparate and subjective account of terrorism across the EU and in turn 
undermines the long-term intention to achieve a coordinated approach to counter 
terrorism. The lack of a coherent conceptual understanding of terrorism also renders 
the TE-SAT description of terrorism and terrorist groups rather broad and opaque as 
exemplified by the reference in TE-SAT 2008 to:
■ Islamist terrorism
■ Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups
■ Left-wing terrorist groups
■ Ring-wing terrorist groups
c 9
■ Single issue terrorism .
Furthermore, the emphasis placed on certain ‘types’ of terrorism activity within the 
TE-SAT report also provides insight into the way in which terrorism is framed within
52 This term incorporates violence committed to change a specific policy or practice and includes 
animal rights and environmentalist groups.
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an EU context. In some ways the TE-SAT report reflects the securitised discourse 
underpinning the work of Waever (1996), Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). The 
report alludes to notions of internal and external security in relation to the origins and 
consequences of transnational terrorism. This is exemplified in the predominant 
focus on Islamist terrorism within TE-SAT reports. Although the TE-SAT reports 
highlight only one successful Islamist terrorist attack in the EU between 2006 and 
200853, and that the number of arrests for Islamist terrorism is decreasing year on 
year, it is still articulated as the ‘biggest threat worldwide’ (TE-SAT, 2009). 
Moreover, despite the absence of a successful Islamist terrorist attack within the EU 
in 2008 much of the ‘talk’ in this report focuses around transnational, Islamist 
terrorism and the threat that it poses to many EU Member States. However, it is 
perhaps most significant to note that the TE-SAT report (2008: 6):
‘discusses terrorism from a law enforcement point of view i.e. as a “crime”, 
although terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon driven by political 
motives and orientated towards political ends’.
The TE-SAT report prioritises the collection of quantitative data from law 
enforcement agencies within the EU regarding recent terrorist attacks, arrests and any 
subsequent prosecutions and convictions. It is suggested that this has a number of 
implications for the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are framed and 
understood within the EU. In particular, it presupposes that counter terrorism is 
purely a reactive, criminal justice activity. This point is exacerbated by the exclusion 
of data on radicalisation and recruitment as terrorism-related activities and the 
absence of attempts to assess effective counter terrorism across the EU which would 
inevitably highlight the role of community-based prevention initiatives. This in turn 
provides a rather one-dimensional presentation of terrorism and a narrow 
understanding of counter terrorism activity.
Furthermore, it is evident that the quantity and quality of data varies considerably 
across the EU. Europol collect data on the basis of the Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA which relates to the exchange of information and cooperation 
concerning terrorist offences. However, due to the status of the EU policy-making
53 There is evidence of failed attacks in Germany, the UK (Airplane Plot), 2006: Glasgow Airport, 
2007) and Denmark in both 2006 and 2007 and a perpetrated attack in the UK in 2008.
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process there are no enforcement mechanisms to compel Member States to 
communicate standardised information to Europol. This has a number of implications 
for the quality of the dataset that is generated on an annual basis. It precludes a 
comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the nature and amount of terrorism within 
the EU. Furthermore, the inconsistent submission of data from year to year prevents 
meaningful trend analysis. However, it is important to note that this type of 
methodological critique is not intended to undermine the role of law enforcement 
agencies in counter terrorism activity. It is merely designed to generate insights into 
the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are framed and understood at the 
EU level.
This section has highlighted the complex landscape of policy-setting within the EU. 
In particular, it has revealed how the decision-making structures within the area of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCC) pose enduring challenges 
to the effective creation of common counter terrorism policy measures and, in turn, 
their adoption and application by individual Member States. Moreover, the inherent 
diversity that characterises the national legal and judicial systems within EU Member 
States represents a major challenge to the transfer or convergence of PJCC policies 
within the EU. It can be argued that even with a successful translation of EU policy 
‘talk’ to policy ‘decision’, the current legal and judicial divergences across Member 
States would prevent the adoption and application of common policy ‘action’ within 
individual countries. However, the section has also revealed that European policy 
talk, far from being unimportant and meaningless, is both resilient and flexible in that 
it has the capacity to accommodate significant discursive shifts. This is exemplified 
in the widely-acknowledged shift in the balance between ‘freedom’ and ‘security’, 
and the now, increasingly securitised nature of policy talk at the EU level due to the 
growing preoccupation with terrorism and other associated security concerns. The 
similarities between the EU and UK policies on the policing of terrorism and 
extremism are striking, both in terms of the perception of the threat, and the strategies 
that should be implemented in order to counter the threat posed by such activities. 
However, where do the similarities end? Can the criticisms regarding the issues of 
legitimacy and accountability also be levelled at UK legislation and security policies 
associated with counter-terrorism? The next section examines the nature of security 
policy talk at the national (UK) level and explores the extent to which European talk
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has transferred or at least resonates within the ideas and policy rhetoric that 
characterise security discourse in the UK.
4.2 The Evolving Nature of Security ‘Talk’ in the UK
The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist incidents in Madrid in 
2004 and London in 2005 changed forever the nature of policy-making within the 
context of security and counter terrorism. However, it is only by analytically 
distinguishing the levels of policy that one can explore both the intricacies of policy 
transfer and the extent to which one ‘level’ might impact upon another. This 
argument is exemplified through an examination of the development of the UK 
security and policing policy-making process in recent years. While policy ‘decisions’ 
made in the UK reflect the structure and substance of many of the policy agreements 
that characterise the EU response to terrorism and extremism, the tone of UK counter 
terrorism policy ‘talk’ remained resolutely ‘American’ at least in the period 
immediately following 11 September 2001.
The US counter terrorism rhetoric retained a clear, militaristic tone epitomised by 
President Bush’s frequent reference to the ‘war on terror’ (CNN, 2003). The phrase 
became quickly synonymous with combat; a rallying call to arms in the face of an act 
of war by A1 Qaeda and the wider Muslim world. In the US, the nature of the policy 
talk was evident in both legislative and executive policy ‘decision’ with the passing of 
the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and the establishment of the Department of 
Homeland Security respectively. In the months that followed it was evident that the 
rhetoric adopted by the US had transferred to the UK political arena with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair often drawing on the ‘talk’ emanating from the States. In a 
speech given in his Sedgefield constituency in March 2004, Blair referred to the 
nature of the global threat as ‘real and existential’ and promised to ‘wage war 
relentlessly on those who would exploit racial and religious division to bring 
catastrophe to the world’ (Guardian, 2004).
However, in 2007 the UK government formally distanced itself from the use of such 
inflammatory rhetoric with a number of high profile cabinet ministers and 
government affiliates denouncing the use of the phrase ‘war on terror’ as misleading
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and damaging. Such a move simultaneously indicated a political desire to ‘resist the 
language of warfare’ (BBC, 2007), and an acknowledgement of the power of policy 
‘talk’. As Hilary Benn the then International Development Secretary observed in a 
visit to New York in 2007, ‘words do count and that is why, since this is not 
something we can overcome by military means alone, we need to find other ways of 
describing what the challenge is’ (Independent, 2007). The government’s stance has 
remained consistent reflected in the then Foreign Secretary’s observation that the 
phrase ‘war on terror’ was misleading and ‘gave the impression of a unified, 
transnational enemy, embodied in the figure of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda when 
the situation was far more complex’ (BBC, 2009). In recent times both UK political 
and policing rhetoric has drawn on an emerging discourse of ‘new terrorism’ 
exemplified by phrases such as the ‘changing nature of the threat’. The political and 
policing reference to this term is framed around the same two discursive themes 
identified within EU policy ‘talk’ -  the nature of the threat and the nature of the 
response.
4.2.1 The Nature o f the Terrorism Threat from a UK Perspective
The evolution in the nature of the threat has necessarily prompted a re-assessment of 
both the international security landscape and the understanding of the concept of 
national security. Such re-assessment has in turn changed the nature of the policy 
‘talk’ in relation to security issues such as counter terrorism and radicalisation. The 
National Security Strategy (NSS, 2008c), identified as an example of UK security 
policy ‘talk’ and exhortation within this thesis, reflects the political assessment of the 
current security threats facing the UK and outlines the strategic response to these 
threats. First published in 2003, the NSS was updated in 2008. It is this latter 
publication that forms the basis of the discussion in this chapter. Significantly, the 
nature of the policy ‘talk’ contained within the most recent National Security Strategy 
(Home Office, 2008c: 3) reflects much of the same rhetoric and exhortation that 
contextualises EU policy-setting:
‘Since the end of the Cold War the international landscape has been 
transformed. The opposition between two power blocs has been replaced by a 
more complex and unpredictable set of relationships. Economic trends, 
including more open global markets have strengthened the connections
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between individuals, societies and communities. All those are positive 
changes...but they also create new challenges. The Cold War has been 
replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which have 
the potential to undermine wider international stability’.
In line with recent developments within the EU, the UK’s NSS (2008c: 16) reflects an 
increasingly securitised discourse with particular emphasis placed on a rapidly 
changing global security landscape which has evolved since the end of the Cold War 
and is now characterised by an ‘interconnected set of threats and risks that require an 
integrated and multilateral response’. As a result the idea of national security has 
been reconceptualised to incorporate the potential impact of a diverse range of 
external yet often interconnected drivers of security and insecurity such as poverty, 
inequality and poor governance; transnational crime, pandemics and climate change; 
global trends such as globalisation and terrorism. The reference to the interconnected 
nature of many of these drivers of insecurity mirror EU policy ‘talk’ which reflects 
academic observations that many of the issues outlined above have come to operate 
on a security continuum (Bigo, 1994). This research argues that policy documents 
such as the NSS (2008) reflect the first phase of the securitisation process -  the 
identification of (existential) threats to security. This in turn sets the scene 
(alternatively viewed as the justification) for the introduction of extraordinary 
measures to counter the threats to national security. This latter stage of the 
securitisation process is identified as the ‘response to the threat’ and this is discussed 
in more detail in due course.
The predominant security challenge emphasised in the NSS is terrorism with many of 
the developments in national security strategy, structures, resources and legislation 
since 2001 focusing on or around terrorism. Many of the reform measures referenced 
in the NSS 2008 are conceptualised as policy ‘decisions’ within this thesis because 
they are imbued with compliance mechanisms in the form of legislation, ring-fenced 
funding, or performance -  or at least ‘progress’ -  assessment frameworks. In terms of 
counter terrorism specifically the NSS references the introduction of the cross- 
government strategy, CONTEST; the establishment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC); an increase in funding for counter terrorism from £1 billion in 2001 to 
£2.5 billion in 2008 and rising to £3.5 billion in 2010/11, and the introduction of new
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powers to tackle terrorism and secure successful prosecutions in terrorism-related 
cases (NSS, 2008c).
The nature and scale of the terrorist threat outlined in the NSS reflects much of the 
political and policing discourse associated with ‘new terrorism’ in recent years (see 
Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 379)54. The threat is described as greater in scale and 
ambition than the terrorist threats faced in the past. The published threat level has 
remained at severe, the second highest level since August 200655. The NSS (2008c) 
states that at any one time the police and security services are contending with around 
30 plots, 200 groups or networks and 2000 individuals who are judged to pose a 
terrorist threat. Many of these perceived threats share an ambition to cause mass 
casualties through the use of suicide attacks, and aspirations to use chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Although the level of 
organisation among these groups and networks may vary it is often complex; they 
often work together exploiting information communication technologies (ICTs) to 
share information, personnel and to spread a common ideology (NSS, 2008c: 10-11). 
The NSS also makes clear the potential links between burgeoning trans-national 
organised crime and the financing of terrorism. The contemporary situation is in stark 
contrast to the UK’s historical experience of terrorism emanating from the political 
violence in Northern Ireland. Such a shift in the nature of the threat is articulated by 
the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair:
‘The IRA, with very few exceptions, did not want to die, they did not want to 
cause mass casualties and they gave warnings. None of the three apply to the 
group of people with whom we are now in opposition. The circumstances 
have changed. The quality and quantity of the threat has changed’.
[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 4), 9 October 2007]
54 This includes the speech made by the then Director General of the Security Service, Dame Eliza 
Manningham-Buller in November 2006. See: http://www.mi5.gov.uk/Drint/Page568.html.
55 The exception to this is two short periods during August 2006 and June/July 2007 when it was raised 
to ‘critical’.
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4.2.2 The Nature o f the Response
While the previous section outlined the first phase of a ‘securitisation process’ at the 
level of policy ‘talk’, this current section provides evidence of the second phase at the 
level of policy ‘talk’; justification for the introduction of extraordinary measures to 
counter the identified, existential threats to national security. It is important to note 
that some aspects of UK policy ‘talk’ often culminate in concrete policy responses, 
identified as policy decisions within this thesis. In relation to countering terrorism 
these include the introduction of CONTEST, in particular the Prevent strand of the 
strategy; recent counter terrorism legislation which provide the police and other 
criminal justice agencies with a wide range of powers to minimise the threat of 
terrorism56 and the publication of the government’s Public Service Agreements 
(PSAs) to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international 
terrorism. The transfer of policy talk to policy decision is also reflected in the 
emphasis placed on the role of local, routine policing. This theme is integral to this 
thesis, and although it is explored in greater detail in the next chapter it is pertinent to 
reference it here as an example of the influence different levels of policy-making can 
exert upon each other and thus the importance of distinguishing between levels of 
policy development for the purposes of empirical enquiry.
The political drive to enhance the role of neighbourhood policing within the public 
police service is nothing new. The policy paper Building Communities, Beating 
Crime (2004) promoted the development of dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Teams 
(NPTs) across England and Wales. The eventual policy ‘decision’, which introduced 
the PCSO and the Police and Communities Together (PACT) meeting to the UK, was 
a key driver in attempts to make the police more accessible, visible and accountable 
and, in turn, to increase public satisfaction (Home Office, 2004b). At this point there 
was very little evidence of attempts to align neighbourhood policing with a 
discernible role in countering terrorism. It is interesting to note the context to this 
police reform proposal (and ultimate policy decision), and in particular the nature of 
the policing policy talk during this period. The consultation document references a 
‘changing world, technologies that have removed borders and barriers and a growing
56 Such powers include Section 44 Police Stop and Search and the use of Control Orders which are 
often used to tackle the threat to national security by suspected terrorists whom the UK is unable to 
prosecute or deport.
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consumer culture [which] has led to rising expectations of customer service’ (Home 
Office, 2004b). Such rhetoric contrasts sharply with the increasingly securitised talk 
that accompanied the publication of subsequent Green Papers promoting the 
importance of routine, neighbourhood policing (Home Office, 2008a).
The Green Paper, From the Neighbourhood to the National (2008a) represents the 
next step in policing reform at the local, routine level. This document overviews the 
development of Neighbourhood Policing in the UK and the attempts to improve the 
connection between the public and the police. This came at the same time as the 
publication of the National Community Safety Plan 2008-2011 which outlined the 
government’s overarching priority objectives as set out in the Public Service 
Agreements (PSAs). However it is argued that documents such as these, 
conceptualised as policy ‘talk’ within this thesis, represent an increasingly securitised 
approach to policing reform and community safety, and this is demonstrable in two 
key areas. Firstly, by placing a stronger focus on the need to reflect the increased risk 
posed by terrorism and in particular violent extremists and role of neighbourhood 
policing teams in the prevention and detecting of these potential threats (Home 
Office, 2008a), and, secondly, through references to the relationship between national 
priorities and local concerns. The first area of emphasis reinforces the rhetoric that 
has been emanating from the senior police ranks for a number of years and epitomised 
by Sir Ian Blair’s observation in the Dimbleby Lecture (BBC, 2005):
‘It will not be a Special Branch officer at Scotland Yard who first confronts a 
terrorist but a local cop or a local community support officer...it is not the 
police and the intelligence agencies who will defeat crime and terror; it is 
communities’.
The nature of both the political and policing rhetoric emerging around terrorism and 
other associated security concerns such as extremism and radicalisation really set the 
tone and unequivocally thrust community policing or more accurately Neighbourhood 
Policing into the counter terrorism sphere where traditional approaches had focused 
around the security services, Regional Counter Terrorism Units and police Special 
Branch. The second point that emphasises the increased connection between national 
priorities and local concerns -  and indeed which is also indicated in the title of the 
Green Paper -  can be seen as evidence of increased securitisation because it 
epitomises observations made by advocates of the securitisation theorists who note
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that changes at the local policing level are seen to be occurring at the same time as an 
increasing preoccupation with national and international security priorities (King and 
Sharp, 2006).
However, much of the securitised policy talk around the response to terrorism has 
remained very much at the level of rhetoric and debate and has not translated into 
concrete policy ‘decisions’. Two of the most salient examples of this are the much- 
maligned National Identity Scheme and the enduring political debates surrounding the 
extension to the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects in the UK. The National 
Identity Card Scheme is conceptualised as an example of security ‘talk’ within the 
framework of this thesis because, although it was incorporated into legislation in 2006 
in the form of the National Identity Cards Act, ultimately this policy ‘decision’ did 
not retain the legislative power to compel all UK citizens to carry an identity card. 
However, both of these debated issues reflect one of the central themes that 
characterise the nature of policy ‘talk’ in relation to counter terrorism in the UK: the 
enduring tension between national security and the maintenance of societal values and 
individual civil liberties. Moreover, they both reflect the politically turbulent and 
contingent nature of public policy-making in the UK. This research focuses on one of 
these areas; the enduring debates surrounding pre-charge detention of terrorist 
suspects.
The length of time a terrorist suspect can be held without charge has dominated much 
of the policy debates around counter terrorism in the UK from 2000 to the present 
day. During this period the policy ‘talk’ has often translated into policy ‘decision’ in 
the form of significant and frequent legislative changes. The overhaul of counter 
terrorism legislation in 2000 introduced the basic 48 hour detention, extendable to 
seven days with court permission. In 2003 this doubled to fourteen days, and 
subsequently the Terrorism Act 2006 took this to 28 days. The latter timeframe was 
introduced after Tony Blair’s attempts to secure a significant extension -  to 90 days -  
resulted in his first House of Commons defeat as Prime Minister in November 2005. 
The current pre-charge detention limit remains at 28 days but there have been a 
number of attempts to extend this timeframe, and it remains a hugely contested issue. 
In 2007, the debate was reignited by Gordon Brown’s publicly stated intention to 
make the issue a priority for his Premiership within days of replacing Tony Blair
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(Guardian, 2006). The former Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith signalled her support by 
indicating she would use the upcoming Terrorism Bill to extend the detention 
timeframe to 42 days. The government’s rationale for pre-charge extension has 
remained steadfast, that it is an imperative response to the scale and complexity of the 
threat and guided by the objective and professional assessment of the facts as 
provided by the Security Services, ACPO and Metropolitan Police Service. In March 
2008, the then Metropolitan Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations and Chair 
of ACPO TAM wrote to the Home Secretary outlining the police perspective (ACPO, 
2008b):
‘The changing nature of the threat and the intent to cause mass casualties 
without warning and without consideration to personal risk has meant that a 
decision to arrest is often made earlier than in previous counter terrorism 
investigations. Operations against violent extremists are characterised by the 
risk of having to take pre-emptive action on public safety grounds before 
evidential opportunities have been fully exploited. This sets such 
investigations apart from almost all others and when the complexity is 
considered they become unique. This requirement to take pre-emptive action 
denies the senior investigating officer the opportunity to secure available 
evidence prior to arrest. In my view there is an obvious correlation between 
the increased risk (necessitating early intervention), the increased evidential, 
technical and cross jurisdictional complexity and the risk that a greater period 
of pre-charge detention might be required within the foreseeable future’.
This perspective was corroborated by both the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
Legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who stated, ‘I anticipate that there may well be a
very small number of cases, albeit possibly cases of the utmost importance, in which
28 days may prove to be insufficient’ [Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of
Evidence (Qu. 59), 9 October 2007], and perhaps most notably, the former
Metropolitan Commissioner Sir Ian Blair who commented:
‘The number of conspiracies, the number of conspirators within those 
conspiracies and the magnitude of the ambition in terms of destruction and 
loss of life is mounting, has continued to mount, is increasing year by year and 
a pragmatic inference can be drawn that at some stage 28 days is not going to 
be sufficient’.
[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 1), 9 October 2007]
Although both indicated the possibility of the need to detain suspects for longer than 
28 days in some cases, it is important to note that both stopped short of proposing a 
set timeframe and therefore supporting overtly the government’s plan to increase the
115
detention period to 42 days. The debates on this topic are contentious and enduring, 
and the names and number of individuals in opposition to an extension distinguished 
and increasing -  all of whom remain unconvinced ‘by the evidence put forward for 
increasing the period [of detention]’ (BBC, 2007). Such opposition to an extension to 
42 days was reinforced by the fact that powers already exist to extend detention for up 
to 30 days under emergency powers dealing with grave threats such as war57. 
Unsurprisingly the most vociferous opposition to the planned policy changes 
emanated from the then opposition political parties who maintained that the 
government’s policy talk was a ‘symbolic assault on our liberty that is unnecessary’ 
and is tantamount to ‘ineffective authoritarianism’ (Damien Green: House of 
Commons Hansard Debates, 2008). In December 2007 MPs on the Home Affairs 
Select Committee, following extensive enquiry, found that there was no evidence to 
suggest it was necessary to extend the 28 day limit.
An analysis of key debates around pre-charge detention reveals a focus on two 
recurring themes. Firstly, that an extension to pre-charge detention might signal the 
return of the internment practices that characterised such policy during the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland. And secondly, that such a shift in policy would have a 
disproportionate and therefore negative effect on Muslim communities, commonly 
perceived as the primary recipient of such ‘extraordinary’ police power. The first 
issue was raised consistently by both political opponents and human rights 
organisations such as Liberty who observed advocates of an extension to pre-charge 
detention as public champions for internment (Director of Liberty, 2007). In response 
to fears regarding the return of internment practices the then Labour leadership 
proposed a series of safeguards which, it believed, would guarantee proper checks and 
balances against arbitrary treatment. Lord Carlile supported such moves stating that:
‘What we are talking about here is using the system of checks and balances, 
which is our everyday stock-in-trade in the courts, in a way that is 
proportionate to the threat and the risk’.
[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 65), 9 October 2007]
57 This is the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and its application is dependent on the declaration of an 
emergency and it is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny after seven days.
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The second theme inherent to pre-charge detention debates is the perceived 
disproportionate impact on Muslim communities. Lord Carlile stated:
there is no evidence to suggest longer detention would harm relations between
Muslims and the police and indeed, observed foreign policy was ‘more likely
to radicalise young people’.
[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 76), 9 October 2007]
Sir Ian Blair, in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on 9 October 
2007 (Qu. 17) was more reticent in his observations on the issue indicating that 
extending detention beyond 28 days would not ‘ease relations between the police and 
Muslim communities’. He identified a need to reconsider the nature of the policy 
‘talk’ associated with counter terrorism practices such as pre-charge detention, ‘to 
recast this language to be the language of community safety rather than criminal 
investigation then I think we help’. Ultimately the debates around an extension to 
pre-charge detention culminated in a defeat for Brown’s government following 
rejection of the plans in the House of Lords in October 2008.
The Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg observed Labour’s policy ‘talk’ as ‘more 
about minsters posturing and looking tough than it ever was about fighting terrorism’ 
(BBC, 2008). Furthermore the defeat of the Counter Terrorism Bill in the House of 
Lords in October 2008 was met with condemnation of the supposed, Labour 
assumption that ‘the tougher we [politicians] sound, the more effective we are in 
fighting terrorism’ (Damian Green, Conservative MP: Parliamentary Debates, 
November 2008). Such an observation links in with recent academic discourse 
associated with ‘new terrorism’ and in particular the widely-held opinion that it is 
important for the government to be seen to be ‘acting tough’ within an environment 
that is increasingly out of the government’s power to control (Mythen and Walklate, 
2005). Moreover, the ability to swiftly undermine policy ‘talk’ and its potential 
development into policy ‘decision’ following a change to national, political party 
control effectively reinforces the contingent nature of public policy-making generally 
and certainly within such a politically and publically contested area such as security 
and terrorism. In light of this perhaps it is more accurate to view some aspects of 
counter terrorism ‘talk’ as examples of politicised talk rather than securitised talk. All
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of these issues are integral to the theoretical and empirical frameworks that underpin 
this research and will be revisited in the discussion in Chapter Seven.
4.3. The Nature of the ‘Talk’ within the Case Study Force
This section examines the nature of both the policy and policing ‘talk’ at the Force 
and BCU level. The section incorporates selected findings from the analysis of both 
relevant documentary sources and the interviews carried out with police officers 
across the ranks of the case study Force and BCU. The textual ‘talk’ is identified as 
such for a number of reasons. Firstly, it comprises publicly-available information 
relating to the Force’s overall vision, core values, and key objectives. And secondly, 
although it provides a link with the Force’s strategic aims, and key elements of the 
National Intelligence Model (CENTREX, 2005) are referenced to reflect various 
operational requirements, it does not incorporate any tangible mechanisms of 
compliance and only references pre-existing performance assessments and targets. 
However, both the textual and verbal talk provide an empirical opportunity to explore 
the extent to which national policy ‘talk’ around terrorism and radicalisation is visible 
at the individual Force level, which in turn facilitates an examination of the extent to 
which policy talk at the local policing level has become increasingly securitised.
The Force Annual Plan (2007-2008) in operation at the time of data collection 
provides an empirical opportunity to explore these types of theoretical debates, and 
the analysis of such ‘textual talk’ generates interesting information. Ultimately, the 
extent to which Force level policy talk reflects the ‘securitised’ rhetoric emanating 
from the national level is questionable. In some respects there is evidence of this as 
key Force documents highlight an overt commitment to achieve national priorities set 
by the Home Office (HO) in documents such as the National Community Safety Plan 
(2008-2011) as well as the local priorities identified by communities at PACT 
meetings. The reference to national priorities in a Force-specific document reflects 
aspects of a process of increased securitisation as identified by theorists such as King 
and Sharp (2006) who observe the gradual creep of national preoccupations into local 
policing priorities. The case study Force Annual Plan references the six community 
safety themes outlined in the National Community Safety Plan (2008-2011), one of
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which is ‘preventing extremism and countering terrorism58. The Annual Plan also 
incorporates the government’s Key Strategic Priorities for the Police Service (2007-
2008), which includes ‘protecting the country from terrorism and domestic 
extremism’59. However the nature of the talk at the Force level in respect to these 
issues differs markedly from that espoused at the national level. Whereas the national 
‘security talk’ can be seen to some degree to reflect the EU’s preoccupation with risk 
perception and its ‘entailing emergency discourse’ (Edwards and Meyer, 2008: 18), 
the talk around counter terrorism and associated security concerns is rather 
subordinate to other operational priorities. This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
need for individual Forces to respond to the diverging environments that they police.
However, it is a significant to note that the amount of securitised talk decreases as one 
‘drills down from the national to the local, particularly as the role of routine, 
neighbourhood policing is often at the forefront of policing and political rhetoric 
associated with countering terrorism and extremism. The case study Force identified 
countering terrorism and extremism as a Force priority60 but the references to what 
must be done and how it will be achieved within the Force are somewhat ambiguous. 
The operational activities in relation to terrorism and extremism included reducing the 
climate of fear; promoting good community relationships; gathering intelligence from 
communities, and engaging with partner agencies. The document does not indicate 
how these activities will be carried out in practice and there is no direct reference to 
the government’s CONTEST Strategy (2003; 2009) or to the Prevent strand. 
Moreover, the references to performance assessment and review appear to corroborate 
this observation. The Annual Plan 2007-2008 includes an overview of activity-based 
costing (ABC) that seeks to place an accurate cost on what an organisation
58 The other national community safety priorities are: making communities stronger and more 
effective; reducing crime and Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) and building a culture of respect; creating 
safer environments; protecting the public and building confidence, and improving people’s lives so
they are less likely to commit offences or re-offend.
59 The other national strategic priorities are to: reduce overall cnme by 15%; enable people to feel safer 
in their communities; bring more offenders to justice, and strengthen public protection (particularly in 
relation to increasing capacity and capability for dealing with widespread threats such as serious and 
organised crime.
60 The other force priorities in 2007-2008 are identified as the need to: tackle drug-related crime; 
reduce distraction burglaries; combat ASB and disorder; identify areas affected by town and city 
disorder; reduce, detect and prevent violent crime; establish drug intervention programme (DIP), and 
enhance technology (for example, intelligence/incident databases)
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‘produces’. In order to measure the activities undertaken by police officers at a 
Divisional (BCU) level each BCU undertakes a 2-week study that requires all officers 
to record their activities at 15 minute intervals according to a standard Home Office 
list of codes. The HMIC Baseline Assessments cover a range of areas which include: 
reducing crime (volume crime); investigating crime (including serious and organised 
crime, and promoting safety. Within the Force Annual Plan there is no reference to 
performance in relation to countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. 
There is reference to measurement in relation to stop and searches under PACE 
legislation but not to stop and searches under S44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. These 
findings appear to suggest that the inclusion of ‘countering terrorism and preventing 
extremism’ as a force priority is little more than a general, strategic objective that 
pays lip service to national requirements.
4.3.1 The Changing Nature o f the ‘Talk’: From Headquarters to Neighbourhoods
This section examines the extent to which national talk associated with terrorism and 
other security concerns such as extremism and radicalisation were observed within the 
case study Force, and particularly within the case study BCU. By analysing 
empirically the nature of the talk emanating from different police ranks it is possible 
to begin to ascertain whether there is evidence of a process of securitisation at work 
within routine policing in the UK. An effective way to assess the securitised nature of 
the talk -  at all levels within the case study force -  was to take account of the length 
of time it took for officers or policing support staff to make reference to terrorism or 
other associated security concerns. During the process of setting up and subsequently 
carrying out the interviews, it was made clear that one of the primary aims of the 
research was to examine the nature of routine policing at the BCU and 
Neighbourhood Policing Team levels. One of the most significant findings from an 
initial analysis of all of the semi-structured interviews carried out for this research 
revealed that it took a longer period of time (if at all) for terrorism to be referenced 
the further one ‘drilled down’ through the police ranks of the case study Force. 
Furthermore, where terrorism or associated security concerns were referenced the 
nature of that ‘talk’ differed markedly according to policing rank and responsibility. 
The terrorism talk espoused by chief officers (at both the HQ and BCU levels) more 
closely reflected the policy talk emanating from within the political and policing
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arenas at the national level. This includes clear reference to the need to embed 
counter terrorism strategies into established neighbourhood frameworks and processes 
and the integral role of local, neighbourhood policing in effective counter terrorism 
work. This is epitomised by the following observation made by a member of Force 
Command, ‘as for counter terrorism...it’s right in the middle of it all [officer tasking]’ 
(Force Command2).
The more limited observations associated with terrorism within Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams were characterised by references to terrorism as a general, macro 
occurrence in other ‘policing areas’ and countries, and, when reference was made to 
counter terrorism strategies and activity ‘in-Force’ it was the work of Special Branch 
and designated counter terrorism and radicalisation teams such as Channel Project 
that were highlighted rather than the role of routine officers on the frontline. As one 
PCSO states, ‘I don’t really think of it [counter terrorism] as being part of my job’ 
(BCU PCSOl).
Much of the policy talk or rhetoric that emanates from the upper echelons of the case 
study Force reflects aspects of the securitised talk and decisions61 identified at the 
national level. This includes reference to the change in operational emphasis from 
‘pursuing terrorists’ to ‘preventing radicalisation’, and the fundamental importance of 
embedding counter terrorism work in both the strategic framework and operational 
activity of routine, neighbourhood police officers. This is reflected in the follow 
observations:
‘I think when Gordon Brown took over, he kind of took a look at it [counter 
terrorism strategy] and said ‘this isn’t right...we’re spending 99% of our 
money on pursue and nothing on prevent...since then the needle has shifted 
across to prevent and it’s a much greater priority’.
[Force Command2]
Prevent must be embedded in neighbourhood policing. That structure is well 
trodden; our Neighbourhood Policing Teams are in place, out local partners 
are in place...eyes and ears, hearts and minds...everything is there.
[BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism]
61 Such decisions include the cross-govemment CONTEST strategy and in particular the Prevent 
strand.
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It is widely observed at the senior, strategic policing levels that the role of routine 
police officers in counter terrorism work should be made more explicit to those on the 
frontline. This appears crucial to the effective implementation and longer term 
establishment of security strategies such as Prevent which are contingent on local 
officer understanding and application. The Case Study BCU Lead for Counter 
Terrorism acknowledges the need to promote the role of counter terrorism work at the 
routine policing level, ‘what we’ve got to do now is to make sure that the Prevent 
ethos is moved from the unconscious to the conscious...’.
Such rhetoric takes on increased relevance following the analysis of interviews 
carried out with senior BCU officers and those at the frontline of neighbourhood 
policing. The findings suggest that very often counter terrorism work is an 
unconscious practice:
‘If you were to say to one of our PCs what are you doing about terrorism, 
they’d probably say ‘well, nothing’. They might get someone in custody with 
a multitude of credit cards in different names; they might not immediately link 
that with terrorism. They might think ‘I’m just dealing with a big fraud scam’. 
But they refer it on because they’re suspicious. So, often they are doing 
something about it, they just don’t realise that they’re doing anything about it’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector4]
It is significant to note that such observations are reinforced through interviews with 
the aforementioned PCs. It became quickly apparent that police officers based within 
the case study Neighbourhood Policing Teams did not voluntarily ‘talk’ about 
terrorism or other associated security concerns when asked about their day to day 
routine activity. Out of 14 interviews62 carried out with members of Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams only 3 referenced terrorism or any form of counter terrorism work of 
their own volition. This is an interesting finding given the selection of the case study 
Force and BCU as a HM Government prioritised, Pathfinder police area. More 
specifically, this finding demonstrates the dissonance between policy ‘talk’ at the 
level of the EU, the UK and the BCU policing. The EU action plans and UK 
strategies highlight terrorism as an external threat but in terms of routine policing this
62 This number refers to the ranks of Sergeant, PC and PCSO and excludes interviews undertaken with 
NPT Inspectors.
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detailed, high-political, talk has no resonance. The overwhelming majority of NPT 
officers talk about their job in relation to the nature of criminality in policing areas, 
tasking priorities, PACT commitments and the role of NPT officers to provide ‘high 
visibility reassurance to the public’.
The majority of references to terrorism and associated security concerns were only 
made following direct questions pertaining to this theme towards the end of the 
research interview. When prompted to offer observations on the role of counter 
terrorism work within routine, local police practice, the nature of the ‘talk’ is 
generalised and abstract. In many instances reference is made to historical 
‘complacency’ and ‘living in a world where terrorism is more prevalent’. The 
generalised nature of such terrorism talk is perhaps unsurprising in light of the fact 
that police officers also indicate that they get a lot of their information about terrorism 
from ‘reading the papers’ [BCU Neighbourhood Sgt2] and ‘watching the news like 
everyone else’ [BCU Neighbourhood PC4].
Although it is widely acknowledged that there has been an increase in general talk 
about counter terrorism within the BCU the overwhelming number of NPT officers 
talk about counter terrorism work as a specialism that is noticeably removed from the 
day to day operational practice of routine police officers:
‘For me I still think, right there are people there doing that and it’s a little bit 
more secretive and stuff. Plus, you’re a bit wrapped up in who got burgled 
where last night’.
[Neighbourhood PCI]
‘When I think counter terrorism policing I think specialism. I don’t really 
think of it as my job to prevent it; it’s not like I ignore it, it would be more for 
me to know about it if it was happening and to pass on anything that I do 
have’.
[Neighbourhood PCS02]
These observations demonstrate effectively that the counter terrorism rhetoric at the 
national level appears to have got ‘lost in translation’ at the local policing level. The 
national preoccupation with terrorism and associated security concerns, and the vital 
role of local police officers in addressing these concerns does not resonate to any
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significant degree at the neighbourhood level, at least not in terms of the way in which 
officers ‘talk’ about their work. Counter terrorism work is still regarded as a 
‘specialism’, far removed from the working practices of routine officers. It is a stark 
contrast from the contemporary policing landscape articulated through national text 
and talk. Moreover, the observations highlight the importance of the public service 
agreements (PSAs), performance targets and strategic assessments associated with 
community safety partnerships for understanding routine policing. Such comments 
also go some way to explaining the relative marginality of securitised issues like 
counter terrorism to these routines. In short, securitised issues remain specialised 
rather than routine. Hence the significant limits placed on their ‘contagion’ (Hillyard, 
1987) of policing in England and Wales (as contrasted with West Belfast in Northern 
Ireland).
However, it is also important to note that the majority of interviews reveal that the 
success of Prevent and in particular, embedding the strategy’s central structures and 
processes into the strategic and operational framework of routine policing has yet to 
be realised. This is a pertinent finding in light of the central aim of this thesis to 
explore empirically observations that routine policing is becoming increasingly 
‘securitised’. These types of findings reinforce one of the central conclusions arising 
from this research, that ‘securitisation’ is first and foremost a process which is seen to 
be evident to a greater or lesser degree at different levels of policy-making and 
implementation.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a number of pertinent findings to the theoretical and conceptual 
debates that underpin this thesis. It provides an account of how EU, UK and police 
force levels frame the problem of both terrorism and counter terrorism. The 
documentary analysis reveals that counter terrorism talk is dominated by an external 
threat narrative and therefore counter terrorism is articulated as a coordinated 
response to that theat. More generally, the chapter identifies the vital role of rhetoric 
and exhortation in the policy-making process; the ways in which it initiates and 
sustains public and political debate and acts as a rhetorical platform for public policy­
making in the UK. Moreover, it reveals the fluid and diverging nature of counter
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terrorism talk across international, national and Force settings according to various 
political and societal preoccupations and the consequential conceptualisations of 
security. Finally, while findings do identify evidence of a process of increased 
securitisation, they also demonstrate that the extent of such securitisation varies and 
indeed diminishes as the empirical examination moves from the national to the local 
policing level.
Crucially, the findings presented in this chapter are the first stage in building an 
increased understanding of the nature of securitisation as applied to counter terrorism 
policing policy. It sets the scene for the identification of securitisation as a ‘process’ 
and that various stages of this are visible at different levels of policy-making. It is 
possible to break down the process of securitisation into three component parts, 1) the 
identification of an existential threat, 2) the development of tangible mechanisms to 
respond to the identified threat, and 3) the adoption and utilisation of these 
mechanisms ‘on the ground’. This chapter has demonstrated that, quite uniquely, all 
three parts of the securitisation process can take place at the level of policy ‘talk’ and 
debate. These observations will be further developed in the following chapters which 
focus on policy ‘decisions’ and ‘action’, and the relationship each policy level shares 
with the process of securitisation as applied to counter terrorism policing.
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Chapter Five: ‘What Gets Measured Gets Done’: National Policy at
the Local Level
Being brutally honest? I f  you judged me on my performance in relation to counter 
terrorism issues it would become more mainstreamed. I f  Vm judged on it, I ’ll get it 
done. That’s the way it is.
[BCU Commander3]
5.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore the extent to which local routine policing is 
becoming increasingly securitised as a consequence of the policy ‘decisions’ made 
within the arena of counter terrorism. In order to achieve this aim empirically it is 
important to retain a clear understanding of what counts as a policy ‘decision’ within 
the analytical framework of this thesis. In particular, how does one distinguish 
empirically between policy ‘talk’ and policy ‘decision’ when conducting a critical test 
of the securitisation thesis? The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
section outlines the executive ‘decisions’ made about counter terrorism policy at the 
national level in the UK, and focuses particularly on the CONTEST Strategy (Home 
Office 2009). The second section examines the Prevent strand of CONTEST (ACPO, 
2008a), which, it is argued, reflects an explicit attempt to embed counter terrorism 
work into routine policing. The final section interrogates the extent to which national 
counter terrorism policy ‘decisions’ are incorporated into the strategic framework of 
local, routine policing. This is achieved through a systematic analysis of case-study 
documentation and interview data pertaining to the strategic framework of the Force. 
The overarching intention is to articulate why a focus on decisions made about 
counter terrorism policy helps to conceptualise routine policing for the purposes of 
critiquing the Securitisation Thesis.
The distinctions made between levels of policy-making, and the terminology used 
when conceptualising policy instruments or ‘decisions’ in particular are all-important. 
An examination of previous research into policy formation and policy implementation 
reveals a tendency to focus on the more concrete manifestations of policy in the form 
of policy statements, legislation and regulations. This is perhaps in part because such
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manifestations of policy are seen to capture the ‘actual choices of government’ 
(Bernstein and Cashore, 2000: 70). The work of Jones and Newbum (2007) draws 
similar distinctions between two key dimensions of policy concerned with ‘process’ 
and ‘substance’ respectively. They suggest that policy can be considered 
substantively through an examination of the more concrete manifestations of policy in 
terms of policy content and instruments. Balzacq (2008) highlights the importance of 
focusing on policy instruments, and examines the policy tools directly associated with 
securitisation in the arena of EU responses to terrorism. Drawing on the ‘new 
governance’ literature, Balzacq (2008: 76) suggests that it is important to shift the 
study of securitisation away from discourse and towards the functions and 
implications of the ‘empirical referents of policy -  policy tools or instruments -  that 
are used to alleviate public problems defined as threats’.
Chapter Three provides a detailed discussion of the analytical distinctions made 
between the different levels of policy within this thesis. However, the key point to re­
iterate here is the distinction between the various dimensions of policy ‘substance’ 
(Jones and Newbum, 2007) and that one should beware of conflating the different 
levels -  from expressive policy rhetoric to concrete action. Security policies about 
counter terrorism and radicalisation -  at both the international and national level -  
incorporate a range of strategies, objectives and intervention activities. This thesis 
proposes the extent to which policy responses function as policy ‘decisions’ is 
dependent on a number of fundamental criteria. A policy response to terrorism or 
extremism is categorised as a policy ‘decision’ if it has some form of enforcement 
mechanism attached to it which would in turn necessitate some degree of 
‘organisational or public compliance’ as a consequence. Such powers of enforcement 
might be characterised by legislation, financial incentive and/or organisational 
compliance mechanisms. The UK’s CONTEST Strategy is identified as a security 
policy ‘decision’. The Pursue strand is imbued with compliance mechanisms in the 
form of legislative ‘decisions’ which provide police officers with special powers. 
Moreover, the implementation and delivery of the Prevent strand is subject to a 
number of progress inspections and a series of performance assessments at both the 
local police and community safety partnership levels. However, the key issue to be 
explored is the extent to which such compliance mechanisms are evident at the local 
policing level. In other words, to what extent do national security policy ‘decisions’
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inform strategic decision-making at the BCU policing level? Such issues have 
implications for a critical test of the suppositions that routine policing is subject to 
increased securitisation.
5.1 The CONTEST Strategy: securitised policy decisions in the UK
The following section focuses on the UK’s current counter terrorism ‘CONTEST’ 
strategy as it provides the context for the empirical research undertaken for this thesis 
and the institutional setting for alleged securitisation in the UK. The collective, cross­
party effort on tackling terrorism is taken forward by the Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism (OSCT) which provides strategic direction for counter terrorism in 
support of Ministers, including through CONTEST programme boards63. The 
strategy, first published in 2003 and subsequently re-launched in 2009 comprises four 
work-streams — Pursue, Prepare, Protect and Prevent. It is important to note that 
whilst CONTEST is not a statutory instrument, the authority of the strategy (and thus 
its inclusion as a policy ‘decision’ within this thesis) rests on a number of key factors. 
Firstly, significant funding has been allocated to the implementation of the strategy 
and money is ring-fenced for the development of associated roles, functions and 
initiatives -  particularly within the Prevent strand at the level of local, routine 
policing. Furthermore, the strategy - again particularly in the area of Prevent -  is 
subject to HM Inspection and progress and performance is monitored through the 
development of new Public Service Agreements (PSAs) for countering terrorism and 
performance measures for local authorities and the police (APACS) 64.
The CONTEST strategy is the current, executive policy instrument for countering 
terrorism in the UK. It was first launched in 2003 motivated in large part by the 
tangible shift in the nature of the threat and the perpetration of terrorist acts so starkly 
exemplified by the 11 September attacks in the US in 2001. Up until this point the 
UK’s experience of terrorism had very much focused on the threats and actions of the 
IRA (1969 -  1998) and the counter terrorism policies of the time reflected the
63 See Diagram 5.1.
64 The extent to which such performance assessment mechanisms are evident at police Force and local 
BCU levels will be examined in the next section of the Chapter.
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political and sectarian nature of this activity65. The ‘new terrorism’ landscape that 
emerged following 11 September 2001 was imbued with an international dimension 
characterised by religious justification and a wide-ranging political and religious 
agenda far beyond traditional concerns with single, ‘regional’ issues. The 
consequential change in the nature of the threat prompted a swift and dynamic shift in 
policy-making and policing practice.
CONTEST (Home Office, 2009) sets out a comprehensive plan for dealing with the 
terrorist threat with the four key elements reflecting the breadth of the counter 
terrorism network in the UK. These ‘work strands’ incorporate a range of ‘high’ and 
‘low’ policing strategies (Brodeur, 1983), statutory, voluntary and community 
partnership working and community-generated initiatives. The primary aim of the 
Pursue strand is the disruption of terrorist activity through a focus on Security Service 
and police investigation and criminal justice prosecution. This policy strand serves as 
a clear and contemporary example of securitised decision-making in the UK as it 
works to strengthen the policing and legal frameworks by facilitating the use of 
deportation, proscription, and the exclusion of ‘dangerous individuals’ where 
appropriate. The Protect strand seeks to reduce the vulnerability of the UK and its 
interests overseas. It incorporates a number of strategies to enhance the resilience of 
the critical national infrastructure and external border security. It also aims to provide 
enhanced protection within crowded places by working with architects and local 
council partners to ‘design-in’ safe areas, and uses cutting edge biometric technology 
for monitoring air, sea and rail travel (Home Office, 2009). The Prepare work-stream 
focuses on maximising the response to a terrorist incident whilst simultaneously 
minimising its effects. Those in receipt of counter terrorism training include city 
centre retail outlet managers, and particularly those who operate within the night-time 
economy (NTE).
It is the Prevent strand of CONTEST that is the central focus of this research. It 
represents a notable departure from the other work-streams in a number of ways. The 
primary aim is to prevent support for violent extremism by identifying and supporting 
vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation. It serves as the
65 See Chapter Two for more detailed discussion.
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central empirical focus of this research because local, routine policing has primary 
responsibility for its implementation on the ground. In addition, and pertinent to the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, the Prevent strategy constitutes a tangible 
manifestation of the re-conceptualisation of national security that has taken place in 
the UK in recent years. In the past national security has focused on the protection of 
the state and its interests from attack by other states. The security landscape created 
by both the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the end of the Cold War signalled an 
emergence of both internal and external security threats. The terrorist incident in 
London on 7 July 2005 thrust the internal/external security dynamic to the forefront of 
policy-making in the UK. This is evident within the Prevent strategy and its focus on 
ensuring communities are resilient enough to counter radicalisation and extremism 
and crucially, the extent to which they are prepared to cooperate with policing 
authorities to offer information and assistance to counter such a domestic threat.
However, the disproportionate focus of the Prevent strategy on Muslim communities 
has generated wide-ranging and enduring criticism. The government re-launched 
CONTEST in March 2009 following the publication of 4Prevent: Progress and 
Prospects’ (HMIC, 2008). Officially the launch of CONTEST 2 reflected an 
opportunity to take account of the evolving threat, and incorporate lessons learned and 
the new challenges faced by the UK from international terrorism (Home Office,
2009). However, it is unofficially (yet widely) considered that the re-launch was 
prompted by recognition of the failure to progress the Prevent strand, a strategy 
observed recently and unequivocally as ‘failed and friendless’ (Thomas, 2010: 442). 
Indeed, the main changes to the strategy are focused on the Prevent strand66 which, 
the HMIC (2009: 3) observes, needs to ‘improve understanding about what can be 
done to prevent vulnerable people becoming terrorists’. The motivations for 
radicalisation and extremism are beyond the remit of this thesis. However, in terms of 
this research, the decision to re-launch CONTEST following rigorous inspection of 
the Prevent strand has implications for debates around the increased securitisation of 
routine policing.
66 Notwithstanding changes to the Prepare work strand which reflect technological advancement in the 
detection and response to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) terrorist incidents.
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5.2 The Prevent Strand of CONTEST67
On a conceptual level Prevent is an important empirical example of the transferral of 
security policy ‘talk’ into security policy ‘decision’. It is a tangible manifestation of 
the rhetorical drive away from the traditional hard-edged, and covert approach to 
counter terrorism towards a softer, community-based approach to countering terrorism 
and associated security concerns such as radicalisation and extremism. Furthermore, 
the aim is for these operational initiatives to be undertaken by police officers at the 
BCU level and more specifically the Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) level. All 
of these operational developments are subject to financial incentive, regular 
inspection and comprehensive performance assessment. This in turn has implications 
for a critical examination of the securitisation thesis as applied to counter terrorism 
policing in that it represents discernible attempts to embed counter terrorism policing 
into mainstream, routine policing. This is demonstrated both in the rhetoric (‘talk’) as 
reflected in statements such as, ‘the overall vision will be to mainstream counter 
terrorism Prevent functions into everyday policing’ (ACPO, 2008: 8) and the concrete 
strategies devised to achieve this. This section outlines the key objectives and 
methods of delivering the Prevent policy before examining the mechanisms of 
compliance which denote its conceptualisation as a policy decision within this thesis.
The primary aim of Prevent is to undermine support for violent extremism by 
identifying and engaging with groups or individuals within communities who may be 
vulnerable or susceptible to radicalisation. The strategy highlights the need for multi­
agency partnership working, and the promotion of community-based policing 
principles in order to work with communities to reduce the opportunity for 
radicalisation. These principles are reflected in the strategy’s seven key objectives.
These are to:
1. Undermine extremist ideology by helping to support mainstream voices and 
narratives;
67 At the time of the completion of this thesis the Home Office announced it was to undertake a review 
of the Prevent strand of CONTEST, with a clear separation between Prevent (Home Office lead) and 
integration (Communities and Local Government lead).
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2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism by helping to strengthen 
vulnerable institutions;
3. Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists by 
encouraging them to follow positive and compelling alternatives;
4. Increase the resilience of communities to engage with and resist violent 
extremists,
5. Effectively address grievances.
These are supported by two cross-cutting work streams:
6. Develop PREVENT-related intelligence, analysis and research,
7. Enhance strategic communications
[ACPO, 2008:6]
5.2.1 The Role o f Local Routine Policing
One of the foremost defining aspects of Prevent within the context of this thesis is the 
overriding emphasis it places on the role of routine policing in the effective delivery 
of its operational initiatives68. Moreover, the strategy reflects the shift from a reliance 
on covert tactics and legislative enforcement to the promotion of community 
‘engagement’ and ‘intervention’. The drivers for the adoption of a preventative 
strategy at the local policing level are understood in terms of the need to address 
increasing concerns over community cohesion, and consequently, the need for 
enhanced community engagement. A key distinction between the Prevent strand and 
its CONTEST policy counterparts is the emphasis placed on local authority agencies 
and community organisations in taking a lead in the implementation and delivery of 
the policy agenda. As such it reflects much of the policy ‘talk’ that increasingly 
informs contemporary counter terrorism policy in the UK. As Spalek (2008a) 
suggests, Prevent represents a softer, bottom-up, approach to counter terrorism and 
highlights the need to implement community-based policing principles in order to 
work with communities to reduce the opportunity for radicalisation. The utilisation of
68 Conceptually, routine policing can be usefully divided into two operational categories: response and 
neighbourhood policing. The conceptual understanding of routine policing within this thesis is 
examined in greater detail in Chapters Three and Six.
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community-based policing methods within a counter terrorism context represents a 
tangible transfer of security policy ‘talk’ (the shift from ‘pursue’ to ‘prevent’) to the 
security policy ‘decision’ arena.
An increasing preoccupation with community cohesion and engagement ensures that 
these issues have gradually become core areas of routine police ‘business’, and have 
increased the emphasis placed on community policing, more latterly re-conceptualised 
as Neighbourhood Policing. Increasingly, community engagement strategies are 
operationalised through Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). The NPTs are an 
example of the implementation of a policy decision and subsequent translation into 
policy action in the form of tangible change to police practice. The principles of 
Neighbourhood Policing were established following implementation of the National 
Policing Programme (see 2007a). These include:
1. Every community should have accessibility to, and familiarity with a 
dedicated team;
2. Teams should have influence through partners and key networks,
3. Teams should develop successful intervention plans to address local priorities 
and achieve impact, [italics mine]
These three principles and the Neighbourhood Policing Teams that embody them are 
integral to the successful delivery of the Prevent Strategy as it is acknowledged that 
‘the bedrock of Prevent is to be found within the principles of neighbourhood 
policing’ (ACPO, 2008: 22). Diagram 5.1 below outlines the structure of Prevent, 
specifically highlighting the activity at the local policing and partnership levels.
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Diagram 5.1: Prevent Delivery Structure
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5.2.2 Structure, Roles and Responsibilities
The local delivery of Prevent work -  to be embedded into mainstream routine activity 
-  is widely acknowledged to be the most critical area of operation (ACPO, 2008: 32). 
The local Prevent work is designed to take place within BCUs and will deliver the 
services at the most local level. The resources for carrying out this work are to be 
found from the officers and staff already located within BCUs and focus around work 
already in place (i.e. Neighbourhood Policing Teams). The exception to this is the 
Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) who are funded directly from 
Westminster and are a Force-wide resource.
The Prevent agenda delineates between two main roles at the BCU level; Community 
Engagement and Counter Terrorism Intelligence, although it is thought in some cases, 
the roles may be performed by the same group of staff.
The roles and responsibilities associated with Community Engagement include:
■ engaging with neighbourhood policing teams and associated partners to 
develop and deliver briefings and communication;
■ carrying out neighbourhood mapping;
■ facilitating the work of school liaison officers with regard to Prevent activity, 
particularly around vulnerable sites;
■ supporting and facilitating Channel Project interventions,
■ acting as the lead point of contact for the local consequence management of 
any counter terrorism activity (links with the Prepare strand of CONTEST).
[ACPO, 2008: 37-38]
The overarching role for counter terrorism intelligence (officers) is to provide the link 
between Prevent and Pursue by enabling appropriately graded intelligence from 
Special Branch and Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units to be effectively 
disseminated within BCUs. It is intended that this will ensure a greater understanding 
of the counter terrorism issues within a BCU and consequently, a higher prominence 
to be given to Prevent-related tasks. The more specific tasks include:
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■ contributing to the development of neighbourhood mapping and community 
intelligence by working alongside neighbourhood policing teams;
■ providing appropriate and relevant briefing material on counter terrorism- 
related issues for BCU staff and officers,
■ liaise with the local Channel Project team to facilitate the development of 
appropriate assessments of locally identified, vulnerable individuals or groups.
There is evidence to be found in terms of the transfer of such ‘talk’ to the level of 
‘decision’ through an assessment of key Prevent strategies and the methods of 
application at the level of local, neighbourhood policing.
5.2.3 Operationalising Prevent: The Focus on ‘Community'
It is argued that the notion of ‘community’ is the most fundamental aspect of the 
Prevent strategy as it is the prefix to the effective delivery of its most central 
component parts -  ‘policing’, ‘engagement’, ‘intelligence’, ‘knowledge’ and 
ultimately, ‘safety’. Although the Prevent strategy delineates between areas of police 
practice for example, community engagement and intelligence gathering [ACPO, 
2008: 33-34], it demands simultaneously an operational interplay between the 
component parts outlined above. As a result it can be challenging to distinguish 
analytically between the different elements of police work. Indeed the findings from 
this research indicate that community engagement and community intelligence 
gathering often operate on a continuum on the policing front-line, and often culminate 
in the production of ‘community knowledge’. It is acknowledged that intelligence 
gathering in the context of counter terrorism work is traditionally undertaken by 
Special Branch and Counter Terrorism Units (ACPO, 2008: 9). The PREVENT 
programme refers explicitly to intelligence as a pre-requisite for effective 
‘intervention’, and incorporates a number of intelligence gathering strategies 
specifically designed to be carried out by routine police officers to enhance the more 
covert practices. These include the establishment of:
‘mechanisms for the effective collection of community intelligence at the local 
level to help build the ‘Rich Picture’ to enhance the understanding of threats
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from violent extremism, and thereby identify vulnerable individuals and 
enable effective interventions to take place69.’
[ACPO, 2008: 20]
The Prevent tasks designed to enhance police awareness and knowledge of local 
neighbourhoods include neighbourhood mapping70 and the development of Key 
Individual Networks (KINs). These are policing strategies first highlighted as 
generic, operational tasks in the Green Paper Building Communities, Beating Crime 
(2004a) which aimed to initiate debate on government proposals to introduce 
dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Teams across England and Wales. However, it is 
the Prevent strategy that directly links these routine operational tasks to counter 
terrorism. In an attempt to undermine extremist ideology, local policing teams must 
improve knowledge of the communities they police, increase understanding of how 
they function both in a social and religious context, and ensure that grievances 
emanating from communities can be addressed effectively. These are already core 
requirements of neighbourhood policing, but the Prevent agenda aims to provide more 
focused support for this by providing Intelligence and Community Engagement (ICE) 
training, and develop police-led exercises designed to explore community concerns 
regarding terrorism, and the local police response to it. The intention is that this type 
of counter terrorism police ‘work’ should become increasingly embedded in routine 
policing at the local level in an attempt to assist in the identification of individuals and 
institutions who may be susceptible to violent extremists and their support networks.
Intervention over Enforcement: The Channel Project
The development of effective multi-agency collaboration and information sharing is 
also considered central to Prevent’s success. The partnership network links across 
statutory, voluntary and community71 sectors. On one level it can be seen that this 
move provides some evidence at the level of ‘decision’ about the securitisation of 
other areas of policy, for example, youth policy and community safety. The level of
69 This research suggests that intelligence work is a predominant aspect of routine police activity. 
However the same findings highlight clear distinctions between criminal and community intelligence 
and in turn, cast doubt on the extent to which information gathering within communities is motivated 
by increased concerns around terrorism and radicalisation. This theme is examined in Chapter Six.
70 Neighbourhood mapping was developed by the Neighbourhood Policing Programme (2007a) in 
2004/2005.
71 Community partners include community centres, youth clubs, mosques and other sites through which 
potentially vulnerable individuals may be targeted and influenced by violent extremists.
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potential ‘securitisation’ is arguably heightened when attention focuses on the 
Channel Project which is identified as one of Prevent’s foremost multi-agency 
initiatives to address issues around radicalisation and extremism. The Channel 
Project is promoted as a multi-agency approach to support individuals vulnerable to 
radicalisation. It is a local and community-based initiative which utilises existing 
partnership working between the police, local authority and the local community. It is 
centred on the identification of those individuals at risk, devising a partnership 
intervention strategy and then delivering the intervention. In many ways the Project’s 
structures and procedures reflect the multi-agency risk assessment conferences 
(MARACS) set up to address domestic violence, and the multi-agency public 
protection arrangements (MAPPAs) in place for dangerous offenders.
The Channel Project receives referrals from a number of sources including police, 
schools, and equality and diversity organisations regarding individuals identified as 
potentially vulnerable to radicalisation. A joint risk assessment of each individual 
case is then made; the elements of concern are identified and addressed, and an 
appropriate programme of intervention is put together. This intervention programme 
is then implemented by a designated lead agency or community contact and subject to 
regular progress reviews. However, the Channel Project has elicited criticism from 
within black minority ethnic (BME) communities, and in particular Muslim 
community leaders due to the predominant focus on Muslim youth. Indeed, in terms 
of the theoretical propositions that underpin this thesis it can be argued that the 
Channel Project exhibits elements of ‘securitisation’ in its most fundamental form 
through the re-conceptualisation of a social problem such as youth exclusion into an 
(existential) security risk identified as radicalism or extremism. Furthermore if one 
extends the theoretical perspective beyond the bounds of policing to incorporate the 
realm of race, religion and belief one is perhaps facing the possible ‘securitisation of 
faith’ in order to justify executive and police ‘intervention’.
5.2.4 Mechanisms o f Policy Compliance and Enforcement
One of the central concerns for this thesis is the extent to which executive strategies 
and initiatives can be conceptualised as executive ‘decisions’. Essentially, what 
enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure policy implementation and delivery at
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the local policing level? Moreover, in what ways are the impact criteria going to be 
assessed and measured? Whilst Prevent is not a statutory instrument, its authority - or 
capacity to facilitate compliance -  within police Forces appears to rest in two areas: 
financial incentive and performance measurement and inspection. There are financial 
resources ring-fenced for the new roles and functions, and it is intended that 
developments in these areas will be subject to performance assessment and external 
inspection from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).
Compliance Mechanism 1: Funding
The renewed emphasis placed on the importance of community-focused counter 
terrorism work as exemplified by the Prevent agenda is reinforced by the allocation of 
£140 million to fund programmes and initiatives in 2008/2009 (HMIC, 2009). In 
April 2008 the Government announced the allocation of investment to fund ‘ring- 
fenced’ posts, specifically within the Police Service, to support delivery of the Prevent 
strategy. Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) funding was allocated to 24 
‘priority’ forces responsible for policing areas with higher levels of ‘risk’. This 
funding was allocated according to assessments of population, vulnerability and 
evaluated intelligence. Within the 2008/2009 CSR, £7,239,000 was allocated to the 
Police Service; sufficient funding for 64 Prevent posts with the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS), and 137 posts within the 23 ‘priority’ forces outside of the London 
Metropolitan area. Each of the 3 regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) received 
funding for 7 Prevent posts, and 8 posts were created in ACPO Terrorism and Allied 
Matters (ACPO TAM) for regional and national coordination.
Compliance Mechanism 2: Performance Measurement
The Police Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan (ACPO, 2008) is designed to support 
delivery of the overarching government Prevent strategy and objectives. These 
include:
■ increased police ability to identify and prevent violent extremism;
■ improved quality and quantity of intelligence information within the police 
and partner organisations, and in relation to the identification of areas of high 
risk,
■ enhanced coordination of operational activity in support of the Prevent agenda.
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Three years following the initial launch of Prevent (2003) it was anticipated there 
would be:
■ neighbourhood teams with established relationships with Muslim 
communities;
■ comprehensive neighbourhood mapping;
■ well developed and maintained Key Individual Networks (KINs) within 
communities;
■ individual police officers and PCSOs trained in intelligence and community 
engagement (ICE);
■ effective partnership working across a range of agencies and the promotion of 
open dialogue in relation to radicalisation and extremism;
■ a clear and systematic process for gathering community intelligence,
■ further development and implementation of the Channel Project
[ACPO, 2008: 39]
The measurement of performance can be seen as one of the primary mechanisms by 
which to ensure that police forces comply with the implementation of policy 
decisions. It is intended that counter terrorism capability should be reflected within 
individual force’s wider performance framework. At the national level, there is 
evidence of Prevent-specific mechanisms for inspection and performance assessment, 
but they remain ambiguous. This is perhaps unsurprising given the relatively recent 
emergence of counter terrorism work as a strategic and operational concern within the 
realm of routine policing. In 2008, the government’s Public Service Agreement 
(PSA) scheme introduced a measure on countering terrorism (PSA 26)72. However, 
this agreement did not include a police measurement per se; rather, it includes a note 
that police performance will be highlighted through the Assessments of Policing and 
Community Safety (APACS). Thus performance assessment of counter terrorism 
practice is under continued development.
72 A number of other PSAs are also relevant to counter terrorism. These include PSA (Increase the 
number of young people on the path to success) and PSA 21 (Build more cohesive, empowered and 
active communities).
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Nevertheless, at the national level it is anticipated that performance information 
derived from the following three areas could conceivably contribute to an assessment 
of police capability in support of the Prevent strategy.
1. NI35 ‘Building resilience to violent extremism’ in respect of the police 
contribution to Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) self-assessment;
2. An assessment of each police force’s contribution to Rich Picture 
understanding included within APACS,
3. A force by force HMIC assessment of progress made against the Policing 
Prevent Delivery Plan
[ACPO, 2008: 40-41]
The aim of indicator NI35 is to assess the contribution of local partners in developing 
programmes in support of the seven Prevent objectives and in particular, the 
objectives that focus on building resilience to violent extremism and identifying and 
supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment). The Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) envisaged that assessment would focus on the standard of local 
areas’ arrangements against a number of processes, rather than outcomes, which are 
inherently difficult to measure in this area. At the time of the fieldwork, NI35 was 
being adopted in some Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) as a key priority and 
negotiations continue between forces, police authorities and local authorities. 
However, all partnerships, and the local police commitment, were to be assessed 
through a self-assessment process as part of the national indicator (NI) set.
In terms of HMIC inspection, the focus of assessment is on the progress made by 
Forces in implementing aspects of the Prevent strategy -  prioritising as appropriate -  
against the seven strategic objectives and the specific activities set out in the ACPO 
plan. HMIC Inspections were carried out on Prevent implementation progress in the 
24 ‘priority’ forces between November 2008 and February 200973. The ACPO 
‘Prevent Implementation Plan’ had been published shortly before HMIC fieldwork in 
forces began and therefore rigorous assessment in terms of force comparison and
73 It should be noted that this HMIC Inspection was earned out after the fieldwork period for this 
research.
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force grading against a standard was deemed impracticable. Therefore, the 
inspections were focused on identifying the stages to which forces had reached in 
their development of capabilities to deliver the government Prevent strategy. HMIC 
identified 5 key areas of capability:
■ Assessing vulnerability -  understanding where to focus interventions;
■ Leadership, Governance and Structures;
■ Information Sharing;
■ Community Engagement and Interventions,
■ Assessing Success
[ACPO, 2008: 41]
It is important to note that both of these compliance mechanisms -  ring-fenced 
funding and performance assessment -  have been examined within a national context. 
The Prevent Strategy is an explicit attempt to ‘mainstream’ counter terrorism 
functions into routine policing, and so if you were to find evidence of ‘securitisation’ 
anywhere, it would be here. The final section of this chapter examines the extent to 
which the two aforementioned mechanisms of enforcement are embedded within the 
strategic framework of local, routine policing in the case-study force. This in turn 
provides a means by which to critically test the predominantly discoursed-based 
arguments regarding the increasingly securitised nature of routine policing at the local 
level.
5.3 National Counter Terrorism Policy at the Force Level
This final section examines the extent to which national security policy decisions have 
transferred to the case study force by examining whether compliance mechanisms -  in 
the form of funding and performance assessment -  are evident within the case-study 
Force. Furthermore, if there is evidence of such enforcement mechanisms, to what 
extent are they embedded in the Force’s strategic decision-making processes? This is 
explored specifically in relation to the establishment of BCU-level operational 
priorities and the assessment frameworks in place to monitor performance in these 
priority areas. The qualitative findings referenced within this section are generated
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through documentary analysis of Force and BCU level material74 and the analysis of 
interviews with senior police officers who have responsibility for strategic decision­
making, and tactical priority-setting within the case-study Force. It is acknowledged 
that the inclusion of such ‘discursive’ data in a chapter consciously designed to 
advocate the importance of moving beyond ‘talk’ may, for some, raise questions 
about the conceptual logic of this thesis. However, it is argued that the data included 
in this section is not simply discourse, but can be interpreted as accounts of decisions 
that have been taken, or evidence in support of including a particular policy (in this 
case the Prevent strategy) within the category of ‘decision’ as conceptualised within 
this thesis.
5.3.1 Evidence of Compliance Mechanisms 
1: Prevent Funding in the Case Study Force
The interviews with members of the Force Command Team, although often 
reinforcing much of the rhetoric surrounding the national shift in emphasis from 
Pursue to Prevent, also provide important insight into the level of funding that is 
allocated to the implementation and delivery of national, counter-terrorism policies 
within individual police forces. As a member of the Force Command Team observed:
The majority of effort to date -  or until the middle of last year -  was in 
‘pursue’. There was huge money being piled into pursue, and I think when 
Gordon Brown took over, he took a look at it and said ‘this isn’t right...we’re 
spending 99% of our money on pursue and nothing on prevent’, and since then 
the needle has shifted across to ‘prevent’ and it is a much greater priority.
[Force Command2]
There are considerable funds allocated to the establishment of the specialist roles and 
functions inherent to the Prevent Strategy. During the period of fieldwork for this 
research, the national Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) had just been 
announced with £180 million ring-fenced for the Prevent phase of Contest over the 
next 3 years. The case study force was chosen as one of the twenty-four priority 
forces to qualify for funding in the first year and the case study BCU was designated a
74 These documents constitute both the strategic decision-making and performance assessment 
frameworks at the Force and BCU levels.
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Pathfinder BCU75 which means that is was recognised nationally as an area 
potentially vulnerable to extremism, and it is active in obtaining the funding available 
to confront such vulnerability. The police Prevent document (ACPO, 2008: 17) 
outlines the ‘developing architecture of counter-terrorism assets’ which include 
Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs), Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) and 
Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs). Indeed, there is some evidence of 
financial incentive to implement Prevent at the local policing level. The case study 
BCU was one of ten local policing areas in the UK highlighted for the piloting of the 
Channel project which is a project with Objective 3 funding to prevent violent 
extremism and target vulnerable groups. Such financial incentives can be seen as a 
key lever of influence in terms of local implementation in such budget-conscious 
times.
There are currently no designated counter-terrorism (security) positions (DSPs) at the 
BCU level in the case-study Force. At the moment they remain centrally-based at 
HQ. However, it is perhaps significant to note that these DSPs, functioning as 
Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs), operate within the Protect strand of 
CONTEST and are not formally attached to the Prevent strategy. At the time of 
writing the only police officers who were officially associated with Prevent work 
were those heading up the Channel Project. However, these were officers seconded 
from pre-existing BCU resources. Each BCU has a Minority Support Unit (MSU) 
which operates within a BCU Community Safety Department. This unit will include 
hate crime officers whose specific role is to liaise with BME communities in the BCU 
area. As part of that role -  although they are not tasked directly in this area -  they are 
in a position to monitor any tensions which might emerge within communities in the 
form of offences of racial hatred for example. The issues of hate crime and 
radicalisation were often conflated during BCU Commander interviews and although 
this is a valid observation, the response to this situation appeared to fall under the 
remit of hate crime officers within the Minority Support Unit, rather than through 
intervention strategies outlined in the Prevent strategy.
75 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the case study force.
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However, it was revealed by the BCU lead for Counter Terrorism (CT) that funding 
for BCU-based CT posts was imminent, and it was expected that these positions 
would become a permanent fixture within force budget considerations when the 
external funding comes to an end:
‘We will be allocated £180000 to create three CTIOs (Counter-Terrorism 
Intelligence Officers) supported by a number of community engagement 
officers. The funding is coming from central government because they 
recognise that there’s no blood left in the stone [the force budget]. The 
funding is 3 years, then it will be daily business, the positions will be 
mainstreamed and underpin the work at Level 1 ’ [BCU policing].
[BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism]
The interviews conducted with members of the Force Command Team corroborate 
the final statement above.
[Interviewer]
‘Could it be said that ring-fencing means that policing around counter 
terrorism is moving towards becoming more mainstreamed on a Force or a 
BCU level’?
[Force Command2]
‘Yes, absolutely’.
2: Performance Assessment in the Case Study Force
The previous section outlined the various performance assessment structures through 
which police Forces (and their partners) can be measured on Prevent implementation 
and development. The analysis of relevant strategic and operational documents, and 
the interviews carried out with senior management officers within the case study 
Force revealed a notable absence of compliance mechanisms in relation to the 
implementation of national counter terrorism policy decisions. This in turn 
undermines suppositions pertaining to the increased securitisation of routine policing.
145
The one area where there appears to be any evidence of policy enforcement with 
respect to the case-study’s implementation of the CONTEST strands is at the level of 
HMIC inspection. However, there is widespread frustration with the nature of the 
inspection. As the case study BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism observes:
‘The twenty-three Forces [not including the MPS] that are the subject of Year 
1 spending from the comprehensive spending review are going to be HMIC- 
inspected. So we’re either going to have an inspection before or after Jan 
2009. This inspection will be around CONTEST but that’s the national 
inspection; local inspection? No, we won’t have one. And you would think it 
should be bottom up, not top-down. That needs to happen because how are 
you going to get the [counter-terrorism] picture if you assume you’ve already 
got it’?
However, it is significant to note that none of the compliance mechanisms attached to 
the Prevent strategy in the form of police or partner performance assessment are fully 
operational in the Force area at the centre of this study. In particular, neither the 
Public Service Agreements (PSAs) nor National Indicators (NIs) are operational in 
the Force area. Moreover, at the time of writing the APACS framework was only 
partially established in the Force area and many Community Safety Partnerships 
(CSPs) were reluctant to adopt the performance assessments. The interviews carried 
out with senior police officers operating out of Force Headquarters highlighted the 
situation with respect to the role of APACS in the Force area:
‘[The Force] will come off negatively and in fairness the HMIC have already 
said that. We’ve said, ‘well look we haven’t got any of these APACs 
structures in place here’, and they said ‘well you’ll fail the inspection then’. 
Not all of the CSPs are keen on the APACs. I mean, some of the CSPs have 
agreed to use them but it’s almost a bottom-up as opposed to a top-down 
decision making process’.
[Force Command3]
‘If you consider that these two [PSAs and NIs] don’t apply in [Force BCU 
areas], and APACS are provisional in [Force area] then as a service it’s 
difficult to assess our progress in this area. In addition, if our partners are not 
assessed on performance in this area -  notwithstanding that you’re going to 
get some Chief Execs saying in some parts, ‘well terrorism is a London issue’ 
-  so it’s going to be a bit on the difficult side in some circumstances’...
[Force Command4]
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The final comment made by the Force Command officer undermines some of the 
assertions put forward by advocates of the securitisation thesis as applied to routine 
policing. King and Sharp (2006: 387) argue that a series of legislative and policy 
shifts over the past fifteen years have ensured a discernible ‘move from local 
decision-making to a centrally-proscribed agenda’ which sees all forces required to 
produce an annual force plan which must incorporate the national policing plan 
formulated by the Home Secretary alongside the local police priorities. The 
suggestion here is that local concerns have gradually been replaced by national 
priorities determined against an increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda. 
However, the comments from within Force Command appear to suggest that power 
and discretion with regards to the implementation of national policy and frameworks 
still operates at the local level. It is clear that considerable funds have been ring- 
fenced for the implementation and delivery of some of the central aspects of the 
Prevent strategy in the case study Force. However, at the time of research it was also 
evident that the lack of a discernible and enforceable framework for measuring 
performance in the area of preventing terrorism and violent extremism had the 
potential to undermine both the depth and breadth of strategic implementation as one 
moves from the ‘centre’ to the level of local policing. It will be seen that the nature of 
the performance assessment frameworks within the case study force has a profound 
effect on ‘what gets done’ at the level of local policing.
5.3.2 The Nature o f Strategic Decision-Making within the Case Study Force
One area of empirical interest for this research is the extent to which national 
priorities within the area of crime and justice, and more specifically counter terrorism 
are reflected in the strategic decision-making frameworks at both Force and BCU 
policing levels. A number of strategic documents are identified as policy decisions 
consistent with the conceptual understandings that frame this research. Each police 
Force in the UK uses the National Intelligence Model (NIM) to prioritise resource 
distribution; key intelligence products inform decision-making at both the force and 
divisional (BCU) level. The primary examples of concrete policy documents within 
the case study Force -  at both the force and BCU levels -  are the Control Strategy and 
the Strategic Assessment. The Strategic Assessments provide an overview of current 
and long-term risks faced by the force as a whole, and at the level of local policing.
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The Control Strategy sets the long term priorities for crime prevention, intelligence 
and enforcement opportunities. It is developed following a critical examination of the 
broad areas of criminality, public disorder and other unlawful acts affecting a BCU, 
local force or region as set out in the strategic assessment. It provides senior 
management with a framework in which decisions can be made about the issues that 
should take precedence when allocating resources. These force documents are 
identified as concrete policy decisions because they retain compliance mechanisms 
which ensure each level of policing must deliver against at least some of the priority 
areas highlighted within them. However, it is important to note that the notion of 
decision when transferred from the policy sphere to the policing arena takes on an 
additional dimension: ‘decision’ also relates to strategic assessments on the most 
effective ways to police, and the construction of priorities which are seen as examples 
of applied decision-making because they have some form of accountability 
framework at the local (neighbourhood) policing level in terms of performance 
assessment.
Force Level Strategic Decisions
‘it is intended that CT capability should be reflected within a force’s wider 
performance framework, recognising it as a key priority for forces and 
mainstreaming it within day to day force planning and governance’.
[ACPO, 2008: 4]
The Force Strategic Assessment (FSA) in operation during the fieldwork period 
covered the period November 2007 -  200876. The FSA is a comprehensive document 
and its purpose is to provide an accurate and realistic evaluation of the significant 
crime, disorder and organisational issues that may face the force over a 12 month 
period. It also reviews the impact of the current crime and disorder control strategy 
against Force priorities and identifies any required changes to these priorities for the 
future. The data for the FSA is generated from a variety of sources which include 
performance information across the Force and information from BCU-level Strategic 
Assessments. The Strategic Leads Group meets shortly before the publication of the 
FSA to finalise the crime and disorder priorities that underpin the strategic direction 
of the Force for the year in question.
76 BCU Strategic Assessments are updated every 6 months.
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The FSA in 2007-2008 highlighted four thematic areas as Crime and Disorder 
Priorities. These were Serious and Organised Crime; Community Safety; Volume 
Crime, and Public Protection. The four priority areas focus on the following crime 
and disorder issues:
■ Serious and Organised Crime: Class A drugs; Gun Crime; Immigration Crime;
Terrorism;
■ Community Safety: Anti-social Behaviour; Alcohol-related Street Violence;
■ Volume Crime: Volume Crime; Distraction Burglary,
■ Public Protection: Domestic Abuse
These are the same crime and disorder priority areas that underpin the Force Control 
Strategy (FCS) 2007-2008. The FSA reviews progress made against the control 
strategies outlined in the FCS, highlights emerging trends and strategic threats and 
ultimately makes recommendations as to whether such crime and disorder issues 
should remain as force priorities77. Through an analysis of the FSA it is possible to 
identify the strategic emphasis in relation to two of the crime and disorder areas most 
pertinent to this research -  community safety and counter terrorism. In order to tackle 
the community safety priority areas (outlined above) the FSA highlighted the 
importance of neighbourhood priorities (generated from PACT meetings) and 
community intelligence. In relation to the latter, the FSA recommends that the 
‘strategic and successful integration of community intelligence with normal business, 
in terms of both process and intelligence, will impact positively on dealing with both 
neighbourhood priorities and BCU/Force priorities [and that] the training, confidence 
and briefing of frontline staff will be important in bridging this gap’ (FSA, 2007: 2). 
Although counter terrorism is included as a strategic force priority, it is significant to 
note that the strategic overview in relation to terrorism remains wholly national in
77 Following a mid-year review of the Strategic Assessment in 2007-2008 it was determined that the 
following crime and disorder issues should be removed as force priorities: immigration crime; street 
robbery and interestingly, vehicle crime. The rationale for removing vehicle crime as a force priority is 
that levels have stabilised or decreased in many force areas. It is acknowledged that the difficulty with 
prioritising any type of acquisitive crime is that successful enforcement activity in one area might lead 
to functional displacement to other types of acquisitive crime. In addition, the removal of vehicle 
crime as a force priority might lead to a subsequent increase in occurrence levels. However, it is 
observed that vehicle crime remains a priority in many of the BCU areas and any local level concerns 
will register at the force level at Force Tasking and Coordinating (TCG) meetings.
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tone and distinctly removed from the ‘local setting’. The FSA references the revised 
ACPO (TAM) three year strategic plan which sets out the national response to the 
threat from international terrorism. It also illustrates the current, national threat levels 
and the risks posed by Al-Qaida and its preferred methods of perpetration. 
Significantly, the only reference to a local, strategic response is the need for clear and 
measureable BCU ownership of the counter terrorism seven-point programme to be 
achieved and incorporated into local control strategies to evidence strategic delivery 
of counter terrorism.
Furthermore, the FSA includes a detailed examination of emerging issues and 
strategic threats in relation to all of the crime and disorder priority areas EXCEPT 
counter terrorism78. There is reference to counter terrorism within the context of the 
development of the government’s Counter Terrorism Bill (2008). However, 
notwithstanding the fact that such a ‘bill’ remains policy ‘talk’, the possible strategic 
implications focus around ‘legislative enforcement’ in the form of Special Branch 
investigation and resources in Custody Service (in anticipation of an extension to pre­
charge detention). Overall, the references to counter terrorism remain national in 
tone; there is little attempt to contextualise the information within the strategic 
framework of the case study force. Where reference is made to counter terrorism 
policies it remains at the level of legislative decision and the strategic focus is on 
enforcement rather than prevention79. In short, the FSA provides little empirical 
evidence to suggest that national security policies have had a discernible impact on 
the strategic, decision-making framework of the case study force. This in itself is 
significant in terms of the theoretical propositions that underpin this research.
The Force Control Strategy (FCS) provides a detailed overview of the strategic 
response to each of the nine crime and disorder priority areas outlined in the Force 
Strategic Assessment. Terrorism is the final crime area to be considered in the FCS. 
In line with NIM requirements each of the occurrences are categorised into three
78 This includes an examination of strategic threats in relation to fraud/forgery and money laundering 
but no attempt to highlight the widely acknowledged, potential links with terrorism and the financing 
of terrorism.
79 The FSA 2007 -  2008 makes no reference to the Prevent Strategy. Perhaps more significantly, there 
is no reference to Prevent in the updated version of the FSA (Nov 2008 -  Nov 2009), which was 
introduced after the completion of the fieldwork for this research. This is highly significant given the 
considerable policy drive to embed counter terrorism strategies into routine, neighbourhood policing.
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strategic areas: intelligence, prevention and enforcement. The content of each of the 
three strategic requirement areas have been quantified in order to ascertain the 
strategic emphasis placed on each of the nine crime areas.
Crime
Category
Intelligence
Priorities80
(N=)
Prevention
Priorities
(N=)
Enforcement
Priorities
(N=)
Gun Crime 4 5 5
Class A 
Drugs
5 3 5
Immigration
Crime
5 4 3
Distraction
Burglary
5 4 4
Volume
Crime
7 6 19
Community 
Safety -  
ASB8'
10 6 4
Community 
Safety -  
ARSV82
7 12 10
Public
Protection
3 4 6
Counter
Terrorism
5 7 8
Table 5.1: Force Strategic Priorities (2007-2008)
As Table 5.1 indicates, strategic requirements for volume crime and community 
safety issues considerably outweigh those for counter terrorism. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the emphasis placed on serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) within 
routine police performance assessment frameworks. However, and in contrast to the 
Force Strategic Assessment, the Control Strategy makes direct reference to the 
CONTEST strategy. Interestingly though the predominant focus is on Pursue (within
80 The Intelligence Priorities are outlined in further detail in the Strategic Intelligence Requirement 
(SIR) which is a Force policy document updated every six months. The document includes the same 
nine crime categories as the Force Control Strategy. In the document that covers the period Nov 2007 
-  May 2008 information regarding Counter-Terrorism moves from 9th to 7th in the list, and is framed 
around the CONTEST priority to improve levels of ownership of counter-terrorism at the local level. 
The Intelligence Requirements cover four distinct priority areas: International Terrorism, Domestic 
Extremism, Irish-related Terrorism and Extremism, and Serious and Organised Crime (Crime/Terror 
Nexus).
81 Community Safety -  Anti-social behaviour
82 Community Safety — Alcohol-Related Street Violence
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the intelligence priorities) and Prepare (within the prevention priorities). The Prevent 
strand of the executive ‘decision’ is only alluded to briefly and the aims of which are 
referred to ambiguously as ‘preventing terrorism by tackling underlying causes’ (FCS, 
2007). Furthermore, although the risk from terrorism and violent extremism was 
considered within all aspects of force strategic decision-making, there is an absence of 
general links between national and force perceptions of risk, and how such risks are to 
be mitigated at a force level. However, such findings -  from within key force 
strategic planning frameworks -  appear to suggest that the inclusion of ‘countering 
terrorism and preventing extremism’ as a force priority is little more than a general, 
strategic objective that pays lip service to national requirements.
BCU-Level Strategic Decisions
The processes in place for strategic decision-making in relation to the establishment 
of crime and disorder priorities at the BCU level is the same as the strategic 
framework at the Force level. Moreover, the lack of tangible detail in relation to 
countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism are similarly reflected in the 
BCU-level strategic documents. The BCU Strategic Assessment (BCU SA)83 in 
circulation during the period of fieldwork for this research prioritised the following 
areas:
Serious and Acquisitive Crime
1. Autocrime - Vehicle Crime: theft of motor vehicle, theft from motor vehicle
2. Dwelling Burglary
3. Violent Crime -  serious violence, domestic violence, robbery and sexual assaults
Neighbourhood Management
1. PACT Engagement
2. Anti-social behaviour
3. Criminal Damage
Counter Terrorism
1. Awareness, consideration and response
o-i
The BCU SA came out in July 2008 but covers the period Jan-June 2008.
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Serious and Organised Crime
1. Class ‘A’ Drugs
2. Gun Crime
3. Cannabis Plantations
4. Organised Crime Groups
The rationale for adopting these priorities areas is that they represent the most 
pressing issues affecting the case study BCU and will therefore also serve as the main 
focus in the fortnightly Tactical Tasking and Coordinating (tTCG) meetings84. 
Although it is clear that counter terrorism is identified as a local priority in its own 
right, the BCU Strategic Assessment only makes cursory reference to developments 
and requirements in this area. Such references include general pronouncements on 
the dissemination of terrorism-related information to staff, and the presence of Special 
Branch officers at Fortnightly tTCG meetings. There is no provision of information 
on strategic objectives or methods of delivery in relation to counter terrorism or 
preventing extremism85. All of this is in stark contrast to the information provided on 
the other BCU priority areas such as Serious and Acquisitive Crime which includes 
progress made on strategic objectives and reference to emerging issues and threats.
The same priorities -  reflecting the majority of issues affecting the BCU -  were also 
outlined in the case-study’s BCU Control Strategy (BCU CS). This document adopts 
the same structure as the Force Control Strategy, and therefore incorporates a focus on 
the three strategic areas, intelligence, prevention and enforcement in each of the crime 
categories. The content of each of the three strategic requirement areas at the BCU 
level have been quantified in the same way as that undertaken at the Force level. This 
time the aim was not only to ascertain the strategic emphasis placed on each of the 
crime areas, but to identify whether the strategic emphasis altered to any degree at the 
local policing level.
84 These meetings generate Fortnightly Tasking Action Plans (FTAs). The FTAs generated within the 
fieldwork timeframe of this thesis have undergone quantitative content analysis (QCA) in order to 
generate an empirical understanding of routine policing. The findings from this QCA are presented in 
Chapter Six.
85 The exception to this is reference to a major sporting event that was anticipated and the potential 
‘terrorism implications’ this may have for the Force area (BCU SA: 20).
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Crime
Category
Intelligence
Priorities
(N=)
Prevention 
Priorities 
(N—)
Enforcement
Priorities
(N=)
Vehicle Crime 9 13 8
Class A Drugs 9 9 5
Violent Crime 13 13 9
Terrorism 6 4 4
Neighbourhood
Policing
7 10 7
Dwelling
Burglary
(BDW)
10 9 12
Table 5.2: BCU Strategic Crime and Disorder Priorities
Table 5.2 reveals that strategic emphasis on counter terrorism is considerably less 
than at Force level (Intelligence: 5; Prevention: 7; Enforcement: 8), and that it 
generates less strategic attention at the BCU level than the other five crime categories. 
However, this is perhaps unsurprising given the emphasis placed on serious and 
acquisitive crime (SAC) within routine police performance assessment frameworks, 
particularly at the neighbourhood (sector) levels. Moreover, not one of the 
requirements under each of the three strategic priority areas refers explicitly to the 
Prevent Programme. In terms of intelligence requirements, broad reference is made to 
raising awareness of terrorism-related Operations in-BCU, and increasing the flow of 
intelligence. From an enforcement perspective reference is made to taking the 
‘necessary steps’ when arresting suspects and searching property. Finally, in terms of 
prevention, all staff must remain ‘vigilant’, encourage the local community to report 
suspicious incidents, and maintain contacts with all members of the public, especially 
with the minority communities to accurately gauge tensions.
Significantly, the Force Strategic Assessment states that there is a lack of ‘clear and 
measureable’ ownership at BCU level for counter terrorism, and that there is a need to 
ensure that counter terrorism is reflected within BCU control strategies. The findings 
from this research appear to go further; the lack of any coherent integration of
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national counter terrorism or preventing extremism ‘decisions’ into the strategic 
framework of force or divisional level policing could be indicative of a number of 
things. It may well be a result of deficient channels of communication or ‘tasking’ 
from Force to BCU level. Certainly interview data appears to highlight a disjuncture 
between expectations of strategic requirements coming from the ‘centre’ (HQ) and 
operational understanding at the divisional (BCU) level:
‘I was at Force Tasking yesterday: I think for the actual tasking element of it 
the counter-terrorism bit has it honed down best of all. It’s about saying to 
divisions, we want you to be doing this, this and this. We want you to be 
referring your credit card stuff, go and check all of your lost/stolen passports. 
So they’ve got some very clear intelligence requirements and tasking that 
comes out of that’.
[Force Command 1]
However, interviews with BCU Commanders reveal that counter-terrorism policing, 
and the Prevent Strategy in particular, does not impact significantly on the strategic 
management of some of the divisions. In some cases counter terrorism does not 
feature in the BCU Control Strategy or the Strategic Assessments, and where it is 
present it appears it is only to pay lip service to Force priorities. There is certainly no 
indication of strategic awareness of the links between ‘routine crimes’ such as credit 
card fraud and money laundering, and the financing of terrorism:
‘It is [counter terrorism] in our Control Strategy and will remain as it has to be 
an agenda item. But if you say to me do I think about what I’m going to do 
about it on a daily basis -  perhaps the community cohesion side of things, 
sometimes -  but in terms of target hardening and patrolling vulnerable areas, 
no’.
[BCU Commander5]
5.3.3 ‘What Gets Measured Gets Done ’
Furthermore, it is when attention turns to the nature of the performance assessment 
frameworks in place at the local BCU policing level that one begins to gain an 
important insight into the level of priority afforded to counter terrorism policing on 
the routine, operational frontline. The systematic analysis of relevant BCU 
documentary sources and the analysis of officer interviews -  interpreted as accounts
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of the impact of policy decisions that are in operation within the case study BCU -  
reveal that BCU level policing is not held to account for performance in relation to 
counter terrorism policing. This is corroborated in one way by the COMPSTAT 
process which serves as an example of a tangible policy compliance mechanism and 
is a process for ensuring the enforcement of Force and BCU priorities through the 
systematic analysis of operational performance at both the divisional (BCU) and 
sector levels. COMPSTAT reports are produced by performance analysts on a 
monthly basis, and provide a comprehensive review of BCU operational activity. 
They are structured uniformly and review the same generic areas each month. They 
provide a reliable, empirical indication of the core areas of performance measurement 
for local (BCU) policing. The top three performance assessment areas are occurrence 
analysis, recorded crime and detected crime86. Within these three performance areas 
there is an overwhelming focus on Serious and Acquisitive Crime (SAC) which 
comprises robbery; autocrime (TOMV and TFMV); burglary dwelling and violent 
crime (most serious violence against a person and assault with injury). One can 
confidently assume that the areas targeted for performance analysis are 
consequentially the areas of policing priority at the local, operational level. 
Therefore, it is significant to note that the only reference to counter terrorism and 
extremism is the replication of the Force’s strategic priorities as set out by APACS 
targets/requirements.
The findings from an analysis of COMPSTAT output are corroborated by the 
interviews with BCU Commanders across the case study Force with one stating that:
‘in terms of performance the emphasis remains on volume crime or serious
and acquisitive crime (SAC) -  violent crime, autocrime...
[BCU Commander2]
Although BCUs are assessed on their strategic capacity and capability in relation to 
counter terrorism policing by the HMIC, BCU Commanders are not held to account 
for counter terrorism policing in terms of operational performance — either in relation 
to enforcement (specific operations around counter terrorism) or prevention in the 
form of community engagement and other Prevent ‘intervention strategies’. The
86 The others areas are quality of service (victim satisfaction); NCRS compliance; NPT activity; ISU 
performance; staff sickness; stop searches; warrants, and ASB referrals.
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following observation provides a comprehensive assessment of contemporary policing 
and echoes many of the observations emanating from senior police officers within the 
case study Force.
‘In this organisation one of the adages is ‘what can be measured gets done’. 
Everyone works, because we are such a performance-based culture, on that 
ethic. So whilst everyone may understand where and what [our counter­
terrorism ops] are, how do we quantify it? Who measures it? How can we 
justify our actions in supporting these strategies when there are so many other 
things to do, so many other things that are measurable, that are performance- 
driven, and that are relevant? You get COMPSTAT’ed on those, all the 
APACS stuff but it’s difficult to measure our impact on counter terrorism 
because it’s a case of if I go out and visit all the [Operation sites] today -  or I 
don’t -  what difference am I making and how are my efforts being measured, 
how are they being recognised? So it’s an area that everyone is cited on and 
conscious of, but in terms of terrorism it almost becomes -  as a juggler -  
you’re juggling 6 balls it’s almost the 7th ball and you keep dropping it’.
[BCU Commanderl]
A number of BCU Commanders indicated that counter terrorism-related activity 
would become more embedded in everyday policing activity if it became a Key 
Performance Indicator (KPI).
‘Being brutally honest? If you judged me on my performance in relation to 
counter terrorism issues it would become more mainstreamed. If I’m judged 
on it, I’ll get it done. That’s the way it is’.
[BCU Commander3]
Both of the above observations indicate that the lack of tangible mechanisms for 
performance assessment in relation to counter terrorism has a number of implications 
for the nature of policing at the local level. One of the foremost of these is that any 
activity in relation to counter terrorism is often reactive rather than proactive and, 
therefore, an episodic and specialised, rather than routine form of policing. It is 
acknowledged that the implementation and/or delivery of CT and Preventing Vioelnt 
Extremism (PVE) strategies such as Prevent is often proportionate to the perceived 
level of risk facing a BCU. It is commonly acknowledged that 2 of the 6 BCUs in the 
case-study Force area are considered to be at greater risk of terrorism than the other 
more rural divisional areas. Therefore it is expected that those BCUs facing the 
highest levels of risk should be further forward in the implementation of aspects of
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counter terrorism-related policies and strategies. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that all 
BCUs should be on the road to establishing minimum capabilities proportionate to 
their levels of risk. However, the majority of BCU Commanders -  significantly, in 
areas deemed to be of both high and low risk -  state that the extent to which increased 
concerns around terrorism impact at the divisional level is minimal. Moreover, where 
there is an impact it tends to be reactive rather than proactive:
‘I have to say it’s all quite reactive. If we’ve got a planned event, for example 
a Royal Visit we make sure all officers are briefed; we put together an 
intelligence package... ’
[BCU Commanded]
‘In terms of operational policing I tend to focus my officers in on crime not on 
counter terrorism. It’s only when we get a bombing in London or another big 
city do we think, what are we doing in relation to this’?
[BCU Commander4]
‘Activity occurs on a reactive level -  post event, pre-Royal visit. It’s risk- 
initiated rather than it is normal policing. When something does happen then 
they’ll ask. Then we’ll scurry around and fill some gaps’.
[BCU Commander5]
There is little evidence -  from interviews or strategic documentation -  to suggest that 
any proactive structures are in place to carry out the intervention strategies outlined in 
the Prevent policy document; this is significant in light of the fact that Level 1 
policing has primary responsibility for implementing and delivering on the Prevent 
policy. As one BCU Commander observes:
‘We have a number of very good CTSAs (Counter Terrorism Security 
Advisors) in the Centre (HQ) who are very good at pushing things out [e.g. 
Prevent strategies]. But if those individuals hadn’t done it would I? The 
answer’s no to be honest. They did [Prevent initiative] here; they instigated it 
and we supported it’.
[BCU Commander5]
In fact, in 4 of the 6 BCU Commanders interviews87 there was no direct reference 
made to Contest or the Prevent strategy. When ultimately asked to comment on the
87 These interviews took place in BCUs commonly acknowledged to be at less risk in terms of 
terrorism.
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impact of counter terrorism or preventing violent extremism strategies on BCU 
strategic management the responses were often ambiguous:
‘My answer will be vague...our intelligence unit is fed information centrally 
and I am given information personally. When it comes to me I will action that 
in ways deemed suitable. This has happened only a handful of times in the 
last six months’
[BCU Commander4]
There is little evidence of any of the Prevent intervention strategies becoming 
established at the BCU strategic level. The majority of BCUs (5 out of 6) do not have 
designated counter terrorism staff or Designated Security Posts (DSPs). Each BCU 
has a Minority Support Unit (MSU) which operates within a BCU Community Safety 
Department. This unit will include hate crime officers whose specific role is to liaise 
with BME communities in the BCU area. As part of that role -  although they are not 
tasked directly in this area -  they are in a position to monitor any tensions which 
might manifest within communities in the form of offences of racial hatred for 
example. The issues of hate crime and radicalisation were often conflated during 
BCU Command interviews, and although this is a valid observation, the response to 
such situations appeared to fall under the remit of hate crime officers within the 
Minority Support Unit, rather than through intervention strategies outlined in the 
Prevent strategy. Only a small number of the BCU Commanders referred to the role 
played by neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) in delivering aspects of the Prevent 
strategy but again references were often non-committal:
If I’m honest we haven’t really developed that area...(pause)...we have one 
Mosque and one of our PCSOs is designated to be there every Friday -  eyes 
and ears etc but I’m not pushing that too hard because I don’t want to be seen 
to be going down there saying there’s a problem in the Mosque’.
[BCU Commander4]
The analysis of BCU strategic documents and interviews with officers in charge of the 
strategic management of policing at the BCU level reveals significant gaps in the 
transfer of counter terrorism talk and decision to the strategic, decision-making 
frameworks within the case study force. These findings do not provide a great deal of 
support for emerging concerns that routine policing is becoming increasingly 
‘securitised’. Ultimately, the Police Service is an overwhelmingly performance-
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driven organisation. Senior officers at both the BCU Command level and Sector 
(Neighbourhood) policing levels are rigorously held to account for the crime rates in 
their area. They are tasked to ensure that offences are reduced and detection rates are 
increased. As a result time and resources inevitable go in that direction. Although the 
majority of sector (neighbourhood) inspectors state that there has been increased 
‘talk’ about countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism and they are aware 
of strategies, they are not measured on it and therefore there is no incentive to 
implement policies or initiate activity in this area. Although this is not to suggest that 
work is not undertaken in this regard, it is not a priority and ultimately it is the notion 
of priority that guides police officers, certainly those that are held to account for 
policing performance.
These observations link to another analytical theme which emerges from the data. 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) acknowledge that measuring 
counter terrorism within the context of the Prevent strategy ‘presents some particular 
challenges in terms of measuring appropriate outcomes’ (ACPO, 2008: 40). The 
question to be addressed is if local policing was measured on performance in this 
area, what would assessment look like? In short, how do you measure prevention? 
Fielding and Innes (2006: 129) suggest that there is a ‘shortage of imagination in 
present measures of performance’ and it is particularly acute ‘when it comes to 
monitoring and measuring informal, community-orientated interventions. 
Community policing’s appeal relates more to its iconic status and homely name-tag 
than to the clarity of the concept or unambiguously demonstrable effects’. A number 
of police officers reinforce this observation:
‘I’ve been saying for many years that we don’t understand performance. Do I 
get measured on some of the work I’m doing in schools because I think that’s 
also where you’ve got problems? No, I don’t. Whilst the Chief Constable 
supports it, I’m not getting any...there’s no let up on my car crime. People 
will like to talk about it, the government like to talk about how we engage with 
young people and diversity, communities etc. They like to talk about it but I 
won’t get measured on it’.
[Case Study BCU Commanded]
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Fielding and Innes (2006) examine the effectiveness of current, predominantly 
quantitative police performance measures88. They argue that a more qualitative 
approach to police performance offers the potential for a more meaningful 
understanding of police work. The methodological approach to measuring police 
performance is somewhat outwith the remit of this thesis. However, the current 
research supports this assertion particularly when the empirical focus is on the 
‘prevention’ aspects of local police work. It is a salient reference point within the 
context of a critical assessment of the extent to which counter terrorism policy talk 
and decision impacts on routine police action. The lack of tangible and coherent 
mechanisms for measuring prevention have a discernible impact on the delivery of 
counter terrorism strategies at the local policing level which, in turn undermines the 
extent to which routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents the findings from a detailed analysis of the CONTEST Strategy 
and in particular the Prevent Strategy which is identified as an exemplar of a 
securitised decision within the analytical framework of this thesis. The findings 
reveal that the Prevent Strategy represents clear and discernible attempts to embed 
counter terrorism work into routine policing. The research examines the extent to 
which such decisions are afforded the same level of priority at the local level as they 
appear to be at the level of national policy talk and decision-making. An analysis of 
the content of strategic documents within the case study force and case study BCU 
suggests that national counter terrorism policy implementation at the individual force 
and BCU level faces a number of challenges. The findings indicate that there is some 
form of policy compliance at play in the form of ring-fenced funding for the 
implementation of certain aspects of the Prevent Strategy. However, there is a 
discernible absence of detailed reference to national counter terrorism policy 
‘decisions’ within the strategic framework and the formal mechanisms of performance 
assessment of the case study at both the Force and BCU levels. This in turn has 
implications for the ‘mainstreaming’ of counter terrorism work into routine policing -  
at least at the level of strategic decision-making and priority setting. Pollitt (2001:
88 In the form of arrest rates, clearance rates, response times and crime pattern analysis generated via 
processes inherent to the NIM.
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934) echoes the observations made by Niels Brunsson (1989), when he suggests that 
‘observers of organisations -  perhaps especially public sector organisations -  are 
prone to make the mistake of supposing that organisational statements and decisions 
agree with organisational actions’. This observation resonates throughout this 
research and the final empirical chapter interrogates the extent to which national 
security policy ‘decisions’ translate into policy ‘action’ in the form of tangible 
changes to routine policing practice on the ground.
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Chapter Six: Do Actions Speak Louder than Words?
The challenge [for me] is converting the Prevent strategy from document into ‘action ’
[BCU Lead for Terrorism]
6.0 Introduction
This chapter focuses on one of the most fundamental questions for this research, 
namely to what extent do security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of 
counter terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of 
tangible changes to routine police practice at the local level? Therefore, the empirical 
data presented in this chapter focuses exclusively on the ‘action’ or operational 
practice within the BCU at the heart of this case study research. At the outset it is 
important to reiterate how ‘action’ is conceptualised within the analytical framework 
of this thesis. Drawing on Pollitt’s (2001) conceptualisation of ‘action’ as the 
practical application of policy on the ground, this study conceptualises ‘action’ as 
routine, operational policing practice.
Ultimately the chapter retains two core functions and is therefore divided into two 
main sections. The first section presents an empirical measure for routine policing 
and in turn highlights the extent to which counter terrorism policing is represented at 
the level of local tasking and operational practice. This conceptualisation of routine 
policing is formulated through the quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly 
tasking action plans generated from tasking and coordinating group (TCG) meetings 
that took place in the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork for this 
research (June -  November 2008). The remit of these meetings is to identify 
prominent and up to date operational issues within the BCU (at a sector-specific, 
neighbourhood level) and agree effective tactical measures to resolve them89. The 
second section provides a qualitative examination of three key analytical themes that 
emerge from the quantitative appraisal of routine policing; 1) the impact of national 
priority concerns, and the role and nature of 2) intelligence gathering and 3) 
partnership working at the local level. This section presents analysis of data
89 See Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of the quantitative content analysis (QCA) that was 
undertaken for this research including reference to data source, coding process and limitations of the 
dataset.
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generated from non-participant observation of relevant meetings at the BCU level and 
the semi-structured interviews carried out with police officers across all ranks within 
the case study force. The mixed method approach to data analysis facilitates a 
rigorous examination of both the evidence of counter terrorism policing at the local 
level (indicating a degree of securitisation), and the enduring challenges to counter 
terrorism policy implementation and delivery at the strategic and frontline 
(operational) level.
6.1 Routine Policing at the BCU Level: An Empirical Measure
In order to carry out this alternative, empirical enquiry into routine policing at the 
local level it was necessary to devise two quantitative research questions and these 
provide the framework for the first section of this chapter. These questions are:
RQ.l: What are the main components of ‘routine’ policing in the case-study 
BCU?
RQ.2: What aspects of routine policing appear to be given the greatest level of 
priority within BCU tasking and operational policing?
The nature of counter terrorism policing, and the extent of the role that it plays in 
routine policing activity forms a specific aspect of the discussion of research 
questions 1 and 2. However, it is pertinent to reiterate one key point at this stage of 
the thesis. The emphasis is on highlighting patterns and relationships within the BCU 
data. As a result the QCA reveals a series of implicit indications regarding the role of 
counter terrorism policing at the local routine level and which, in turn, can be seen as 
evidence of tendencies towards securitisation (or not). The QCA dataset does not 
retain the capacity to explore and identify correlations or causality, and there is no 
intention to generalise the findings from this QCA to the wider policing population.
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6.1.1. What are the main components o f ‘routine ’policing at BCU level?
Table 6.1 contains a significant amount of data, which provides the basis for the 
discussion of the findings associated with the first quantitative research question. It 
shows the type of crime and disorder occurrences that regularly feature in the 
fortnightly tasking action plans. It also shows the number of times each occurrence 
category featured within the data collection period (i.e. how many of the 209 tasks 
were attributed to each occurrence category). It also shows the type of tasks that were 
implemented to respond tactically to each occurrence, and the number of times each 
task type was implemented across the data collection period. Table 6.1 also 
highlights the percentage distribution of tasks across each occurrence category, and 
conversely, the percentage amount of each occurrence category that comprise the total 
number of tasks (n=209).
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Autocrime
Violent
Crime
Burglary
Dwelling Drugs
Anti Social 
Behaviour
Counter
Terrorism General Total
Operation-based Count 18 3 21 0 2 0 0 44
% Task 40.9% 6.8% 47.7% .0% 4.5% .0% .0% 100.0%
% Total 8.6% 1.4% 10.0% .0% 1.0% .0% .0% 21.1%
Intelligence Count 8 11 7 2 13 5 8 54
% Task 14.8% 20.4% 13.0% 3.7% 24.1% 9.3% 14.8% 100.0%
% Total 3.8% 5.3% 3.3% 1.0% 6.2% 2.4% 3.8% 25.8%
Prevention Count 8 6 0 5 20 3 10 52
% Task 15.4% 11.5% .0% 9.6% 38.5% 5.8% 19.2% 100.0%
% Total 3.8% 2.9% .0% 2.4% 9.6% 1.4% 4.8% 24.9%
Enforcement Count 8 5 5 0 0 0 5 23
% Task 34.8% 21.7% 21.7% .0% .0% .0% 21.7% 100.0%
% Total 3.8% 2.4% 2.4% .0% .0% .0% 2.4% 11.0%
In-house admin Count 2 1 2 5 4 2 14 30
% Task 6.7% 3.3% 6.7% 16.7% 13.3% 6.7% 46.7% 100.0%
% Total 1.0% .5% 1.0% 2.4% 1.9% 1.0% 6.7% 14.4%
None Count 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 6
% Task .0% .0% .0% 66.7% .0% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0%
% Total .0% .0% .0% 1.9% .0% .5% .5% 2.9%
Total Count 44 26 35 16 39 11 38 209
% Task 21.1% 12.4% 16.7% 7.7% 18.7% 5.3% 18.2% 100.0%
% Total 21.1% 12.4% 16.7% 7.7% 18.7% 5.3% 18.2% 100.0%
Table 6.1: Types of Occurrence and Types of Task (Count and Percentage)
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The following figures highlight some of the key findings from Table 6.1 in more 
detail. Figure 6.1 shows there are 7 main crime and disorder occurrence categories 
that regularly feature in the fortnightly tasking action plans. The ‘general’ occurrence 
category primarily refers to administrative concerns such as ensuring attendance at 
BCU level meetings. Each occurrence category has been interpreted within this thesis 
as a composite element of local routine policing in the case study BCU.
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Figure 6 .1 : Types and Frequency of O ccurrence C ategories over a 6-m onth Period
The frequencies count included in Figure 6.1 denotes the number of times that an 
occurrence category was included in the 12 tasking action plans included in this 
dataset. The number of times an occurrence is mentioned in a tasking action plan 
equates to the number of tasks assigned to each occurrence category over the 6 month 
data collection period. However, it is important to reiterate that many of the tasks 
were present on fortnightly action plans as repeat tasks (reflecting the ongoing nature 
of some tasks) or as prompts for a review of progress on some tasks.
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Figure 6.2 depicts the frequency distribution of new tasks across the occurrence 
categories.
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Figure 6.2: Frequency d istribution  of new tasks by occurrence category
However, it was deemed appropriate to undertake the QCA on the total number of 
tasks referenced throughout the data collection period because it gives a 
comprehensive insight into the multi-layered nature of routine level policing by 
highlighting the range of tasks (immediate impact/longer term strategies) identified as 
the most effective response to a diverging range of issues. The findings reveal that 
105 out of 209 tasks (50%) relate to autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling. 
Collectively these crime categories are referred to as serious and acquisitive crime 
(SAC), and serve as the overwhelming focus of performance assessment at all levels 
of policing (national, force, BCU and sector). Out of the 209 tasks allocated at the 
sector (neighbourhood) level over the 6 month data collection period, only 11 (5%) 
were related to counter terrorism.
In addition to the types of occurrences that comprise the primary focus of routine 
policing it is also important to ascertain the range of police ranks and departments that 
are integral to routine policing at the local level. Table 2 gives an indication of the 
range of ranks and departments inherent to BCU policing and the frequency with 
which they feature in the assignment and completion of occurrence tasks.
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Rank/Department Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
NPT 76 36.4 36.4
Response 23 11.0 47.4
CID 43 20.6 67.9
Channel Project 1 0.5 68.4
Management Rank 26 12.4 80.9
OMU 1 0.5 81.3
YOT 1 0.5 81.8
Burglary Team 7 3.3 85.2
Community Safety 5 2.4 87.6
Intelligence Unit 6 2.9 90.4
All Sectors/Depts 13 6.2 96.7
NA 7 3.3 100.0
Total 209 100.0
Table 6.2: Frequency of task allocation according to police rank / department
Table 6.2 reveals that Neighbourhood Policing officers (PCSO -  Inspector), Response 
officers (PC- Bronze Inspector) and CID constitute almost 70% of the areas of routine 
police work targeted for the successful completion of fortnightly occurrence tasks90. 
Neighbourhood Policing retains the greatest responsibility for carrying out occurrence 
tasks. This is perhaps unsurprising given that response officers are ‘radio-led’ and 
their foremost responsibility is to respond to emergency calls.
90 The burglary team could be included in these statistics as a branch of CID. However, it was deemed 
important to separate out these departments as it gives a clear indication of the resources put into 
occurrences of burglary dwelling which is an occurrence type in its own right on fortnightly tasking 
action plans (FTAs).
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Figure 6.3 below shows the distribution of officer ranks and departments across the 
seven occurrence categories highlighted on the FTAs during the 6 month data 
collection period.
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Figure 6.3: D istribution of officer ranks and dep artm en ts by occurrence category
If one looks at Neighbourhood Policing officers -  the primary focus of this research 
given the emphasis placed on Neighbourhood Policing within securitised ‘talk’ and 
decisions’ -  it is possible to see that the largest proportion of the tasks (action) 
assigned to officers revolve around autocrime and anti-social behaviour (which was 
latterly renamed ‘neighbourhood management’ in the fortnightly tasking action plans 
(FTAs). This finding reflects the two diverging modes of performance measurement 
that governs Neighbourhood Policing -  centrally-set performance indicators on 
serious and acquisitive crime (autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling), and 
efficient and effective response to concerns raised by community residents (in the 
form of PACT priorities).
The data in Figure 6.3 indicates that the primary responsibility for counter terrorism 
tasks falls to Neighbourhood Policing Teams, the Community Safety Department and 
the Channel Project which is arguably the most tangible evidence of the 
implementation of securitised ‘decision’ (as a key aspect of the Prevent strategy) at
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the local policing level. It can be argued that this type of data provide some evidence 
of the translation of securitised talk and decision to the action level of routine 
policing. Figure 6.4 shows the different types of tasks assigned to the crime and 
disorder occurrences included in the fortnightly tasking action plans. There are 5 
main task types implemented as a tactical response to the occurrence categories. It 
was deemed valid to include the task category ‘none’ in the analysis because it 
demonstrates when occurrence categories were present on fortnightly tasking action 
plans but had no actions/tasks assigned to them. The implicit indication in these 
instances is that occurrence categories were included in tasking action plans merely 
because they were BCU priorities during that fortnightly period.
20
Type of Task
Figure 6.4: Types o f task  im plem ented as a response to occurrences
The findings show that the majority of tasks were either intelligence-related (54/209 
or 26%) or prevention-related (52/209 or 25%). Operation-based responses accounted 
for 21% (44/209) of tasks. An operation-based task is categorised independently from 
the other types of task because, although it might incorporate elements of 
‘intelligence’, ‘prevention’ and ‘enforcement’ work, it has one uniquely defining 
feature: often these tasks have additional money allocated to them to facilitate 
implementation and delivery. This becomes significant when exploring the second
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quantitative research question which focuses on the level of priority attached to 
occurrence categories within the BCU.
Figure 6.5 shows the frequency with which tasks are implemented as a tactical 
response to each of the occurrences shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.5: Types and frequency o f tasks91 im plem ented in tactical response to 
occurrence categories
The results show that 96% (42/44) of operation-based tasks were assigned to 
autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling (serious and acquisitive crime). The 
only other occurrence category to receive this type of task was anti-social behaviour. 
In terms of intelligence tasks, serious and acquisitive crime received 48% (27/54) of 
the allocation. Anti-social behaviour was assigned the largest number of prevention- 
related tasks (20/52 or 39%). Serious and acquisitive crime received 78% of all 
enforcement tasks allocated over the six month period. This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the emphasis placed on operational performance in this area. However, it is 
important to note that only 23 out of 209 tasks were determined to be enforcement-
91 The category ‘operation-based task’ refers to both the implementation of a specific operation to 
tackle an occurrence and any verbal updates that may have been given in subsequent tasking meetings 
(and consequently included as a task on subsequent action plans).
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specific which equates to just 1% of the total number of tasks allocated during the 
data collection period.
The role of counter terrorism within routine policing
The QCA data indicates that counter terrorism became a regular feature of fortnightly 
tasking action plans in July 2008; this was two months into the fieldwork period. As 
an occurrence category, counter terrorism was allocated 11 tasks in total (8 of which 
were identified as ‘new’ tasks); 6 intelligence-based tasks, 1 prevention-related task 
and 4 in-house administrative tasks. The 6 intelligence tasks constitute 55% of the 
total number of tasks allocated to counter terrorism and these tasks focused on 
gathering intelligence within communities or more precisely the designated 
neighbourhood policing team areas. On the surface this finding appears to provide 
support for advocates of the securitisation thesis, particularly King and Sharp (2006: 
380) who believe a key exemplar of securitisation within policing is ‘increasing 
government directives to police forces to enhance contact with and gather intelligence 
within the local communities or neighbourhood areas’.
However, it is important to note that although the 6 intelligence tasks represent 55% 
of counter terrorism tasks this only represents 11% of the total number of intelligence- 
related tasks implemented during the data collection period. Counter terrorism was 
assigned only 1 prevention-related task which constitutes only 9% of the total number 
of tasks allocated to counter terrorism, and only reflects 2% of all prevention-specific 
tasks carried out during the six-month fieldwork period. The nature of prevention 
tasks were somewhat ambiguous and involved liaison with local clothing companies. 
The implicit indication here is that tasks related to pre-determined intelligence 
gathered in relation to an ongoing illicit collaboration. These findings are significant 
given the emphasis placed on the implementation and delivery of the Prevent strategy 
within the pre-existing neighbourhood policing structures at the local level.
Nevertheless, the QCA finding does reveal evidence of some form of discernible 
implementation of counter terrorism policy ‘decision’ (in the form of the Prevent 
strategy) at the action level of routine policing. One of the seven objectives of the 
Prevent strategy -  from a police perspective -  is to ‘develop Prevent-related 
intelligence, analysis and research’ in order to improve knowledge about violent
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extremism and the factors that drive it (ACPO, 2008: 9). The strategy acknowledges 
that to date, the intelligence role has largely been carried out by Security Services and 
Special Branch, but there is a discernible emphasis placed on the need to enhance 
links between national security intelligence and ‘local community information’ 
(ACPO, 2008). As the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Ian Blair 
observed, ‘national security depends on neighbourhood security’ (BBC, 2005). The 
Prevent strategy states ‘local community information’ is to be obtained through 
processes of neighbourhood ‘mapping’ and the development of Key Individual 
Networks (KINs), and that this work is to be the primary responsibility of 
neighbourhood officers. The specific nature of the counter terrorism intelligence 
tasks allocated within the case study BCU related to profiling the size and 
characteristics of the Muslim population in sector/neighbourhood areas, and later to 
begin to identify and locate Key Individual Networks (KINs); Community Contact 
Points and Places of Significance where BME groups may be vulnerable to extremist 
influence. This supports existing empirical work on the nature of counter terrorism 
activity at the local policing level (Innes, 2006). Moreover, 7 of the 11 tasks are 
assigned to either the community safety department within the BCU or the 
sector/neighbourhood inspectors for tasking within their teams. This finding is 
significant for several reasons; it provides evidence of a transferral of securitised 
policy ‘decision’ to the routine police ‘action’ level, and provides emerging 
indications that counter terrorism policing -  at least to some degree -  is being 
embedded into the framework of routine policing at the neighbourhood level.
6.1.2 What aspects o f routine policing appear to be given the greatest level ofpriority 
within BCU tasking and operational policing?
A number of proxy measures of ‘status’ were identified in order to assess the level of 
priority attached to the crime and disorder occurrence categories which form the main 
focus of routine policing in the case study BCU. Two variables within the dataset 
have been interpreted as proxy measures of status:
Proxy Measure 1: Number o f tasks assigned to each occurrence per action sheet.
Proxy Measure 2: Additional money allocated to carry out a specific occurrence task.
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Figure 6.6 shows the number of tasks that each occurrence category was assigned 
within each individual Action Plan. This provides a clear indication of the proportion 
of routine police activity that is directed towards each occurrence category.
■ A u to cr im e
■ V io le n t  C rim e
□  Burglary D w elling  
□ A n ti-S o c ia l B ehaviou r
■  D ru gs
□  C ou n ter  Terrorism
■  G en era l
Number of Occurrence Tasks Per Action Sheet
Figure 6.6: Number of tasks assigned to each occurrence category per fortnightly 
tasking action sheet
Figure 6.6 shows that autocrime, anti-social behaviour and general (administrative) 
issues consistently received the greatest number of tasks within each fortnightly 
action plan. An outlier in this regard is anti-social behaviour which received 8 tasks 
in one action plan. Autocrime was assigned a minimum of 3 tasks in 11 of the 12 
action plans. This occurrence category received 5 tasks on two occasions and 6 tasks 
on one occasion. Although counter terrorism remained a regular feature of Action 
Plans from July 2008, the amount of counter terrorism-related tasks remained 
consistently low; 1 task on 4 occasions and 2 tasks on 3 occasions. However, it was 
evident that often, where there were two tasks, one of them was a replication of a task 
from a preceding Action Plan. Perhaps it is more significant that, on one occasion, 
counter terrorism was included on an Action Plan as an occurrence category but 
received no tasks. This was also the case for the drugs occurrence category (which
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received no tasks on 5 occasions). The implicit indication here is that these 
occurrences were only present on tasking plans to satisfy BCU strategic priorities 
during these periods.
Figure 6.7 highlights the frequency with which additional money was allocated to 
support the implementation and delivery of tasks. There is no information included 
on action plans as to how the additional money was used, although following periodic 
observation of tasking meetings, it was determined that additional money facilitated 
police officer overtime. It was decided that it was more valid to apply the code ‘not 
mentioned’ rather than ‘no’ on the basis that just because additional funding had not 
been noted in relation to tasks on action plans it could not be assumed that it had not 
been made available in some form. The code ‘not applicable’ was applied to tasks 
that were deemed wholly administrative in nature, or which constituted updates on 
ongoing tasks. However, this analysis is primarily concerned with the instances in 
which additional money was provided to carry out occurrence tasks. Therefore 
subsequent discussion focuses on the instances where additional money was allocated 
in order to enhance task implementation and delivery.
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It can be seen from Figure 6.7 that additional money was allocated to tasks on 23 
occasions. This equates to 11 % of all tasks over the six month period.
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Figure 6.7: Frequency of additional money allocation
The only occurrences to secure additional money/resources -  with the exception of 
anti-social behaviour on one occasion -  were autocrime, violent crime and burglary 
dwelling (i.e. serious and acquisitive crime). Autocrime tasks were provided the 
greatest amount of financial assistance, receiving additional funds on 14 of the 23 
occasions it was provided. Again, this is unsurprising given the emphasis placed on 
serious and acquisitive crime in terms of performance assessment across the BCU. 
Both counter terrorism and drugs-related occurrences did not receive any additional 
funding. Only two types of tasks were in receipt of additional funding -  those that 
were operation-based and intelligence-related. The operation-based tasks received the 
greatest frequency of funds -  21 out of 23 cases of additional financial provision. 
These findings are consistent with those relating to the first research question which 
revealed a notable relationship between autocrime and the implementation of 
operation-based tasks.
Figure 6.8 shows the amounts of money allocated to tasks and the frequency with 
which it was distributed across occurrence categories. In total, £14,300 was allocated
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to support the implementation and delivery of tactical responses to occurrences over 
the 6-month period between June and November 2008. In terms of funding 
distribution, the mean amount was £621 and the modal value was £500 (allocated on 
9 occasions).
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Figure 6.8: Frequency of money allocation by occurrence category
Of the £14,300 allocated in total, £9250 was directed towards autocrime occurrences; 
£3370 to burglary dwelling; £1080 to anti-social behaviour, and £600 to violent 
crime. So although serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) received 92% of the total 
amount of money, it was autocrime that secured the greatest amount of money overall 
-  almost 3 times as much as the other two SAC occurrences put together.
6.1.3. Summary
Ultimately, the QCA reveals a considerable amount in relation to the composition of 
routine policing at the BCU level, particularly in terms of the types of crime and 
disorder occurrences prevalent within local policing activity, the nature of the tasks 
implemented in response to each of the occurrence categories, and the department 
most commonly responsible for the implementation of the tasks. The data indicate 
that issues pertaining to serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) dominate the activity of
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police officers at the routine action level (or at least at the routine tasking level) and 
that it is Neighbourhood Policing Teams who bear most of the responsibility for 
carrying out the tasks assigned to address the SAC issues. Furthermore, through an 
assessment of the two proxy measures of ‘status’ it is determined that serious and 
acquisitive crime constitutes the greatest proportion of routine policing at the BCU 
level and in turn retain the greatest priority at the operational level. Moreover, the 
QCA has provided a number of empirical insights into the nature and role of counter 
terrorism within routine policing activity in the case study BCU. It is evident that 
counter terrorism has a proportionately minor role to play in routine policing at the 
operational tasking level. The QCA indicates that counter terrorism became a regular 
feature of fortnightly tasking action plans during the period of fieldwork, which could 
prompt the not unreasonable assumption that this would remain the case post­
fieldwork. However, by highlighting the number and nature of tasks directly assigned 
to counter terrorism at the local level -  in addition to the lack of financial support for 
the implementation and delivery of these tasks -  it is possible to cast doubt on the 
level of importance it retains as an operational policing priority area.
Nevertheless, the QCA does reveal that counter terrorism has become a tangible 
presence in the routine tasking of local police officers, and there is every reason to 
suggest that this will continue if not increase following the completion of the 
fieldwork for this research. Such evidence can be used to suggest that counter 
terrorism policing is becoming increasingly embedded into routine police activity to 
some extent, which in turn can be used as empirical evidence to suggest that routine 
policing is indeed becoming more securitised. However, the quantitative findings are 
not without shortcomings and it is important to reiterate the aim of the QCA was to 
provide an empirical measure of routine policing rather than to identify correlations 
within the data and modes of generalising the findings to the wider policing 
population. Indeed, two of the analytic themes arising from the QCA -  the role of 
intelligence and the nature of community safety partnership working are examined 
from a more in-depth, qualitative perspective in the following section and the findings 
generated from this analysis can be seen to show the QCA findings as a series of 
implicit indications with regards to the role of counter terrorism within routine 
policing. However, it is important to highlight that this in itself does not negate the 
QCA data from providing valuable empirical evidence with which to assess critically
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the extent to which policing is becoming securitised at the local, routine level. In 
effect, a test of the securitisation version of the ‘contagion’ hypothesis (Hillyard, 
1989) which would argue that even though routine police involvement in counter 
terrorism-related activities as explicitly defined in their tasking measures does not 
appear to have increased, it may be the case that more everyday policing tasks are 
becoming suffused with the mentalities and methods of counter terrorism policing -  in 
effect infecting ‘low policing’ with ‘high policing’ attitudes and technologies. By 
looking at the two thematic areas identified in the QCA in a more detailed qualitative 
way it is possible to further assess such propositions.
6.2: A Qualitative Exploration of Key QCA Themes
This section provides a qualitative examination of three key analytical themes that 
emerged from the quantitative appraisal of routine policing, and includes an analysis 
of data generated from non-participant observation of relevant meetings at the BCU 
level and semi-structured interviews carried out with police officers across all ranks 
within the case study force. The three themes under examination at the routine 
policing level are:
1. The impact of national priority concerns;
2. The role of intelligence work,
3. The nature of partnership working and ‘community safety’ structures.
These analytic themes are examined in relation to routine policing in general and then 
more specifically in relation to counter terrorism and other securitised concerns, such 
as radicalisation and extremism. The latter exploration is undertaken because all of 
these elements of police practice have been identified by securitisation theorists as 
key exemplars of increased securitisation of local policing (see Chapter Two). 
Therefore, the extent to which each are informed by concerns around terrorism and 
radicalisation (reflected in securitised ‘talk’ or ‘decision’) can be used to either lend 
strength to, or undermine the assertions that policing is subject to increased 
securitisation.
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6.2.1. National Priority: Local Ambivalence?
The QCA of the fortnightly tasking action plans raises a number of qualitative 
questions. One of the foremost of these is why do certain occurrences come under 
closer scrutiny than others, as reflected in their inclusion in the action plans? There 
are perhaps two possible reasons for this. One is that each occurrence is a significant 
issue for the BCU as reflected in the regularly published performance statistics, for 
example COMPSTAT. This would certainly account for the presence of occurrences 
such as violent crime, autocrime and burglary dwelling (serious and acquisitive 
crimes) which are rigorously audited at all policing levels. It would also account for 
the presence of anti-social behaviour (latterly titled neighbourhood management on 
FTAs) because Neighbourhood Policing Team response to the issues of concern 
raised from within local communities are also monitored at the BCU and force levels. 
However, this would not account for the presence of counter terrorism because, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, BCUs are not held to account for the performance in 
relation to counter terrorism. The other possible reason for the presence of certain 
occurrences on fortnightly tasking action (FTA) plans is that they are national 
priorities that have necessarily been adopted as force and local BCU priorities. It is 
indeed possible this is the case with counter terrorism, particularly in light of the fact 
that it only became a BCU strategic priority (and thus present on the fortnightly action 
plans) in the fourth month of the six month fieldwork period. This in turn ties in with 
the publication and subsequent implementation of the Prevent strand of the 
government’s CONTEST strategy (2003 and re-launch in 2008).
King and Sharp (2006: 387) argue that a series of legislative and policy shifts over the 
past fifteen years have ensured a discernible ‘move from local decision-making to a 
centrally proscribed agenda’ which sees all forces required to produce an annual force 
plan which must incorporate the national policing plan formulated by the Home 
Secretary alongside the local police priorities. The suggestion here is that local 
concerns have gradually been replaced by national priorities determined against an 
increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda. Such observations are arguably 
bome out by the apparently anomalous inclusion of counter terrorism on FTA plans. 
King and Sharp’s (2006) assertions also chime with researcher observations generated 
at the fortnightly tasking meetings which were attended during the fieldwork period of
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this thesis. Such observations include an initial uncertainty from officers over the 
origin of counter terrorism tasks given that they were not driven by the same 
motivations that prompt the allocation of tasks to the other types of occurrences, for 
example as a result of the performance (reporting/detection) figures during the 
preceding weeks.
The Prevent agenda states that ‘neighbourhood mapping’ was developed by the 
Neighbourhood Policing Programme, and the ‘development of standards on the 
composition, completion, content and use of mapping information will be completed 
by September 2008’ (ACPO, 2008: 25). The findings from the observational data 
generated during this research reveal that the provision of this type of documentary 
guidance will be of critical importance. The observations of fortnightly tasking 
meetings identified a lack of information and clarity in relation to what was required 
to fulfil counter terrorism tasks, and in some cases a reluctance to carry them out for 
fear of appearing to target certain members of communities. In general terms, 
questions were raised in relation to the validity of using the current census data which, 
at the time of writing had not been updated since 2001. If this was indeed used then 
the (out of date) numbers would only reflect the resident population and not the 
transient population -  a key issue for case study sectors that house a large number of 
students during the academic year. Moreover, it was observed that there is a need to 
clarify the terms used within the task, for example, ‘Muslim’ is a reference to religion 
and not to ethnicity. A more specific issue arising from fortnightly tasking meetings 
is a lack of operational information regarding the manner in which such sensitive 
‘counter terrorism’ tasks are carried out within communities. Although it was 
commonly acknowledged that the motivation for such task was to counter 
radicalisation in the long run, it was noted by one Neighbourhood Policing Inspector 
that the Muslim community is not the only source of terrorism in the UK, and that any 
approach to ‘mapping’ communities and establishing key contact had to be thought 
out strategically in order to avoid accusations of ‘just focusing on the Muslim 
community’ [Neighbourhood Inspector3].
The following quotation was typical of Neighbourhood Policing team inspectors: if a 
specific task came ‘from the Centre (Force HQ) or from central government then 
more time, and clarity of information was required’ in order to effectively carry out
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this task [Neighbourhood Inspector4]. This situation in itself prompts a more detailed 
analysis as there can be seen to be a number of inherent implications for an 
examination of ‘securitisation’ at the local policing level not least in relation to the 
nature of the formal frameworks in place for the implementation of national security 
policy (in this case Prevent) within police forces, and particularly at the BCU level. 
The uncertainty and caution exhibited in relation to the origin and undertaking of 
counter terrorism tasks may reveal a case study BCU-specific, strategically under­
developed tasking process for counter terrorism-related work. However, it is 
important to reiterate that counter terrorism was introduced as a new area of tasking 
with no additional funding and as highlighted, little guidance on the origin of the 
occurrence as a priority concern or how to carry out the tasks in practice.
However it might also reflect the observations put forward by securitisation theorists 
such as King and Sharp (2006) and others whose work is arguably closely associated 
with the securitisation thesis. It can be argued that there are aspects of the case study 
scenario which serve as exemplars of a post-11 September 7 July 2005 security 
climate which some theorists see to be characterised by changes at the local policing 
level occurring at the same time as an increasing preoccupation with national and 
international security priorities, and the state’s increasing influence over the public 
police alternatively observed as ‘constitutionalisation’ (Walker, 2002) and the ‘retreat 
of police institutions from [the position of real power-holders in relation to policy 
decisions] back to the political powers of nation states’ (DeFlem, 2002: 229). 
According to advocates of the securitisation thesis within the context of policing such 
a preoccupation has prompted certain legislative and policy shifts (interpreted as 
examples of securitised decisions within this thesis) which have gradually seeped into 
the practice of everyday police ‘work’. Such examples of securitisation include an 
increase in government directives to public police forces to enhance contact with and 
gather intelligence concerning the local community through the (re)establishment of 
community safety initiatives (Home Office, 2007a). This statement resonates within 
two of the analytical themes emerging from the QCA and which are further explored 
from a qualitative perspective in the following section.
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6.2.2. The role o f  ‘intelligence ’ at the local policing level
Community Intelligence: it’s one o f the hardest things to define, and one o f the 
hardest things to record.
[BCU Commanderl]
It is clear from the QCA that the types of task most consistently implemented across 
all occurrence categories during the six month data collection period were 
intelligence-related. One of the most significant points of interest is the delineation in 
the nature of the intelligence gathering ‘work’. For occurrences that constitute serious 
and acquisitive crime (SAC) the intelligence gathered was primarily criminal in 
nature. However, for the counter terrorism tasks the intelligence gathering work was 
wholly community-orientated with the emphasis placed on profiling the size and 
characteristics of the Muslim population in sector/neighbourhood areas, and later to 
begin to identify and locate Key Individual Networks (KINs); Community Contact 
Points and Places of Significance where BME groups may be vulnerable to extremist 
influence. Although the QCA findings clearly indicate a degree of securitised action 
in relation to intelligence gathering, an in-depth qualitative examination of this routine 
policing activity -  particularly when emphasis is placed on community intelligence 
gathering -  reveals a somewhat ambiguous situation.
The term ‘community intelligence’ is not new and was widely referenced in the 
government’s drive to enhance the role of neighbourhood policing with the public 
service. In the government’s consultation paper, Building Communities, Beating 
Crime (Home Office, 2004a) community intelligence was highlighted as a key 
operational priority. This policy paper indicated the importance of ascertaining how 
community intelligence was going to be ‘gathered, managed, measured and 
employed’ at the BCU policing level (Home Office, 2004a: 3). The term remains 
widely used in political and public discourse and can be seen to have taken on 
renewed significance when applied to terrorism and associated security concerns such 
as extremism and radicalisation. However, despite the government’s attempts to 
outline the role of community intelligence and the processes inherent to its collection,
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analysis and employment92 there remains no commonly agreed definition. As a result 
this research argues that the term has become a ‘free-floating signifier’ (Innes, 2006: 
4). In short, the term has been applied to a range of policing circumstances but in 
particular those that aim to provide ‘valid and reliable insights into the principal 
drivers of insecurity across different neighbourhoods and communities. Innes et a/’s 
(2009: 102) field experiments in ‘community intelligence-led policing’ conceptualised 
community intelligence as ‘information that when analysed provides insights into the 
risks posed by or to a group sharing some common conception of self-identity’. 
However, this research seeks to develop the conceptual parameters of this definition 
by suggesting that the meaning or at least the operational understanding of the term is 
seen to narrow when applied to terrorism and associated security threats such as 
radicalisation and extremism. Community intelligence has gradually become 
synonymous with providing insights primarily into the risks posed by certain groups 
within community or neighbourhood areas.
There is a significant amount of securitised ‘talk’ surrounding the nature and role of 
community intelligence, and this is primarily focused on the role of BCU-level, and in 
particular the role of neighbourhood policing in the successful collation of such 
information. Moreover, there is discernible evidence of securitised decisions 
associated with the collection and dissemination of community intelligence as it is 
emphasised within the seven key Prevent objectives for policing at the national level, 
force and BCU levels. Advocates of the securitisation thesis as applied to policing 
identify the increased emphasis on gathering intelligence within local neighbourhoods 
and communities as an exemplar of the increased securitisation of routine policing 
(King and Sharp, 2006). The findings from the QCA reveal evidence to suggest that 
community intelligence gathering or at least gathering information on communities 
(which appears to be the activity most closely associated with counter terrorism at the 
level of local policing practice) is occurring at the Neighbourhood Policing level.
Crucially however -  and in some contrast to the developments anticipated by HMIC 
(2005) -  the qualitative interviews with officers of all ranks indicate that the extent to
92 Building Communities, Beating Crime (2004a: 4) states that BCUs should provide evidence that 
information from the community is routinely gathered, risk assessed and should be ‘valued as highly as 
criminal intelligence’.
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which neighbourhood policing teams actively seek out information and intelligence 
concerning security threats through the collation of community intelligence is 
minimal. Moreover, the interview data reveal an ambiguous approach to community 
intelligence in general. The following section examines the possible reasons for this, 
and the implications for suppositions regarding the increased securitisation of routine 
policing. These include the lack of an operational definition for community 
intelligence and an absence of formal mechanisms for the collection, storage, analysis 
and ultimately the dissemination of relevant data.
All officers -  from BCU Commanders to Neighbourhood PCSOs -  were asked what 
they understood by the term ‘community intelligence’, and whether they were aware 
of an operational definition of the term. The responses across the ranks were 
consistent:
[Laughs]
‘It’s a very very good question. I’ve never read an actual definition of what Cl 
[community intelligence] is’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector2]
‘I’ve never read a definition on any document or force policy. I don’t think 
people know what it means, what it consists of or what they have to do with it. 
I think if you asked anybody they couldn’t give you a hard and fast answer as 
to what Cl means’.
[Neighbourhood Sergeantl]
‘Hmmmm, it’s different things, knowing your area, knowing where crack 
houses are, mosques, schools...and then you get to know the people - the 
crims; sometimes they’ll tell you stuff. What do you mean by community 
intelligence’?
[Neighbourhood PC SO]
All of the responses -  made by different ranks within one NPT -  demonstrate the lack 
of awareness of a working definition of community intelligence. Moreover the final 
comments, made by a Neighbourhood PCSO -  commonly acknowledged within the 
force to be the most effective conduit for information from within communities due to 
the nature of their daily work practices -  highlights a common inability to delineate 
between community and criminal intelligence. This is further explored later in this 
Chapter. The lack of an operational definition is exacerbated by the apparent absence
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of formal mechanisms for the collation, storage, analysis and dissemination of 
community intelligence generated from within Neighbourhood Policing areas:
‘I think probably everybody could give you a fair stab of what it is but then the 
issue is what they actually do with it because we don’t have a system to 
capture it, or analyse it. So it would almost be at the discretion of the 
person receiving it as to what they do with it’.
[BCU Commanded, emphasis added]
There are a number of inherent implications to the above observations regarding the 
lack of an operational definition and the absence of tangible mechanisms for collating 
and disseminating community intelligence. Perhaps the foremost of these is the 
emphasis this places on discretion, at all levels of routine policing — BCU, sector and 
individual officer. It appears to be left to the discretion of BCUs and their individual 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams to decide the importance placed on information 
generated within the community and how such community intelligence should be 
utilised -  if at all. This in turn raises the profile of officer discretion across all ranks 
working within Neighbourhood Policing teams, and not just at the frontline where it is 
commonly acknowledged there is the greatest amount of discretion within the police 
service. It is evident that a lack of tangible mechanisms for the collation of 
community intelligence places significant emphasis on the importance 
Neighbourhood Policing Team sergeants and inspectors attach to the concept of 
community intelligence. In Neighbourhood Policing Teams that prioritise the 
collection and use of community intelligence there is often evidence of proactive 
initiatives to set up mechanisms for its storage and analysis, and this is often evident 
in the form of a sector-wide intelligence blog.
‘It’s something that we’ve led on in this sector. All the staff have been briefed 
- have you seen the internal sector blog? That is where we capture any Cl that 
comes in because it doesn’t fit the format for our intelligence submissions. 
[There are] daily reports on the blog so that officers can update themselves. 
We weren’t told to do it; we set it up here as a sector initiative and we’ve had 
500 entries since March 08. It’s seen as best practice’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector2]
It is also clear that the absence of clear operational guidelines for the collection, 
analysis and dissemination of community intelligence has a profound impact on the
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way in which police officers conceptualise it as an operational practice. The below 
observations from a PC working in one of the case study BCU Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams provides an interesting insight into the conceptions of community 
intelligence at the local policing level.
‘You can have criminal intelligence on the computer and that’s fine but I 
think the community stuff is sometimes more informal. We might discuss 
things amongst ourselves and sometimes that’s more useful than the stuff on 
the computer. You may sometimes think, oh maybe I should have put that on 
the computer...sometimes you think, well I won’t put it on there because it’s 
obviously sterilised on there whereas if we’re just talking amongst ourselves 
then you don’t need to worry about any of that - who’s told you what etc.
And there are certain times where I think, I won’t bother to put that on there 
because actually it’s really minor, it’s not worth going to all the effort. It 
might just be a stop somewhere but if I tell one of my colleagues oh I saw x 
walking down x they might say oh there was a vehicle crime that 
happened...because it’s your colleagues and you trust your colleagues. When 
you put something on the computer, you’re opened up to criticism etc and I 
think some might not realise that it’s useful because they’re worried about 
getting judged. There are so many variables as to how you write things, and 
whether you even do write it’.
[Neighbourhood PC, emphasis added]
The observations of this Neighbourhood PC were common within the case-study 
BCU and raise a number of salient points with regards the use of community 
intelligence as an effective tool to counter terrorism and extremism. One of the 
consequences of a lack of operational mechanisms for the submission of community 
intelligence is that such information is often seen as an informal aspect of police 
work. The Prevent strategy incorporates an Intelligence and Community Engagement 
(ICE) training package aimed at increasing the confidence and ability of staff to 
engage with communities and to gain community intelligence (ACPO, 2008). This 
training was due to ‘embedded’ in national police training towards the end of 
2008/09. It is clear that the absence of formal guidelines on conduct in this area often 
renders officers uncertain and fearful of criticism for submitting information deemed 
to be ‘useless’ because it carries no evidence of criminal intent or act. This can 
culminate in the adoption of a rather perfunctory approach to this aspect of police 
practice which often culminates in localised discussion within the Neighbourhood 
Policing team rather than following a process of formal submission akin to that in
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place for criminal intelligence93.
Indeed, the often ambiguous relationship between criminal and community 
intelligence is a fundamental aspect of contemporary routine policing. The 
Neighbourhood PC alludes to this by stating that you have criminal intelligence on the 
computer and that’s fine. Such observations are reinforced from within the 
management ranks of the case-study BCU:
‘It depends if we get criminal intelligence or community intelligence [from the 
public] because criminal intelligence is fed into our NICHE system. If it’s 
community intelligence it’s a bit more of a tricky subject and we haven’t 
really got to grips yet on how that can be properly stored and analysed and so 
forth’.
[BCU Commander 1]
Such observations corroborate existing research that observes community intelligence 
as a ‘dust-bin concept’ used whenever police want to refer to a form of information 
that does not fit into their more firmly established conceptions of ‘crime’ and 
‘criminal’ intelligence (Innes et al, 2009: 102). This contrasts sharply with the 
national policy ‘talk’ associated with community intelligence which states that 
community intelligence should be analysed, prioritised...acted upon where actionable 
and valued as highly as criminal intelligence’ (Home Office, 2004a: 4).
Reasons for gaps in the transfer/implementation ofpolicy
This research identifies a number of possible reasons for the gaps in the transfer and 
subsequent implementation of counter terrorism policing policy between the levels of 
talk, decision and action. This chapter focuses on two in particular, 1) the application 
and understanding of the National Intelligence Model within the case study force, and 
2) the cultural and operational relationship between Special Branch and routine police 
officers. These thematic areas are broadly characterised as organisational and cultural 
‘challenges’ to implementation respectively.
93 The Force Strategic Assessment states that a Community Intelligence Pilot commenced in August 
2007 in one of the divisional areas other than the case study BCU within this research. If it was 
deemed to be successful (following evaluation) the intention was to roll out the ‘good practice’ across 
the force in January 2008. There was no evidence of such a ‘roll-out’ during the fieldwork phase of 
this research. Moreover, the decision not to implement a community intelligence pilot in the case study 
BCU -  which was designated a pathfinder BCU under the auspices of Prevent -  is questionable.
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1. The Role of the National Intelligence Model
The processes in place for the submission of criminal intelligence are clear, 
systematic and compulsory. The formal mechanisms negate the need for discretion 
and as a result officers appear clear and confident in their operational duties. In terms 
of intelligence gathering, police practice or ‘action’ traditionally revolves around that 
which is ‘criminal’ in nature. The structures and systems in place to capture, analyse 
and disseminate intelligence reinforce this traditional, cultural practice. This is 
exemplified by the introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) in 2004. At 
the time the NIM represented the most significant manifestation of intelligence-led 
policing (ILP) and characterised a concerted shift towards a more focused, prioritised, 
and intelligence-led approach to crime control (Tregidga, 2003). A raft of new 
phrases entered the policing vernacular such as ‘managing problems’ and a ‘targeted 
approach’ to crime control, and gradually replaced the traditional concepts of reactive, 
case based approach to criminal investigation (Maguire, 2004). The shifts in both 
thought and action that the NIM represents had profound implications for public 
policing at all levels in England and Wales. The NIM was introduced to provide a 
national framework for how police agencies acquire and process intelligence data. As 
Maguire and John (2006) observe, in principle if not always in practice, the NIM was 
intended to connect information flows and exchange between high and low policing 
agencies. However, existing research (Tregidga, 2003) reveals widespread criticism 
of the NIM at the time of its introduction, particularly in terms of how it was 
‘marketed’ to officers as a business management tool. This together with a perceived 
disproportionate focus on the ‘intelligence’ aspect of the Model left many officers 
feeling isolated from aspects of the NIM and therefore struggled to see the relevance 
of it within the context of their own policing activity.
Nevertheless, the NIM remains the overarching management framework for policing 
in terms of both strategic decision-making and the tactical deployment of resources at 
the BCU policing level. The Intelligence Products generated from NIM include the 
Tactical Assessments that inform the fortnightly tasking and coordinating groups 
(TCGs) which in turn generate the fortnightly tasking plans which served as the focus 
of the quantitative content analysis (QCA) of this research. However, criticisms of 
the NIM appear to have evolved into frustration with its monolithic nature and
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inability to incorporate the different forms of intelligence that now characterise the 
modem policing landscape at the BCU level:
‘If we could revisit NIM as an information management model rather than an 
intelligence management model...because ‘intelligence’ suggests criminal 
intelligence and community intelligence is actually community information. 
We’ve made progress in this area in small pockets...over the last decade 
community policing has gained strength, we used to be very response focused, 
crime focused and investigative focused and that didn’t help’...
[Force Command4]
Innes (2006), states that community intelligence is different from criminal intelligence 
in a number of ways. Firstly, it tends to be open source rather than acquired from 
covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), and secondly it is often provided by 
members of the public. The inability to capture information generated from within 
local communities and neighbourhood areas has profound implications for the 
implementation of national counter terrorism policies such as Prevent at the local 
level. Notably, the Prevent strategy states that the ‘National Intelligence Model 
creates opportunities for linking community intelligence and the shared data from 
partners’ (ACPO, 2008: 22). The observations made by the Force Head of 
Community Safety appear to undermine this assertion.
‘I think we’ve read NIM as a crime management model and we’re now having 
to revisit how we manage our community intelligence because if there is 
information that a member of a Muslim community is acting suspiciously, is 
that criminal intelligence or community intelligence? What do we do with it’?
[Force Command4]
Innes et al (2009) suggests that the conceptual framing of intelligence-led policing has 
served to cast it as the antithesis of community policing, operating more recently 
under the auspices of Neighbourhood Policing. This research further suggests that the 
traditional and continued emphasis placed on criminal intelligence at the routine 
policing level has compounded the notion that ILP and NP are competing police 
paradigms; that the two methods of policing practice are operationally incompatible. 
However further research counters such assertions (Maguire and John, 2006) and
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suggests that the development of a more structured approach to the submission and 
analysis of community intelligence had the potential to ‘bridge the gap’ between ILP 
and NP (Tregidga, 2006). However the current research reveals no such 
developments within the case study BCU.
2. The relationship between routine police officers and Special Branch
The operational distinctions between Special Branch and routine policing provide a 
tangible, empirical example of the conceptualisations of high and low policing 
(Brodeur, 1983). The work of Special Branch and comparable ‘specialist’ units 
reflects the high policing work in that ‘intelligence-gathering is all-encompassing; it is 
not ‘uniquely bound to enforce the law and regulations as they are made by an 
independent legislator; protecting the community from law violators is not an end in 
itself, and it strives to maintain a low operational visibility’ (1983: 513-514). This is 
in salient contrast to traditional conceptions of low, routine policing which is 
concerned with protecting the public, maintaining public order and solving volume, 
‘micro’ crimes such as serious and acquisitive crime. Moreover, the veil of secrecy 
that has traditionally shrouded the work of specialist units such as Special Branch has 
helped to cultivate and maintain cultural divisions and as a consequence, an 
operational disjuncture between generalist and specialist police practice. It is 
increasingly acknowledged, even by key proponents of high and low policing such as 
Brodeur (2007) that events such as the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have 
instigated a blurring of the boundaries between the two policing domains (Innes and 
Thiel, 2010). This current research indicates that the cultural and organisational 
legacy remains intact and continues to inform (mis)conceptions of such ‘specialist’ 
work.
This observation is reinforced through the interviews carried out across the ranks and 
divisions within the case study Force with references made to a ‘sneaky deaky world’ 
[Response Sgtl]; ‘James Bond stuff and on one occasion the place for ‘the sick, the 
lame and the lazy’ [Neighbourhood PC4]. Although it is commonly acknowledged 
that the secretive doors of Special Branch have opened slightly and it is important that 
this takes place, it is also apparent that clear distinctions remain which, very often, 
have negative implications on the operational working relationship. More pertinently, 
it can be seen that the often contentious relationship poses a tangible challenge to the
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implementation and effective delivery of some counter terrorism strategies at the 
frontline of policing. An examination of the relationship between special branch and 
routine police officers reveals a significant disjuncture between counter terrorism 
‘talk’ and counter terrorism ‘action’ on the ground. A number of the Force Command 
Team indicate the importance of mainstreaming counter terrorism policing within 
routine practice and highlight the need to, ‘lift the lid’ and make it relevant...lift the 
cloak off what’s going on [Force Command2].
The strategic rhetoric espoused by Force Command is reflected to a degree in the 
tactical tasking framework of divisional policing. The now regular presence of 
Special Branch officers at BCU-level Fortnightly Tasking meetings represents a 
discernible change in the operational practices of both Special Branch and routine 
policing:
‘There is an input from Special Branch at fortnightly tasking. They’ll brief us 
on activity if appropriate, and that’s the extent of input with regards counter 
terrorism’.
[BCU Commander 1]
However, it is clear that there remains an enduring operational distinction between 
‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ police practice:
‘The generalists will be responsible for restoring order; the specialists will 
carry out the investigations, forensics etc. It’s the frontline bobbies who are 
there initially but the investigation and subsequent trace back will always be a 
specialism’.
[BCU Commanded]
As this quotation illuminates, even within the context of counter terrorism routine 
police work is framed around the restoration of order and public reassurance. It is 
observed that such operational gaps can have negative implications, particularly when 
judged within the context of an increasingly prominent role for neighbourhood 
policing in the response to the terrorist threat as indicated in contemporary security 
‘talk’ and ‘decision’ in the UK:
‘We need to find ways to normalise issues around counter terrorism. There
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are gaps and probably quite significant gaps in terms of what we do on a day 
to day basis and what specialists are doing on a day to day basis. There isn’t a 
great knowledge amongst the officers on the ground. And if the importance is 
on the officers out there now - community officers and more so than anybody 
else - then maybe they [specialists] need to open their doors even more’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector2]
‘It won’t be a member of Special Branch that comes across a suspect package; 
it’ll be a copper going about his everyday activity. That police officer needs 
to be at least aware that in those circumstances, he shouldn’t go up with his 
fingers in his ears and kick the package. I think there should be input from 
Special Branch to say this is what you should do and definitely what you 
shouldn’t do. That briefing should be given to all officers, and then 
consistently reinforced. People become complacent and they forget’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector4]
The observations put forward by Sector/Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) 
Inspectors are validated by the interviews carried out with the frontline officers 
operating within these NPTs. There is a clear and consistent distinction made 
between ‘specialist’ and ‘routine’ police practice within the context of counter 
terrorism policing and this distinction often informs the officers’ perceptions of their 
roles and responsibilities:
‘I don’t really think of it as my job to prevent it [terrorism]. When I think 
counter terrorism policing I think specialism. It’s not like I ignore it; I’d pass 
things on’...
[Neighbourhood PCS02]
‘Obviously you are a bit more aware now but for me I still think, right there 
are people there doing that and it’s a little bit more secretive and stuff.
[Neighbourhood PC2]
The clear delineation between specialist and routine police practice is often viewed as 
positive and reassuring particularly on the frontline of neighbourhood policing:
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‘I think we have a bit of a buffer because Special Branch does come in behind 
us and I think they pick up on certain things...but would we culturally? Yes, 
but because of the risk, or because they’d [officers] had a briefing lately’.
[BCU Commanderl]
There is general acknowledgement that contemporary, routine police officers are 
more aware of counter terrorism work, and that the working relationship with 
specialist units has slightly improved in some areas as a result. However, there is also 
an acknowledgement that the operational distinctions are important, that the secret 
element to the work is essential and furthermore, it is widely assumed that specialist 
departments such as Special Branch will remain the ‘experts’ in relation to counter 
terrorism work:
‘There’s a couple of things that they do that are very secret for very good 
reasons and it’s important to protect those and important to know the 
difference. We don’t get a huge amount of information but understandably so; 
most things are classified to a level that we don’t get involved in’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector3]
However, in some cases the cultural and organisational separation between specialist 
and generalist police work culminates in operational ambiguity and frustration. This 
is particularly salient within the context of intelligence gathering and dissemination:
‘The officers do their bit and then it all gets pushed over to Special Branch or 
[Counter terrorism unit]. It would be nice if all that information came back to 
us because we don’t get to know about any links etc...it would give PCs a 
more informed decision as to what they’re looking for, what they need to pay 
attention to. It’s one way information, they deal with it all and job done. You 
never hear of it again’.
[Neighbourhood Sgtl]
It is argued that, ‘secrecy gives the person enshrouded by it an exceptional 
position...out of this secrecy, which throws a shadow over all that is deep and 
significant grows the logically fallacious, but typical error, that everything secret is 
something essential and significant’ (Georg Simmel, 1906 as cited in Innes and Thiel, 
2010: 464-5). Such an observation can be attributed equally to both the ‘terrorist’ in 
the process of planning incidents and subsequently evading capture or, the ‘counter
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terrorist’ tasked to prevent, detect and disrupt such acts and actors (Innes and Thiel, 
2010: 553). In both cases ‘secrecy’ can be seen as both vital and effective. However, 
within the context of counter terrorism policing it can also be seen to act as a barrier 
to success. This is particularly the case when strategies and methodologies for 
countering such acts begin to evolve and incorporate aspects of policing traditionally 
extraneous to counter terrorism work. The increased strategic and operational 
emphasis placed on the role of local neighbourhood policing in counter terrorism 
work necessitates both a cultural and organisational shift away from a ‘need to know’ 
mentality towards a ‘lifting of the lid’ approach to intelligence work.
An acknowledgement of this need resonates within contemporary academic debate 
and indeed within counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’. However, it is clear 
that enduring cultural and organisational tensions between Special Branch and routine 
police officers pose a potential challenge to the implementation and effective delivery 
of some counter terrorism policy decisions at the operational frontline. This is 
particularly the case for policies and strategies focused around intelligence work. The 
presence of such challenges can be seen to undermine some of the suppositions made 
about the increasingly securitised state of routine policing.
It is noted throughout this thesis that an increased emphasis on gathering intelligence 
on local communities is perceived by some as an exemplar of the securitisation of 
routine policing (Virta, 2008; King and Sharp, 2006). The findings from the 
quantitative content analysis (QCA) appear to support such assertions to some degree, 
particularly those that highlight operational tasks focused around neighbourhood 
mapping and establishing key informant networks (KINs) particularly within areas 
with a high density BME population. However, a qualitative examination of the 
nature of intelligence work at the routine policing level renders the ‘evidence’ to 
support notions of increased securitisation somewhat ambiguous as findings suggest 
that the securitised ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ pertaining to intelligence gathering do not 
translate into tangible changes to routine policing on the ground. This argument is 
strengthened when attention focuses on community intelligence. The cultural and 
organisational police preoccupation with criminal intelligence as reflected in the 
organisational mechanisms in place within the police service have a number of 
profound implications for intelligence work in general and the potential to embed
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counter terrorism work in routine policing ‘action’ more specifically. The lack of an 
operational definition for community intelligence and an absence of formal 
mechanisms for its collection, storage, analysis and dissemination render the collation 
and utility of such information rather inconsistent across BCUs, and certainly within 
the Neighbourhood Policing Teams at the centre of the case study BCU. This 
situation, coupled with the consequential emphasis placed on officer discretion rather 
undermines securitisation theorists’ suppositions that local concerns have gradually 
been replaced by national priorities, which in turn ensures a discernible ‘move from 
local decision-making to a centrally proscribed, increasingly securitised and 
politicised crime agenda’ (King and Sharp, 2006: 387).
6.2.3 Partnership Working
‘Also our role is to work with our partners - we can’t do this job on our own 
anymore. ’
[Neighbourhood Sgt]
Another key exemplar of securitisation at the routine policing level, alternatively 
viewed as another product of an increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda 
(King and Sharp, 2006: 387) is realignment in the responsibility for crime control. It 
is commonly observed that it is no longer the sole responsibility of the police but 
instead comes under the auspices of ‘community safety’ which is a shared 
responsibility necessitating both effective local partnership working and community 
engagement. A number of community safety initiatives designed to increase public 
confidence have been introduced under the banner of Neighbourhood Policing. Such 
initiatives can be seen to include the introduction of Police and Communities 
Together (PACT) meetings which play an important role in determining 
neighbourhood policing team priorities, and can -  in theory -  serve as an important 
source of community intelligence for police officers.
Virta (2002: 195) observes the establishment of strategic partnerships and initiatives 
as a form of local security management, and that such multi-agency cooperation 
facilitates the ‘co-production of security’. This section examines the extent to which 
such partnership working is evident at the local level, both in relation to routine
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policing in general and then, more specifically, in relation to counter terrorism and 
other ‘securitised’ concerns, for example, extremism and radicalisation. The QCA 
revealed that the Community Safety Department had a role to play in carrying out 
counter terrorism tasks within the BCU. Moreover, the opportunity to sit in on 
tasking meetings revealed that a number of Neighbourhood Policing team (NPT) 
leaders (inspectors) who have primary responsibility for carrying out counter 
terrorism tasks felt that it was necessary for some form of community safety 
involvement in the undertaking and completion of tasks. This was particularly the 
case when tasks involved gathering information on key informant networks (KINs) 
and neighbourhood mapping. However the qualitative examination of partnership 
working in this regard provided a somewhat mixed picture. Again all officers -  from 
BCU Commander to Neighbourhood PCSO -  were asked about the prevalence and 
nature of partnership working at the local level. The interviews revealed that, in 
general, partnership working is an important and indeed fundamental aspect of routine 
police work which often occurs in some form on a daily basis. Yet, the extent to 
which concerns around terrorism and radicalisation informed this operational practice 
was minimal.
Community Safety at the BCU Level
The concept of ‘community safety’ at the level of routine policing within the case 
study BCU is characterised by a three-tiered structure of governance and is, 
interestingly, a rare example of bottom-up decision-making and implementation. The 
three-tiered setup incorporates grass-roots neighbourhood resident participation 
(PACT meetings); a sector-level multi-agency response to the issues emanating from 
the PACT meetings, and strategic BCU-wide oversight of the sector-level activities 
undertaken to enhance the safety or perhaps more accurately, the quality of life within 
local communities. The ‘inverted’ nature of community safety at the BCU level 
prompts a brief diversion from the analytical approach adopted for much of the thesis: 
away from the ‘drilling down’ through the force and the ranks to an ‘informing up’ 
from community to strategy.
This approach helps to highlight one of the dominant themes underpinning this 
research, namely the notion of power relations within policy-making and 
implementation. On one level aspects of the community safety arrangements at the
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local policing level appear to signal a departure from the more traditional approach to 
crime control whereby ‘the police tended to retain the power to define which 
situations and incidents [were] deserving of police action’ (Innes et al, 2009:99). The 
community safety arrangements within the case study BCU which, in turn reflect the 
policies outlined within the Neighbourhood Policing Plan, empower local residents; 
they help to set the tone and determine the priorities addressed by Neighbourhood 
Management Teams (NMT) and the strategic Neighbourhood Management Network 
(NMN). It is acknowledged that centralised directives ensure counter terrorism is a 
priority at the BCU policing level but at the neighbourhood level it simply does not 
register with local residents who increasingly hold a degree of power in relation to 
police decision making and priority setting. This could have significant implications 
for the implementation of national security policy at the local level, and in turn those 
who seek to interpret policing change in terms of securitisation.
The three-tiered nature of community safety at the BCU level ensured that the 
interpretation of ‘partnership working’ varied depending on the rank of the officer. 
Neighbourhood PCs and PCSOs would refer to Police and Communities Together 
(PACT) meetings and the priorities arising from them as an integral aspect of their 
routine activities. Neighbourhood Inspectors highlight the role of Neighbourhood 
Management Teams which are multi-agency meetings primarily designed to address 
the issues raised at PACT meetings. The BCU Commander and Superintendent Lead 
for Counter Terrorism referred to the overarching Neighbourhood Management 
Network which oversees the community safety work carried out across the seven 
neighbourhood policing areas that make up the case study BCU. There is a 
discernible community safety network in operation within the case study BCU. The 
following section outlines the structures and priorities inherent to partnership working 
and community safety at the routine level, and in turn the implications these findings 
have for a discussion of local police practice in terms of securitisation.
Problem identification
One of the most fundamental and ‘concrete policy decisions’ arising from the 
Neighbourhood Policing Plan is the establishment of Police and Communities 
Together (PACT) meetings. These meetings take place on a monthly basis and are in 
essence an opportunity for local communities to highlight the issues they perceive to
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be a concern in their area. The onus is on Neighbourhood PCs and PCSOs to 
encourage local residents to attend these meetings as a means of becoming involved 
in the statutory decisions that are taken on how their neighbourhoods are policed. 
Ideally the police act as ‘facilitators’ taking note of the priority concerns raised by 
local residents and using them as a guide for the activities carried out by 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams.
Interestingly, the findings from this research reveal that interpretations of crime and 
disorder vary markedly between the police and local communities which, supports a 
wide body of research on local police accountability (Jones, 2008). The priority 
concerns raised by local residents are rarely criminal in nature, and tend much more 
towards low level disorder and issues traditional dealt with by local councils:
‘You go to a PACT meeting and people aren’t interested in burglary dwelling 
or drug dealing. They don’t see it as a priority. They want to go to the SPAR 
without feeling intimidated by the hoodies’.
[BCU Commander3]
This type of observation emerged consistently from interviews with police officers 
and raises an interesting point for further discussion (in Chapter Seven). The notion 
of security means different things to different groups of people. From a police 
perspective it is often signified by a reduction in crime; for local residents it is often 
less about freedom from crime and more about an increase in quality of life. This is 
corroborated by previous research conducted by Innes et al (2009: 105) that 
demonstrated that local residents in a given neighbourhood area were most concerned 
about ‘signal events’ such as fly-tipping, litter and dog fouling and rather less 
concerned with issues more commonly aligned with a police response such as youth- 
related disorder and speeding. This type of empirical evidence ensures that a broad 
definition of ‘security’ is necessary when applied to the aims and intended outcomes 
of community safety at the local policing level.
The processes inherent to community safety partnership working at the BCU level are 
transparent and include problem identification (through PACT meetings) and problem 
solving (at the Neighbourhood Management Team meetings):
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‘In theory, the problems are identified at PACT and then you look at the 
tactics you can use to resolve the problem. You then see whether needs to 
come up to a Neighbourhood Management Team [NMT] meeting for those 
individuals to influence others, or, can it be left at a lower level’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector2]
It is clear that PACT priorities feature heavily in the routine work of Neighbourhood 
officers. The observations of neighbourhood officers on the relationship between 
PACT meetings and the newly-established Neighbourhood Management Teams 
(NMTs) reflect the policy intentions of the Neighbourhood Policing Plan by 
appearing to suggest a departure from previously noted police conduct that actively 
dismissed problems and concerns routinely brought to them by the public as falling 
outside the police remit or not serious enough to warrant much operational attention 
(Innes et al, 2009). It is noted that a primary motivation for this in the past was the 
pre-dominance of centrally-set performance targets focused around serious and 
acquisitive crime. This ‘performance monopoly’ has been undermined to some 
degree by the introduction of the Neighbourhood Policing Plan and its focus on 
ensuring satisfaction and reduced fear of crime within communities. This 
development has prompted a sea change in conceptions of what police work on the 
ground really is (Fielding and Innes, 2006).
The findings of this study show that PACTs are an integral aspect of community 
safety at level of BCU policing, and an effective starting point for the development of 
problem profiles within neighbourhoods. Moreover, as the above quotation suggests, 
the PACT meetings and NMTs operate on a ‘continuum’ of community safety within 
the BCU. The PACT meetings act as both the community consultation process within 
Neighbourhood Policing and as a forum for identifying community problems that 
might be more effectively addressed at the more strategic Neighbourhood 
Management Network level. Significantly, they are not referred to as an effective 
forum within which to generate information on certain groups within the community 
even in high density BME communities.
The multi-agency response
The establishment of Neighbourhood Management Teams (NMTs) across the case 
study BCU was commonly acknowledged as a work in process during the data
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collection phase of this research. Thus, progress in this regard was observed as 
uneven and it was unclear (unlikely) whether the implementation of the NMTs was 
assessed in any way at BCU or Force level. Despite this Neighbourhood Inspectors 
noted that increasing emphasis was being placed on efforts to consolidate work in this 
area:
‘There seems to be a greater emphasis coming in on NMTs being set up. I 
think people are still working on their structure. Mine is still in its infancy and 
there is still a lot of work to do’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector3]
The membership of each NMT varies according to the size and demographic makeup 
of each neighbourhood area but commonly comprises representatives from the local 
council, police, housing association, the fire service, health and education. The main 
aims of the NMTs are to address ‘quality of life’ issues within the neighbourhood 
areas and they rarely focus on issues of a specifically criminal nature as these remain 
largely within the remit of the police. The quality of life issues addressed by NMTs 
are usually informed by the issues that arise from the PACT meetings that take place 
in the area. In turn, the NMTs identify three priority tasks to be undertaken within the 
community. The following statement typifies an NMT response to issues identified at 
PACT meetings:
‘We have given ourselves the task of improving the quality of life for three 
different areas of our sector [neighbourhood policing remit]. We deluge the 
area with a high-visibility presence, anti-social behaviour referrals...the 
council to remove litter and the fire service to give all houses a free safety 
check’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector3]
Strategic oversight
The main drivers behind the Neighbourhood Management Network (NMN) which 
retains strategic oversight of the activities undertaken across the BCU are the BCU 
Commander and a representative from the council at management level. The non­
participant observation of a Neighbourhood Management Network meeting 
highlighted the core areas of priority for this network that oversees the community 
safety/neighbourhood management work that is carried out in each of the six sector 
areas with the case study BCU. The ethos of the NMN is to promote multi-agency
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partnership working, enhanced information sharing and the formulation of long term 
strategies to address local neighbourhood concerns.
The meeting included feedback from the six neighbourhood NMTs which served to 
highlight both the types of issues that were arising in the sectors, and the extent of 
progress made in establishing the NMTs as consistent and effective community safety 
structures within the neighbourhood areas. The neighbourhood issues arising within 
neighbourhood communities included youth annoyance, localised flooding, fly- 
tipping, dog fouling and graffiti. However, not all of the NMT leads were present, 
and those present reported inconsistent agency attendance at the meetings.
The counter terrorism role in partnership working and community safety 
The National Community Safety Plan (Home Office, 2008b: 14) states that ‘those 
community groups and local partnerships that have a role in delivering community 
safety equally have an essential role to play in delivering counter terrorism measures’. 
It is clear that partnership working is a fundamental aspect of routine policing activity 
at the BCU level. However, none of the officers interviewed within the case study 
BCU referred to concerns around terrorism or other ‘securitised’ issues such as 
radicalisation or extremism. In light of the issues raised as concerns at local PACT 
meetings (low level disorder) it is perhaps unsurprising that concerns around terrorism 
or other ‘securitised’ issues such as extremism or radicalisation do not feature in the 
priorities identified at PACT meetings. A number of police officers across the BCU 
corroborated this:
‘If I went to a PACT meeting and started talking about counter terrorism 
issues they’d just switch off because it has no relevance’.
[BCU Commanded]
‘If I said counter terrorism to the PACT attendees last night they wouldn’t 
have a clue. There’s no relevance; crime doesn’t have any relevance either. 
They worry about dog fouling, noisy neighbours; what is significant to them’.
[BCU Commander 1]
All Neighbourhood Inspectors were asked about the main objectives of the NMT in 
their area and none of them identified terrorism or associated security issues such as
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radicalisation as an ‘area of business’. When asked whether counter terrorism 
concerns had ever played a role in Neighbourhood Management Team discussions 
replies were swift and consistent: ‘no it hasn ’t come up and people haven’t phoned up 
with concerns around that’ (Neighbourhood Inspector) was a quotation that typified 
this view. Notably, this was the response whether the NMT was based in the city 
centre area or the most rural sectors in the BCU. As a consequence there was no 
evidence to suggest that any securitised ‘decisions’ -  in particular pertinent aspects of 
the Prevent strategy -  were implemented within the BCU and Neighbourhood 
Policing teams. Indeed, the Prevent strategy was not referenced by any officer during 
this section of the interviews.
It was only as a result of non-participant observation of one of the strategic, 
Neighbourhood Management Network meetings that counter terrorism and in 
particular the Prevent strategy was referenced in relation to routine, local level 
policing. The NMN meeting concluded with a presentation on the Prevent strategy by 
the BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism. The primary aim was to promote the relevance 
of counter terrorism concerns to Neighbourhood Management Teams by highlighting 
the need to embed strategies into pre-existing structures for example mainstream 
neighbourhood policing teams. Following this meeting the BCU Lead for Counter 
Terrorism acknowledged the enduring challenges to raising the profile of terrorism 
and associated concerns with police partners such as the Local Authority, education 
and housing. It was the only interview conducted in this research in which reference 
was made to any form of securitised concerns when discussing the nature of 
partnership working at the routine policing level:
‘It’s a sensitive area of business. You speak to an MP or politician, a 
councillor and you mention that you’re in the business of preventing violent 
extremism and radicalisation and the first thing they’ll say is that we don’t 
have a problem [here]because they don’t understand the threat. In the meeting 
I’ve just come out of, I’ve actioned for a PREVENT briefing to our partners -  
local authority, youth justice board, magistrates’ court, education, health, 
welfare. They need to understand the threat without frightening them and 
telling them they’ve got a problem. Sometimes it’s very hard - even with the 
local authority - we have a good relationship but they won’t look at it as a 
local priority either to be honest’.
[BCU Lead on Counter Terrorism]
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Virta (2002: 191) suggests that local policing is being ‘increasingly enmeshed in 
complex networks of relationships and interests’. The observations made by the BCU 
Lead for Counter Terrorism corroborate this statement. However, such observations 
and other findings within this section demonstrate that the extent to which those 
partnerships and network are increasingly governed by securitised concerns (defined 
as existential threats) remains questionable. It appears that within this aspect of 
routine police and partnership work concerns around terrorism remain at the level of 
securitised talk. It remains an enduring challenge to move beyond the talk to 
implement some form of tangible change to practice -  be it at the policing or local 
council level.
6.3 Conclusion
The findings within this section have profound implications for the theoretical 
suppositions put forward by advocates of the securitisation of policing, particularly at 
the local, neighbourhood level. The QCA reveals a considerable amount in relation to 
the composition of routine policing at the BCU level, particularly in terms of the types 
of crime and disorder occurrences prevalent within local policing activity, and the 
nature of the tasks implemented in response to each of the occurrence categories. It is 
clear from the QCA data that serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) issues dominate 
routine police work at the local level and as shown through the analysis of the two 
proxy measures of ‘status’, these occurrences retain operational priority within the 
case study BCU. The QCA also indicates that counter terrorism has a tangible albeit 
proportionately minor role to play in routine policing at the operational tasking level. 
This in turn suggests that securitised talk and decision pertaining to counter terrorism 
policing is having a discernible, albeit minimal impact on local policing practice or 
‘action’ in the case study BCU. However, a qualitative examination of two of the 
main analytic themes emerging from the QCA indicate that any notions of 
securitisation are at present more observable at the analytically distinct levels of 
policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ than they are at the level of policy ‘action’ in the form of 
tangible changes to routine police action. Although it is clear that intelligence 
gathering, and partnership working and community engagement are fundamental 
aspects of routine police practice, concerns around terrorism and associated security 
issues play a very minor role in the community safety setup at the BCU level. The
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long term success of Prevent is wholly contingent on its integration into routine 
policing, in particular Neighbourhood Policing. However, Prevent was not referenced 
directly within BCU fortnightly action plans (FTAs) and was very rarely highlighted 
within interviews with Neighbourhood Policing officers. It is only at the strategic 
management level that terrorism and more specifically the Prevent counter terrorism 
strategy is identified as an important area of business. And at this level it is more 
accurately defined as yet more evidence of securitised ‘talk’ rather than ‘action’. The 
next chapter refers to such fundamental debates when further exploring the 
implications these findings have for both the theoretical and conceptual framework of 
this thesis.
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions
7.0 Introduction
The overarching aim of this research is to provide a critical test of the extent to which 
routine policing in the UK is becoming increasingly securitised. The main findings 
arising from this empirical test can be summarised as follows:
i) Securitisation is a process that is evident across three analytically distinct 
levels of policy -  ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’.
ii) The nature of ‘securitisation’ differs within each of the individual policy 
levels according to the geo-political region within which it originates.
iii) The amount of empirical evidence to suggest a tendency towards 
securitisation is not consistent across the three policy levels and indeed 
decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy talk -  decision -  
action.
iv) The ‘gaps’ identified between the policy levels are indicative of a number 
of inherent challenges to the transfer, implementation and delivery of 
national counter terrorism policy at the local policing level. These 
challenges arise as a consequence of a range of political, organisational 
and cultural imperatives at play within the three geo-political spaces 
examined within this research.
These findings have a number of fundamental implications for both the analytical and 
theoretical frameworks that underpin this research. They address directly the core 
problem of discourse-analytic studies of security as identified within this research 
study, namely that there is a tendency to impute ‘action’ from ‘talk’; to infer policy 
impact on the frontline from rhetoric and exhortation. The findings provide 
justification for the methodological claim that it is important to distinguish 
analytically between different levels of policy for the purposes of empirical enquiry. 
They also contribute to debates regarding the validity of conceptualising policing 
change in terms of securitisation, particularly in relation to the propositions put 
forward about the increased securitisation of routine policing.
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This chapter is framed around a discussion of these findings within the context of the 
securitisation thesis. In this way it consolidates the critical assessment of the 
securitisation thesis that is woven into the preceding empirical chapters. The chapter 
is divided into three main sections. The first section reviews each of the key findings 
in more detail and revisits key terms and concepts where appropriate. The second 
section discusses the relative usefulness of applying the securitisation thesis to 
policing in light of the empirical findings generated from this current research. In 
other words, to what extent can securitisation theory adequately account for the 
policing policy-making and implementation processes identified within this case 
study research? In doing so it considers the limitations of inferring policing change 
from discourse-analytic studies of texts. This section also highlights the ways in 
which the ‘adaptive’ nature of the research strategy employed within the study 
facilitates further development of the securitisation thesis as a theoretical perspective. 
In light of this critical evaluation, the third section considers the merits of moving 
beyond the securitisation thesis as a viable theoretical framework for debating 
policing change at the local level by considering alternative theoretical frameworks 
for exploring counter terrorism policy implementation in the UK. The work of 
Garland and in particular his work on ‘policy predicament: adaptation, denial and 
acting out’ (2001), is highlighted as a potentially fruitful source of theoretical 
explanation for some of the research findings. The chapter concludes with some final 
reflections on the methodological approaches to researching counter terrorism 
policing and a discussion of the ways in which such empirical work can develop in 
the future.
7.1 Overview of Research Findings
i) Securitisation is a process that is evident across three analytically distinct 
levels of policy -  ‘talk ‘decision ’ and ‘action
This research reinforces existing conceptions of ‘securitisation’ as a process which 
retains at least two salient facets, namely the identification of an existential threat and 
the consequential justification for and development of ‘extraordinary means to handle 
the threat’ (Waever, 1996: 107). However, the analytical framework of this research 
facilitates a more nuanced, empirical investigation of the process of securitisation than
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that undertaken by existing work which has predominantly emphasised the discourse- 
analytic study of security talk and policy decisions. The research indicates that the 
securitisation process is visible at three conceptually distinct levels of security 
(policing) policy making and implementation, namely the levels of policy ‘talk’, 
‘decision’ and ‘action’. Therefore, the research suggests that there are three core 
component parts to the securitisation process, 1) the identification of an existential 
threat, 2) the development of tangible and extraordinary mechanisms to respond to the 
identified threat, and 3) the adoption and utilisation of these mechanisms ‘on the 
ground’. In general terms the identification of an existential threat takes place at the 
level of policy ‘talk’; the development of tangible responses to the threat manifest 
themselves in the form of securitised policy ‘decisions'1, and the adoption and 
utilisation of such decisions must take place at the frontline action level in order to 
complete the securitisation process.
However, it is also pertinent to note that all three component parts of the securitisation 
process resonate within the level of policy ‘talk’ in the form of rhetoric and 
exhortation which emphasises the 1) nature of the threat, 2) the instrumental response 
to the threat and 3) the identification of those responsible (at least in theory) for 
operationalising the policy decision on the ground. This in and of itself reinforces 
how integral ‘talk’ (in the form of rhetoric, exhortation or symbolism) is to the policy­
making process. Moreover, this finding supports the assertion made throughout this 
thesis that a realignment of the empirical focus -  away from an exclusive 
concentration on discourse-analytic studies of text and towards a more comprehensive 
examination of concrete examples of practice -  is in no way intended to suggest that 
policy ‘talk’ is an unimportant aspect of public policy-making or that it has no 
relationship with decisions or action. Indeed, it is suggested that in terms of counter 
terrorism policy, ‘securitised talk’ can be used as a discursive tool with which to 
attempt to extend the powers of dominant institutions and security actors such as the 
state, politicians, security experts and the media (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 389). 
This is exemplified in Chapter Four through reference to UK terrorism and counter 
terrorism political debates and the potential for such forums to be used as a means to 
ratchet up the fear of terrorism and associated concerns and thereby increase public 
anxiety and support for the hardening of domestic security in the form of increased 
stop and search powers, detention without charge, and various forms of surveillance
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including phone tapping. Furthermore, it is argued that counter terrorism ‘talk’ has 
the potential to contribute to the construction of suspect populations as argued by 
Hillyard (1993) in relation to Catholic communities during the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland and more recently in association with Muslim communities following the 
events of 11 September 2001 Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).
ii) The nature and extent of ‘securitisation’ differs within each of the 
individual policy levels according to the geo-political region within which 
it originates.
The nature of the security ‘talk ’ differs markedly across the EU, the UK and the case- 
study police force, and the nature and transfer of security ‘decisions ’ is seen to vary 
across these geo-political spaces. This is particularly noticeable when focusing on the 
extent to which national security decisions are incorporated into the strategic 
decision-making frameworks of the case study police force. The findings inherent to 
this research reveal that a dominant discourse of security around terrorism is 
increasingly shaping policy talk and decisions in the UK. However, this same 
discourse does not resonate to the same degree within routine police practice.
iii) The amount of empirical evidence to suggest a tendency towards 
securitisation is not consistent across the three policy levels and indeed 
decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy talk -  decision -  
action.
This observation is linked inherently to arguably the most significant research finding, 
at least in terms of the overarching aim of the thesis. Although findings reveal 
tendencies towards securitisation at all three policy levels the amount of evidence is 
not consistent across the three levels. Indeed, the amount of empirical evidence to 
suggest that the process of securitisation is at work decreases as the focus shifts from 
the realm of policy talk and decision to the arena of policing action. In general terms, 
this research reveals significant evidence of securitised ‘talk’, some evidence of 
securitised ‘decision’ in the form of both legislative and executive instruments but 
minimal evidence of securitised action at the local, BCU policing level and 
particularly the local, neighbourhood policing level.
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iv) The ‘gaps’ identified between the policy levels are indicative of a number 
of inherent challenges to the transfer, implementation and delivery of 
national counter terrorism policy at the local policing level.
The diverging nature of securitisation within the three policy levels and the decreasing 
amount of securitisation across the three policy levels is indicative of ‘gaps’ in the 
transfer and implementation of national counter terrorism policies to the frontline of 
police action. These implementation gaps are the product of a series of diverse yet 
enduring challenges to policy implementation and delivery of counter terrorism policy 
on the frontline. This research indicates that the relative influence or ‘power’ of the 
securitising process is wholly contingent on the type of political, organisational and 
cultural imperatives in operation within the three geo-political units. Moreover, these 
challenges manifest themselves to a greater or lesser degree within and across all 
three policy levels, and can be seen to constrain the process of counter terrorism 
policy transfer and implementation. Moreover, it is suggested that unless certain 
challenges are addressed there is a possibility that, rather than embedding counter 
terrorism work into mainstream policing, the UK will end up with a bifurcation 
between counter terrorism policing and conventional routine practice.
Political Challenges
This research reveals that political challenges most commonly arise within and across 
the levels of policy talk and decision. At the EU level political challenges emerge as 
a consequence of the diverse range of national identities and sovereign interests that 
constitute the policy-making process in this region. As Waever (1996: 105) observes 
each Member State has a ‘specific security identity’, which must be accommodated 
and negotiated in the pursuit of coherent and enforceable policy decisions. It can be 
argued that the pillarised structure of policy-making in the EU has enhanced the 
security identity of each Member State because it does not retain the power to enforce 
the adoption of key policy frameworks. It is clear that the notion of policing, in its 
myriad forms, has become increasingly politicised in the UK in recent years. 
However, it can be argued that since the events of 11 September 2001 and 
particularly, 7 July 2005 the policing of terrorism has dominated national political 
debates in the UK. It can be argued that both the nature of the terrorist threat and the 
nature of the response to that threat have been used by political parties — those in
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power and those in opposition — to demonstrate or undermine political strength and 
legitimacy. This is exemplified in the UK through the contentious debates around 
pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects, the national identity card scheme, and the 
inherent association of both to the enduring tension between national security and 
civil liberties. The research also indicates that political challenges manifest in the UK 
as a result of the national governance structures in place within England and Wales. 
The issue of ‘policy relevance’ was consistently raised within the interviews with 
officers within the case study force, and most notably those within the Senior 
Command Team. The notion of relevance resonates at the level of talk and decision 
where it is often determined that counter terrorism rhetoric and strategies are 
‘Westminster-centric’ and that there is a misguided assumption that ‘one size fits all’.
Organisational and Cultural Challenges
There are a number of organisational imperatives that serve to undermine the 
implementation of national counter terrorism policies at the frontline policing level. 
One of the foremost of these is the emphasis placed on measuring police performance 
and meeting strategic and operational targets. This results in the widely-adopted — 
and much quoted mantra -  ‘what gets measured gets done’. This research indicates 
that police forces dedicate human and technical resources to priority performance 
areas. At the time this research was conducted the priority areas were serious and 
acquisitive crime (SAC) and the case-study BCU was not measured on its counter 
terrorism activity. This research also indicates that the implementation of counter 
terrorism policy and particularly its operational delivery on the operational frontline is 
undermined by a number of enduring cultural imperatives at play within UK police 
forces. One of the most pertinent to this research is the cultural and operational 
distinctions that have historically been drawn between ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ 
police work, particularly in relation to ‘intelligence work’. It is evident within the 
case study force that a prolonged operational separation ensured that interactions 
between Special Branch and routine police officers were often characterised by 
suspicion and frustration. Although it is acknowledged that the operational 
relationship is gradually improving it is clear that the legacy of the cultural and 
operational division of labour has the potential to undermine the effective delivery of 
counter terrorism policies that necessitate a more prominent role for routine policing. 
These types of organisational and cultural imperatives -  which are seen to inform and
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indeed sustain one another — have fundamental implications for the amount of counter 
terrorism activity undertaken at a local level and the longer term potential for it to 
become increasingly embedded in mainstream, routine practice.
All of these findings have a number of fundamental implications for inferring policing 
change in terms of securitisation. The following section discusses the key findings 
within the context of the securitisation thesis as understood by theorists such as 
Waever (1996); Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). One of the key issues to address 
here is the extent to which the securitisation thesis as grand theoretical narrative can 
account for the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland, 2001: vii) at play within the distinct 
levels of counter terrorism policy in the UK. The findings are also discussed in 
relation to existing work that applies the securitisation thesis to routine policing and 
which suggests that routine policing is subject to increased securitisation.
7.2: A Critical Assessment of the Securitisation Thesis within the Context of 
Routine Policing
The core aspects of the securitisation thesis as understood by some of its most notable 
proponents are detailed in Chapter Two. This final chapter examines the extent to 
which dominant themes resonate within the findings of this research study. These 
include the role of, and relationship between security ‘actor’ and ‘referent object’, and 
the importance of security narratives and notions of identity (Waever, 1996). It has 
been noted that the police are not ‘simply bystanders’ but often ‘active participants’ in 
the changes that arise as a result of the securitisation process of change. There is an 
increasing body of work that applies the securitisation thesis to the arena of policing. 
This has occurred within a European context through the work of Bigo (2000), Loader 
(2004) and within the UK specifically (King and Sharp, 2006). However, there is an 
important body of work that focuses on the impact of recent discursive and policy 
shifts in the nature of crime control, disorder and insecurity at the local, community 
level. This work focuses on the increasing convergence of policing and partnership 
work at the local level, and in particular the rise and impact of community safety 
partnerships (Hughes and Rowe, 2007), and the increased emphasis placed on the use 
of community intelligence in the policing of insecurity (Innes, 2006; Innes et al, 
2009). The issues raised within the UK also resonate within an international, and
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specifically a European context. Virta (2002; 2008) observes the development of 
local security networks in Finland and the use of intelligence-led approaches to 
community policing in Finland and Terpstra (2008) notes the emergence of local 
security networks in The Netherlands. Such work highlights the importance of 
‘community’, and in particular, the gradual reformulation of the notion of community 
policing and community safety in light of heightened concerns around issues of both 
national and personal security.
However, the key point, at least in terms of this research is that the securitisation 
thesis is characterised by a methodological approach that focuses on the discourse- 
analytic study of policy rhetoric and various legislative and executive decisions. 
There is a lack of empirical scrutiny of the actions that constitute routine police 
practice. The securitisation thesis is sustained by a macro-theory which has a 
tendency to ‘homogenise’ research settings, or, at least generalise and thereby de- 
contextualise security. This necessarily precludes recognition of the pluralistic 
narratives that frame different geo-political security spaces. Moreover, it is argued 
that the adoption of a discourse-analytic approach to data generation elicits a tendency 
to infer or impute ‘action’ from ‘talk’ which consequentially leads to questions 
regarding the validity of conceptualising any changes to routine police practice in 
terms of securitisation. It is argued that the development of a methodology for 
investigating policing routines is better placed to establish security ‘in action’. This 
section explores the extent to which the core aspects of the securitisation thesis 
resonate within the main findings arising from this research. This includes the key 
facets that serve as the basis for the grand theoretical narrative as articulated by the 
likes of Waever (1996), Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000) but also exemplars that 
have been identified through the application of the theory to the field of policing 
(King and Sharp, 2006; Virta, 2002; 2008). The ultimate aim is to assess the extent to 
which the securitisation thesis as grand narrative can account for the empirical 
particulars that manifest within this research. In order to achieve this each main 
finding is discussed in turn.
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i) Securitisation is a process that is evident across three analytically 
distinct levels of policy -  ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’.
This research provides empirical evidence to support existing observations that 
securitisation is a process which retains two inherent facets, namely the identification 
of an existential threat, which in and of itself provides the justification for the 
development of ‘extraordinary means to handle the threat’ (Waever, 1996: 107). 
However, it is argued that the analytical framework devised for this research 
facilitates the opportunity for a more nuanced, empirical investigation of the process 
of securitisation. This research indicates that the securitisation process is evident 
within three conceptually distinct levels of security (policing) policy making and 
implementation, namely the levels of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Therefore, 
the research suggests that there are three core component parts to the securitisation 
process, 1) the identification of an existential threat, 2) the development of tangible 
and extraordinary mechanisms to respond to the identified threat, and 3) the adoption 
and utilisation of these mechanisms ‘on the ground’. In general terms the 
identification of an existential threat takes place at the level of policy ‘talk’; the 
development of tangible responses to the threat are visible in the form of securitised 
policy ‘decisions’, and the adoption and utilisation of such decisions must take place 
at the frontline action level in order to complete the securitisation process.
It is clear from the traditional references to securitisation as a two-stage process that 
any empirical examination of it predominantly focuses on policy ‘talk’ in the form of 
rhetoric and exhortation and concrete policy decisions. Waever (1996: 104) states, it 
is important to ‘survey basic shifts in European security practices in order to 
contribute to security debate and policy’. However, this research suggests that it is 
important to identify which ‘practices’ are surveyed and how they are to be defined or 
conceptualised in order to gain an informed understanding of the nature and impact of 
the securitisation process. It is argued that a predominant, methodological focus on 
policy elites and the ‘textual footprints’ of their talk and decisions necessarily 
precludes the opportunity to acquire knowledge relating to the culmination of the 
securitisation process and how it manifests at the ‘sharp end’ of policy-making. What 
are some of the implications of the development of extraordinary measures to counter 
the existential threat? The limitations of the securitisation thesis with regard to these
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types of empirical issues sets the tone for the rest of the discussion that focuses more 
specifically on the extent to which changes to routine policing practice can be 
conceptualised in terms of securitisation.
ii) The nature of ‘securitisation’ differs within each of the analytically 
distinct levels of policy-making
The research reveals that the nature of securitisation differs within each of the levels 
of policy talk, decision and action. Furthermore, the research indicates that the 
diverging nature of securitisation is contingent on the unique narratives and identities 
that characterise the different geo-political spaces within which it is originates and 
develops. This finding relates in large part to the policy levels of talk and decision in 
that it is generated from an analysis of the diverging nature of counter terrorism policy 
talk and the extent to which national policy decisions are transferred and incorporated 
into the strategic decision-making frameworks of the case study force. Ultimately this 
finding indicates the existence of various security ‘narratives’ within the EU, UK and 
case study force. These narratives are informed by a range of issues, the most notable 
of which within the realms of policy talk and decision include political imperative (at 
the EU and UK level) and notions of organisational priority (at the case study police 
force level). This research reveals that the extent of securitisation is often contingent 
on the relative dominance of these types of issues and imperatives.
This research examined the nature of counter terrorism talk within each of the three 
geo-political units that served as the focus of this research. There are a number of 
ways in which the securitisation thesis resonates with this finding. It is clear that the 
securitisation thesis can in some ways account for the multi-faceted nature of counter 
terrorism policy making and implementation because it acknowledges the existence of 
different security ‘narratives’ and ‘identities’ within distinct security ‘sites’ (Waever, 
1996: Huysmans, 2000). Moreover, the application of theoretical concepts such as 
security ‘actor’ and ‘reference object’ has been an effective means by which to 
explore the relative resonance or dissonance of counter terrorism talk, decision and 
action across officials networks within the EU and the UK. However, it is when 
empirical attention turns to the case study force and thus the level of routine police 
practice that some of the limitations of applying a grand theoretical narrative to
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certain research settings begin to emerge. This observation manifests more strongly 
as one ‘drills down’ through the force to the level of neighbourhood policing.
This examination revealed that there are significant disparities in both the nature and 
‘amount’ of counter terrorism talk within the three units. The amount of empirical 
evidence to suggest securitised ‘talk’ is significant at both the EU and UK levels. 
This is reflected in the reference to both terrorism and radicalisation as existential 
threats to the security of these ‘units’ and the rhetorical justification for the 
development of extraordinary, emergency measures to counter these threats. 
However this research reveals a significant contrast in the nature of the talk within 
these two security units in terms of how the ‘problem or threat’ of terrorism and 
radicalisation is framed and in terms of how the threats will be addressed. This 
reveals that there are a number of diverging security ‘narratives’ at play within the 
various research settings.
Within the context of this research the nature of the talk at the EU level is judged to 
be conceptually different from that of the UK. Both the talk in the form of debate, 
rhetoric and exhortation and the counter terrorism policy agreements and directives 
that result are determined to constitute policy talk within the analytical framework of 
this thesis. This is because the EU policies do not contain any tangible enforcement 
mechanisms and therefore do not have the power to compel Member States to adopt 
and implement the policy measures. However, this is not to suggest that there is not a 
clear and discernible security identity within the EU. This is comprised of a security 
narrative that has undergone a fundamental shift since the end of the Cold War and is 
now seen to be characterised by a growing emphasis on the desire for integration and 
cohesion. This is epitomised within counter terrorism policy through the creation of 
policy agreements that seek to enhance the information-sharing networks across 
Member States.
In the UK, the tone of the counter terrorism ‘talk’ has shifted noticeably away from 
the war-oriented rhetoric of U.S. security discourse, and more towards an emphasis on
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the changing nature of the threat94 and the need to preserve national security. The 
nature of counter terrorism ‘talk’ in the form of political and policing debate is framed 
around the need for emergency responses to the identified existential threats and has 
most recently focused around the enduring and contentious issues of extension to pre­
charge detention for terrorist suspects and the national identity card scheme. Political 
and policing rhetoric also focuses around the increasingly important role of 
community-based, counter terrorism strategies which necessarily enhance the role of 
routine policing in counter terrorism activity.
However, the nature of the counter terrorism talk is demonstrably different within the 
case study force, and this is particularly evident as one ‘drills down’ through the 
various policing levels and ranks. The strategic rhetoric emanating from the case 
study Force Command Team and the publicly available Annual Plans reflects national 
priorities and concerns around terrorism. However, there is discemibly less evidence 
of securitised talk at the lower levels of the case study police force. The research 
reveals that the resonance of national counter terrorism rhetoric within the highest 
levels of the force is replaced with a degree of ambivalence at the operational 
frontline and counter terrorism policy and policing is referenced sporadically and 
often in discemibly abstract terms. The policy ‘talk’ on the frontline is framed around 
references to local BCU priorities and performance targets. In short the police officer 
talk reflects tactical, operational concerns. There is no empirical evidence to indicate 
that the case study BCU is measured on performance in relation to counter terrorism 
activity and therefore the level of securitised ‘talk’ is very low.
The examination of securitised decisions focused on both the nature of such concrete 
policy instruments but more specifically the extent to which national policy decisions 
are evident within the strategic decision-making frameworks of the case study police 
force. This research reveals a rather inconsistent and ambiguous transfer and 
integration of national counter terrorism policy within the case study Force, and more 
pertinently, the BCU at the centre of this study. This conclusion emerges from a 
systematic analysis of relevant case study-specific text which was undertaken in order
94 From the sectarian, political violence associated with the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1969-1994) 
to the terrorist attacks perpetrated by more globalised yet loosely-coalesced cells of organisations such 
as Al-Qaeda.
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to ascertain the extent to which national security policy decisions such as the Prevent 
strategy and its inherent enforcement mechanisms are embedded in the strategic 
decision-making frameworks of the force, particularly the strategic processes in place 
at the BCU level. The research reveals that the Force is in receipt of funding in order 
to implement aspects of the Prevent strategy and that counter terrorism is present as 
both a Force and BCU strategic priority. However, a number of key compliance 
mechanisms necessary for a securitised policy ‘decision’ are not in operation within 
the case-study force, in particular the targeted measurement of performance in relation 
to counter terrorism activity.
The dissonance in the nature of the talk across the three security sites and the apparent 
disconnect in the transfer and integration of national counter terrorism policy decision 
into the strategic, decision-making frameworks of the case study force have a number 
of implications for the application of the securitisation thesis within the context of 
routine policing. The findings of this research reveal the complexities of counter 
terrorism policy by revealing the pluralistic narratives that comprise its construction, 
development and implementation across diverging security sites or spaces. 
Furthermore, these narratives are informed by a range of different security 
motivations, experiences and priorities which manifest themselves in the form of 
enduring political, organisational and cultural imperatives. However, the 
securitisation thesis in its current form emphasises diverging security priorities and 
experiences at an abstract and macro level, for example at the level of ‘Europe’, 
‘state’ or ‘nation’ (Waever, 1996). Therefore it cannot account for findings that 
reveal policy disconnect or dissonance below these levels, for example at the level of 
individual police forces. Moreover, the methodological preoccupation with the 
discourse-analytic study of elite security actors and the textual footprints of their talk 
and decisions precludes an examination of a key area of security policy, namely, in 
this instance, the impact of counter terrorism talk and decisions on the frontline of 
policy application. This observation is reinforced unequivocally through a critical 
assessment of the next finding which focuses on the nature of routine policing 
practice within the case study force.
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iii) The amount of empirical evidence to suggest a tendency towards 
securitisation is not consistent across the three policy levels and indeed 
decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy talk and decision to 
the level of action.
This is arguably the most significant finding in terms of the research question that was 
formulated in order to operationalise the critical exploration of the securitisation 
thesis, namely, to what extent do security ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ made within the arena 
of counter terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of 
tangible changes to local policing practice. Although findings reveal tendencies 
towards securitisation at all three policy levels the amount of evidence is not 
consistent across the three levels. Indeed, the amount of empirical evidence to 
suggest that the process of securitisation is at work decreases as the focus shifts from 
the realm of policy talk and decision to the arena of policing action. In general terms, 
this research reveals significant evidence of securitised ‘talk’, some evidence of 
securitised ‘decision’ in the form of both legislative and executive response but 
minimal evidence of securitised action at the BCU level of policing and in particular 
the level of local, neighbourhood policing. This indicates that there are salient gaps in 
the transfer and implementation of national counter terrorism policies at the local 
policing level. This policy ‘disconnect’ across the levels of policy talk and decision 
and frontline action can be seen to have arisen as a consequence of a range of 
political, organisational and cultural imperatives at play at the national and local 
policing levels. The findings from the empirical examination of routine police action 
are arguably the most crucial to a critical examination of the validity of a) applying a 
grand, theoretical narrative such as the securitisation thesis to certain research 
settings, but more specifically, b) arguments made about the increasingly securitised 
nature of routine policing. The discussion of this finding within the context of the 
securitisation thesis focuses on the lack of securitised action in the form of tangible 
changes to police practice.
The Quantitative Content Analysis (QCA) undertaken to explore the nature of routine 
policing within the case study police force reveals a number of salient findings. It 
indicates that routine policing is characterised by an operational focus on autocrime, 
violent crime and burglary dwelling; the crime types collectively known as ‘serious
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and acquisitive crime’ (SAC). However, the QCA did reveal some evidence to 
suggest that counter terrorism policing has a role within routine policing in the case 
study BCU. This is evident in the introduction of counter terrorism as a regular 
tasking priority mid-way through the data collection period of the research. It is 
determined that this development constitutes a tendency towards securitised action on 
account of the nature of the terrorism tasks. They reflect some of the operational 
strategies outlined in the Prevent strategy, for example, the development of Key 
Individual Networks (KINs); the importance of neighbourhood mapping, and the 
increased role of community-based initiatives to counter terrorism and radicalisation. 
However, it is important to note the QCA reveals that the level of operational priority 
afforded to counter terrorism remains notably small in comparison to the other 
occurrence types that comprise routine policing within the case study force. This is 
identified through an analysis of the percentage amount of tasks allocated to counter 
terrorism across the data collection period (12%) and the absence of additional 
funding at the tasking level to support the delivery of counter terrorism tasks.
Moreover, the qualitative examination of some of the analytical findings that emerged 
from the QCA reveals a rather more nuanced account of the extent to which counter 
terrorism activity is becoming gradually more embedded in the structure of routine 
policing at the local, neighbourhood level. King and Sharp (2006: 384) emphasise the 
importance of examining the ‘way in which securitisation is translated into policing 
policy and practice’ and identify a number of drivers of securitisation within the 
context of UK policing one of which is described as a return to a local policing 
dimension, but with central direction. However, there is no empirical interrogation of 
the extent to which this assertion is evident on the ground within local routine police 
practice. The findings from the current research indicate that although national 
priorities are visible at the operational tasking level of the case study BCU there is 
often a degree of uncertainty as to how such tasks should be carried out and indeed 
who (which department) is best placed to undertake them. There is widespread 
concern that certain counter terrorism tasks have the potential to be received 
negatively by some sections of neighbourhood policing communities, and it is 
commonly agreed that there should be clearer direction from Westminster or Force 
Command on the delivery of counter terrorism tasks.
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The qualitative analysis also assesses the extent to which intelligence gathering at the 
routine policing level is becoming increasingly securitised. The findings in this 
regard indicate that the policy talk and decisions that emphasise the importance of 
community intelligence as a tool by which to counter terrorism do not resonate to the 
same degree at the level of police action. Indeed, findings suggest an ambiguous 
approach to community intelligence gathering. It appears that this is due to a number 
of reasons including the lack of an operational definition for community intelligence 
and the absence of formal mechanisms for its collation and dissemination. This in 
turn can elicit the adoption of a rather informal and perfunctory approach to 
community intelligence within the case study BCU. The findings also reveal a 
number of more fundamental, cultural imperatives at play within the case study force, 
which may adversely impact on the extent to which community intelligence work is 
becoming increasingly embedded within routine policing. These include the 
commonly agreed observation that routine policing practice or ‘action’ traditionally 
revolves around that which is criminal in nature. The organisational structures and 
processes in place within police forces, currently exemplified by the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM) reinforce this cultural perspective. In addition, the cultural 
distinctions made between ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ police practice, particularly in 
relation to intelligence gathering, has the potential to adversely impact upon the 
integration of ‘new’ forms of intelligence work into the realm of routine or ‘low’ 
police work. These findings support existing work that suggests the police have to 
merge national security aims with local policing objectives. However they question 
the extent to which the police are managing to merge national security intelligence 
with criminal intelligence (Virta, 2008).
Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of key QCA findings reveals that partnership 
working and community engagement are fundamental aspects of routine police 
practice. They also support the observations made by existing research that policing 
policies to counter terrorism and radicalisation require the involvement of key 
partners such as local authorities, the police, local communities, and the education and 
health sectors (Virta, 2008). However this study reveals that concerns around 
terrorism and associated security issues play a very minor role in the community 
safety setup within the BCU at the centre of this research. The findings from this 
research indicate that the community priorities emanating from the community and
222
subsequently addressed by the local Neighbourhood Management Teams and 
Networks revolve around issues that more commonly come under the auspices of anti­
social behaviour. Moreover, the qualitative data reveals that priority concerns are 
rarely associated with criminal activity, let alone terrorism and other associated 
security concerns.
The critical assessment of the extent to which the securitisation thesis can account for 
the findings generated through this research highlights one fundamental and 
overarching issue. It is evident that the securitisation thesis and associated, applied 
work resonates within findings that focus on counter terrorism ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’. 
It is significant to note that securitisation research is unable to speak to the findings 
generated from the empirical interrogation of police action in the form of routine 
police practice. The theorists who assert the securitisation of routine policing adopt 
the same methodological approach as grand theoretical narrators such as Waever 
(1996), Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000) by focusing on the security ‘actors’ and 
the textual footprints of policy talk and decisions. A discourse-analytic study of 
counter terrorism policy precludes the opportunity to empirically interrogate the 
nature of routine police practice. As a result there is a tendency to infer action from 
policy talk and decisions. The predominant focus on the identification of an 
existential threat and the subsequent development of (justified) extraordinary 
responses to that threat necessarily limits an examination of the impact of designated 
responses on the agencies or organisations tasked with the implementation and 
delivery of those responses95.
The findings from this research reveal that it is important to distinguish analytically 
between different levels of policy for the purposes of empirical enquiry, and in 
particular to focus in on the ‘action’ level in order to scrutinise the ‘empirical 
particulars’ that constitute routine police practice. Moreover, it is argued that shifting 
the empirical focus onto action or practice offers the potential to build on the 
conceptualisations of securitisation. An empirical interrogation of the nature of
95 It is also important to note that this also precludes an examination of the impact of any extraordinary 
measures on the ‘referent objects’ of such responses; the objects that need to be secured or 
‘securitised’, for example, local communities or those identified as potentially vulnerable to becoming 
involved in the existential threat. This is an observation that is outwith the remit of this current 
research but may serve as an area for fruitful research in the future.
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routine policing within the case study BCU provides the opportunity for this, 
particularly when the investigation focuses on the structure and processes inherent to 
neighbourhood policing. In organisational terms neighbourhood policing is 
characterised by the need to negotiate and meet the demands of two masters; the state 
and the local community. The demands from each come in the form of nationally-set 
performance targets and community-generated PACT priorities. This research reveals 
that although Neighbourhood Policing Team officers are subject to the same 
performance pressures as their response colleagues, the nature of their routine activity 
is increasingly driven by the ‘quality of life’ issues that are raised by the communities 
they patrol and police. Thus, notions of community safety and community priority 
are prominent aspects of neighbourhood policing. The point to be made here it that 
neighbourhood policing as ‘research site’ exemplifies the existence of pluralistic 
narratives that are informed by a range of political, organisational and public 
imperatives and expectations. It is a research setting that both defies the homogeneity 
of the securitisation thesis and facilitates the opportunity for a more nuanced and 
detailed understanding of ‘securitisation’ and in particular the theoretical concepts of 
security ‘actor’ and referent ‘object’. It does this by demonstrating two things in 
particular:
1) Conceptions of ‘security’ can vary according to the ‘referent object’
This research indicates that the notion of security is understood and therefore 
prioritised differently according to the ‘referent object’ of security. This is 
acknowledged to some extent by securitisation theorists who observe that ‘the concept 
of security as we know it from security policy has no basic meaning independent of 
its referent object, the state’ (Waever, 1996: 105). At the European level security is 
often understood in terms of integration and cohesion; at a nation state level security 
may be synonymous with the preservation of sovereign power and cultural values. 
However, securitisation discourse fails to account for notions of security beyond these 
macro entities. This research reveals that from a police perspective security is often 
signified by a reduction in crime; for local residents it is often less about freedom 
from crime and more about an increase in quality of life. This is corroborated by 
previous research conducted by Innes et al (2009: 105) that demonstrated that local 
residents in a given neighbourhood area were most concerned about ‘signal events
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such as fly-tipping, littering and dog fouling and rather less concerned with issues 
more commonly aligned with a police response such as youth-related disorder and 
speeding’. This type of empirical evidence ensures that security discourse needs to 
recognise and accommodate myriad narratives about security which are motivated by 
diverging experiences and thus priority and relevance. Certainly, a broad(er) 
definition of ‘security’ needs to be considered when exploring the nature of routine 
policing and the extent to which it is subject to a process of increased securitisation.
2) The ‘referent object’ of security can become security ‘actor’
This research suggests that traditional conceptualisations of security ‘actor’ as the 
political elite or dominant policy maker are limiting and should be broadened to 
acknowledge the potential for the referent object to become security actor. The three 
tiered structure of community safety governance identified at the neighbourhood 
policing level reflects a bottom-up approach to decision-making and implementation. 
This relatively anomalous setup also contributes to one of the dominant themes 
underpinning this research, namely the notion of power relations within policy­
making and implementation. On one level aspects of the community safety 
arrangements at the local policing level appear to signal a departure from the more 
traditional approach to crime control whereby ‘the police tended to retain the power to 
define which situations and incidents [were] deserving of police action’ (Innes, 2009: 
99). The community safety arrangements within the case study BCU provide local 
residents with the opportunity to contribute to priority-setting and the actions 
undertaken by Neighbourhood Management Teams and the strategic Neighbourhood 
Management Network. It is acknowledged that centralised directives ensure counter 
terrorism is a priority at the BCU policing level but at the neighbourhood level it 
simply does not register at the community level where there is now a semblance of 
decision-making power. This could have significant implications for the 
implementation of national security policy at the local level.
It is suggested that these two, interlinked points offer the potential for the 
development of the securitisation theory, specifically through the emphasis they place 
on the relationship between priority and power. This research reveals that the 
question of who ultimately retains the power to set the crime control agenda and the
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priorities that inform routine policing at the local level is becoming increasingly 
complex. Quite uniquely within the Police Service, Neighbourhood Policing Teams 
find themselves at the mercy of two power-holders; central government and the 
communities they serve. In recent decades it has been the centralised policy-making 
machine that has sought to dictate police action on the ground — whether the priorities 
be relevant or not at the local level. Yet increasingly, it is communities that have 
come to influence local routine police activities (McLaughlin, 2007). The ‘inverted’ 
policy-making and implementation structures within the case study BCU reflect this 
development.
Moreover the examination of the nature of routine policing reveals that crimes and 
criminal activity are rarely raised as community concerns at PACT meetings. And, if 
it remains the case that communities retain a semblance of power over local police 
activity then it can be confidently assumed that those ‘quality of life’ issues -  
historically dismissed by the police as lacking in seriousness -  will continue to inform 
routine police work96. All of this provokes a broader analytical discussion about the 
extent to which routine policing is indifferent to, and insulated from, community 
safety partnerships and their priorities. The concern with crime and disorder 
occurrences such as anti-social behaviour and criminal damage suggests that they are 
not insulated and that routine policing has to accommodate the priorities of other 
partners such as local authorities. This is especially true where local authority 
services such as youth work and housing departments are critical to helping the police 
respond to, and ‘reassure’ communities about their priorities, which this and other 
research suggests is more about anti-social behaviour and vandalism rather than 
terrorism. This, alongside the prioritisation of serious and acquisitive crimes, can act 
as a major counter-tendency to that of securitisation in driving routine policing. This 
in turn has significant implications for any executive intentions (which resonate 
within security talk and decisions) to embed counter terrorism work into mainstream, 
routine policing because, as has been highlighted, concerns around terrorism (and 
indeed other conventional crimes) are often contingent on notions of perceived threat, 
experience and general feelings o f ‘relevance’.
96 This observation took on renewed significance towards the completion of this thesis as debates 
around the introduction of elected police commissioners intensified.
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In light of this critical evaluation, the next section considers the merits of moving 
beyond the securitisation thesis as a viable theoretical framework for debating 
policing change at the local level by considering alternative theoretical frameworks 
for exploring counter terrorism policy implementation in the UK. In particular, is 
there a theoretical perspective that could more effectively account for the 
accomplishment of security through everyday police routines?
7.3 An Alternative Theoretical Perspective: Garland’s ‘Culture of Control’
Mythen and Walklate (2005: 382) note that ‘little coherent attention has been paid to 
the question of terrorism in the past [although] since the events of 9/11 the social 
sciences have belatedly declared an interest’. Such ‘attention’ includes the 
development of risk (Beck, 1992) and govemmentality (Foucault, 1991) which serve 
as the theoretical foundations of the securitisation thesis. This thesis suggests that 
aspects of Garland’s (2001) work on policy predicament: adaptation, denial and 
acting-out provide some useful insights into the construction and implementation of 
counter terrorism policy. However, this thesis duly recognises the theoretical and 
methodological criticisms that have been levelled at Garland’s work. Moreover, it is 
acknowledged that a number of the key empirical criticisms that underpin this 
research study can be similarly applied to Garland’s (2001) theoretical perspective. 
Firstly, it is noted that Garland has attracted criticism for developing a grand narrative 
that dismisses the role of ‘empirical particulars’ within research settings. However, it 
is argued that Garland’s (2001) work on policy predicament resonates within this 
research study through the emphasis it places on the ‘administrative actor’, and its 
recognition of the potential impact of policy on those agencies and institutions tasked 
with the responsibility for implementing the policies.
It is similarly acknowledged that Garland’s (2001: 106) observations on two social 
facts: 1) the normality of high crime rates and, 2) the acknowledged limitations of the 
criminal justice state may not transfer effectively from the generalised context of 
‘crime control’ to the specific field of terrorism and counter terrorism. This 
observation alludes to that fact that Garland has been criticised for providing too 
generalised an account of cultures of control ‘in the US’ and in ‘Britain’ and therefore
227
in ‘late-modemity’, when differences in cultures of control within the US and UK are 
often greater than between them and other ‘late-modern’ societies (Newbum, 2006). 
However, it is argued that although recent terrorist events such as 11 September 2001 
and 7 July 2005 may not have elicited similar notions of ‘prominent social facts’ they 
have ensured that terrorism has become a ‘routine part of modem consciousness’ 
(Garland, 2001: 106) and this in turn has generated two burgeoning socio-political 
beliefs: 1) the nature of the terrorist threat has significantly changed post-11 
September and particularly in the UK since 7 July 2005, and 2) the government -  if 
not the criminal justice system — is unable to respond effectively to the evolving 
terrorist threat. This is reflected in academic observations that, ‘terrorist acts disrobe 
the liberal myth that the state is capable of providing order and control over its 
territory’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 382).
Moreover, there is little doubt that an increased preoccupation with terrorism and 
associated security concerns such as extremism and radicalism has prompted attempts 
to reform aspects of the criminal justice system in the UK. Garland (2001: 103) 
argues that this has left a ‘patchwork of repairs and interim solutions rather than well 
thought out re-constmction. This observation resonates within some of the executive 
decisions that have been made in the UK in recent years in response to the changing 
nature of the terrorist threat. In particular, the Prevent strand of the CONTEST 
strategy that was re-launched in 2009 following widespread condemnation of the 
‘targeted’ nature of some of its initiatives. Garland acknowledges that any substantial 
challenge to society’s institutional arrangements creates practical problems and 
uncertainties -  for the publics served by the institutions as well as the institutions, for 
example, the police. Although there is no suggestion that the threat from terrorism 
has brought about the prospect of institutional collapse, the changing landscape of 
security has facilitated the fostering of new policy ideas. These have emerged in the 
form of new debates around the preservation of national security and protection of the 
public. The perceived threat from terrorism and the associated change in the nature of 
the talk has contributed to a range of new programmes and policy initiatives which in 
turn have the potential to impact upon institutional aims and objectives.
Some of this terrorism talk and decision has come to form enduring aspects of counter 
terrorism policing such as counter terrorism legislation and the special powers
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inherent to such legislation. Yet, within Garland’s theoretical framework some have 
left their mark only as ‘emblems’ of policy, for example, the compulsory identity card 
scheme and the proposals to extend pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects to 90 
days. In short, they have remained at the level of policy ‘talk’ and therefore not had a 
tangible impact of routine police practice. This current research indicates that 
although there is some evidence to suggest that key executive decisions such as the 
Prevent strategy do form a part of routine policing activity, the full impact of such 
national initiatives has yet to be widely evaluated. However, the key questions here 
are, 1) why do some aspects of policy get taken up and have an impact on the ground 
and others do not, and 2) to what extent can this framework account for the impact of 
such policies on the ‘administrative actors’ tasked with implementing and delivering 
them? To understand why this is the case we have to examine the analytically distinct 
levels of talk, decision, action and in particular the political, organisational and 
cultural contexts that characterise each level.
Garland (2001: 112) suggests that a policy predicament has different implications for 
different kinds of actors and he references two in particular; the political actor and the 
administrative actor. Garland views the impact on political actors from within the 
context of electoral competition, and indicates that policy choices are often contingent 
on how positively they will be received by the voting public. It is imperative that 
policy measures are seen to be strong, credible, effective and in line with public 
sentiment. Often the extent to which a policy proposal or concrete policy instrument 
is well received is dependent upon the political rhetoric that accompanies it. 
However, it is the role of the administrative actors, for example those working within 
criminal justice organisations, that is most pertinent to the current research. Garland 
suggests that political initiatives are ‘often reactive, triggered by specific events...they 
tend to be urgent and built around atypical cases, and more concerned to accord with 
political ideology and popular perception than with expert knowledge or the proven 
capacities of institutions’ [whereas] the administrative actor must focus upon the 
interests of a single organisation in terms of statistical reasoning and resource 
management’. The police service is included as administrative actor within Garland’s 
conceptual framework and many of the observations he makes resonate within the 
findings of this current research.
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It is suggested that the policy talk in the form of exhortation and rhetoric, can act as 
an ‘external constraint’ upon decisions within organisations such as the police. This 
is evident within the context of this research through the gaps identified in the transfer 
of counter terrorism policy talk to decisions in some instances, and in the uneven 
implementation of national counter terrorism policy decisions at the individual force 
level. These implementation gaps often arise as a result of the political imperatives at 
play within different geo-political settings. However, Garland also observes that such 
political imperatives are not the primary consideration for administrative actors. Such 
actors are predominantly driven by the need to maintain the integrity of internal 
organisational processes and the need to target resources on priority policy areas. 
This observation resonates within the findings of this research as it is evident that both 
strategic decision-making and operational activity is directed in the areas that are 
subject to the most stringent performance assessment. This is epitomised by the much 
referenced statement ‘what gets measured gets done’. In short, the administrative 
actor’s first priority is the core business of the organisation. However, as Garland 
(2001: 111) says ‘it is the administrators’ job to pursue their organisational tasks in 
ways that at least appear to accord with the concerns of their political masters’. There 
is need to negotiate both external and internal pressures. This situation is reflected 
within the current research through the evidence that suggests national priorities are 
included in policing strategic and operational tasking frameworks as ‘lip service’ to 
national, political concerns. As Garland observes, the political and administrative 
discourses are driven by different rationalities, values and interests and this in turn can 
be seen to account in some ways for the disjuncture between counter terrorism policy 
talk, decision and action identified within this research.
7.3.1. Counter Terrorism Policy: An ‘Adaptive Response? ’
There are a number of exemplars of policy ‘acting out’ in the context of UK counter 
terrorism ‘talk’. These include political debates around the extension to the pre­
charge detention of terrorist suspects and the identity card scheme. However, it is 
Garland’s work on policy ‘adaptation’ that resonates most strongly with this current 
research. Within Garland’s framework adaptive responses recognise the predicament 
as previously outlined and are characterised by ‘a high level of administrative
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rationality and creativity to accommodate the predicament’. As such it can be argued 
that the empirical emphasis is on the ‘administrative actor’, namely within the context 
of this research, routine policing. It is possible to identify examples of adaptive 
responses within all three levels of counter terrorism policy talk, decision and action. 
The adaptive responses that are evident within policing policy ‘decisions’ and ‘action’ 
are referenced here.
i) The commercialisation of justice
It is argued that the increased drive towards economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
that has been witnessed within policing policy for the last twnety years has introduced 
new systems of accountability and impacted on the patterns of decision-making and 
thus discretionary powers of police forces. The introduction of key performance 
indicators as a statistical measure of policing success across all police forces ensures 
that routine policing is increasingly subject to state-imposed standards and guidelines. 
Moreover, forces are closely monitored and inspected to ensure they comply with 
these sanctions. The relationship between these policy developments and counter 
terrorism policing is interesting. It is significant to note that the police force at the 
centre of this case study is not measured on its counter terrorism activity in any form. 
This in turn accounts in some way for the gaps in the implementation of national 
counter terrorism policy decisions at the individual police force level. It is suggested 
within this current thesis that one of the conceptual criteria that sets counter terrorism 
policy decisions apart from counter terrorism talk is the enforceable compliance 
mechanisms that are attached to them. The counter terrorism policy decisions 
highlighted in this research retain mechanisms for performance measurement in this 
area. However, the extent to which the key performance indicators relating to counter 
terrorism are embedded in the strategic, decision-making frameworks of the case 
study force remains ambiguous. This is evident in the relative autonomy retained by 
BCU Commanders and Neighbourhood Policing Inspectors in relation to the amount 
of routine police practice that focuses on counter terrorism activity.
ii) Relocating and redefining responsibilities
This type of adaptation alludes to the need to embrace the realisation that there is 
crime control -  or within the context of this research -  terrorism prevention
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mechanisms operating ‘beyond the state’. Garland (2001: 123) suggests that attempts 
to ‘mobilise and harness non-state mechanisms has been the basis of the most 
innovative policies of the recent period’. One such policy innovation that is clearly 
visible within the context of this current research is the ‘community as solution’. This 
research identifies a range of policy initiatives that promote the role of the 
‘community’ within counter terrorism strategies. These emerge in the form of 
community ‘policing’; ‘intelligence’; ‘safety’; ‘cohesion’ and ‘engagement’ amongst 
others. They can be seen to originate in part as an attempt to illustrate the move away 
from the pursuit and enforcement aspects of counter terrorism policing towards the 
more proactive, prevention-style approaches characterised by the Prevent strand of the 
CONTEST strategy. This research has examined the role of community-based 
meetings (PACTs) and the community safety initiatives within routine policing in the 
case study force. Although it is clear that both have increased in prominence and 
form an integral aspect of routine policing activity, the extent to which they are driven 
by concerns about terrorism and associated security problems such as radicalisation is 
minimal. However, this is not to suggest that the government and the police are not 
willing to work with partner agencies in an attempt to counter terrorism. The current 
research indicates that it is often difficult to get non-state agencies to take the lead in 
community-based initiatives, and the relative prominence of terrorism within 
communities is often based on experience and thus relevance. In this way the 
research findings contrast with the securitisation thesis which identifies increasing 
state control over police policy (Flyghed, 2005; Walker, 2000; King and Sharp, 2006). 
Indeed the current research is more in line with Garland’s (2001: 126) observations 
that ‘the state’s new strategy is not to command and control but rather to persuade and 
align’. In this way the findings within this research do appear to perhaps suggests that 
the increased role for non-state actors within routine policing is not so much 
indicative of increased ‘securitisation’ (King and Sharp, 2005; Virta, 2008); rather, it 
is symptomatic of increased ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 2001).
It can be argued that in contrast to the securitisation theory, Garland’s theoretical 
framework acknowledges the complex relationship between political actors and 
administrative actors and the influential role of political, organisational and cultural 
imperatives on policy development and implementation. Thus, Garland’s (2001) 
work on ‘policy predicament; adaptation, denial and acting out’ can be applied
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usefully to key aspects of this current research. This is primarily because of its 
recognition of the administrative actor and the range of adaptive responses that are 
made by criminal justice institutions such as the police in light of the development 
and implementation of national counter terrorism policy. In this way it moves beyond 
a focus on policy elites and the textual footprints of their talk and decisions to a 
concern for the impact of such policy on those tasked to implement and delivery such 
policies. It acknowledges a range of competing discourses between different actors 
and across different organisations. In this way it can, to some degree, account for the 
pluralistic narratives that inform the public policy making process in the UK by 
recognising the ways in which the transfer and implementation of national policies 
within and across the levels of policy talk, decision and action can be problematized 
by politicisation, organisational constraints and public scrutiny. However, it is 
acknowledged that Garland’s theoretical perspective draws on the same 
methodological approach to empirical research as the securitisation theory and those 
who advocate the thesis. And, it is argued that a discourse-analytic study of policy 
talk and decision precludes an empirical investigation of the impact of these policy 
components on action in the form of tangible changes to practice.
7.4. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
This research argues that there are two core problems with the discourse-analytic 
study of security, as exemplified by the securitisation thesis. First and foremost there 
is the problem of imputation; there is a tendency to read action from talk, to infer 
policy impact on the operational frontline from security policy rhetoric and 
exhortation. Secondly, grand theoretical narratives such as the securitisation thesis 
tend to ‘homogenise’ research settings or at least generalise and thereby de- 
contextualise empirical concepts such as security. It is argued that both of these 
problems arise as a consequence of the conceptual and methodological approach to 
security studies advanced by advocates of the securitisation thesis such as Waever 
(1996); Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). Moreover, this theoretical and 
methodological approach to research precludes the recognition and accommodation of 
the pluralistic narratives around security that reveal it to be an ongoing process that is
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accomplished by actors subject to competing pressures in particular socio-political 
contexts.
This research study puts forward two propositions, firstly that academic research 
needs to move beyond a concern with policy elites and the ‘textual footprints’ of their 
talk and decisions to a concern with the action of everyday, local police routines. 
Secondly, it is proposed that it is important to distinguish analytically between 
different levels of policy-making for the purposes of empirical enquiry. Thus, one of 
the main aims of this study is to re-orient the empirical focus onto routine practice on 
the ground by innovating traditional approaches to research design and methodologies 
in order to explore the issue of securitisation within routine policing. It is argued that 
the application of a single, embedded case study method and techniques of qualitative 
and quantitative content analyses of routine policing facilitate the empirical 
investigation of security at the analytically distinct levels of policy talk, decision and 
action. This in turn, facilitates recognition and accommodation of the pluralistic 
narratives around security within different geo-political security settings. It is argued 
that the development of a methodology for investigating policing routines is better 
placed to establish security ‘in action’. This in turn provides a viable way to address 
the problem of imputation. In this way the research aims to produce a different kind 
of study to those that have dominated the field to date; a more focused study that 
attempts to distinguish between different ’levels' of policy (talk, decisions, action), 
and highlight the dangers in conflating them when carrying out empirical research.
The research design that underpins this study generates a number of possibilities for 
fruitful research in the future. It is argued that the nature of the research strategy 
offers the potential to move beyond the corroboration or falsification of the 
securitisation thesis in relation to empirical findings about actual police routines and 
practices. The research design enables the adaptation of the securitisation thesis in 
order to build on specific knowledge of the process of securitisation within the 
context of policing. Furthermore, the knowledge generated from this research study 
can be applied to investigations of the relationship between securitisation and routines 
more generally. However, a discussion of the implications for further research is 
confined to the substantive focus of this current research.
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It is suggested that this robust methodological approach to capturing empirically 
‘routine’ policing can be replicated in other research sites as a basis for comparison in 
future research. The research design could be used to underpin research within other 
police forces across England and Wales -  both in areas of high risk and low risk of 
terrorism and vulnerability to associated security concerns such as radicalisation and 
extremism. In more general terms, it would be interesting to further explore the 
implications of security talk within the context of counter terrorism policy. The 
findings in this research study highlight a number of ways in which counter terrorism 
talk is important. This includes the relationship between talk and public anxieties 
around terrorism and the role of security talk in the construction of ‘suspect 
populations’. Further investigations of the latter would draw on previous work done 
by Hillyard (1993) and consolidate existing work in this area in the UK (Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009). Furthermore, it would be interesting to develop the 
methodological approach in order to further explore the relationship between security 
decisions and actions. Future research could focus solely on the neighbourhood 
policing aspect of routine policing (rather than neighbourhood policing and response 
policing) in light of continued developments within counter terrorism policy-making. 
In particular, it would be interesting to examine security decision developments 
around the prevention of radicalisation and extremism and the ways in which they 
impact on how local police officers work with communities in order to counter threats 
of terrorism and extremism (Spalek, 2008). It would also be interesting to explore 
further the implications of the political, cultural and organisational challenges that are 
highlighted in this research. This study suggests that unless such challenges are 
addressed there is a possibility that, rather than embedding counter terrorism work 
into mainstream policing, the UK will end up with a bifurcation between counter 
terrorism policing and conventional routine practice. Such findings contrast with 
existing observations that evolutions in counter terrorism methodologies are ‘blurring 
the boundaries’ between high and low policing (Innes and Thiel, 2010; Brodeur, 
2007).
It is clear that counter terrorism is a dynamic area of policy-making both within the 
EU and the UK. The ever-changing policy landscape was reflected in the case study 
force at the centre of this study where the implementation and delivery of counter 
terrorism strategies was very much a phased process rather than a discrete event. It
235
would be very interesting to conduct the same critical test of the securitisation in light 
of these new developments. The limitations placed on the research study in terms of 
timescale for data generation inevitably had implications for the nature of the 
findings. It was clear that the delivery of Prevent was gaining momentum at the time 
that fieldwork was completed; if fieldwork had continued the critical test of the 
securitisation thesis may well have produced very different findings. In particular, it 
was interesting to note the early implementation and development of the Channel 
Project within the case study BCU. However, the CONTEST Strategy is currently 
under review by the coalition Government which has diverging perspectives on the 
legitimate nature of responses to terrorism. Ultimately, it is the nature of social 
science research to operate within the parameters of a world that does not stand still, 
and that must often also accommodate the contingent nature of policy-making and 
implementation. This research study is no exception. Notwithstanding these 
important notes of limitation, the study met its central research aims successfully and 
has provided some important steps forward in the study of securitisation and routine 
policing.
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Appendix A 
Full Interview Schedule
Interviewee Name: 
Role/Remit:
Time in Post:
Section 1: BCU/Sector Information 
Could you describe a typical (!) day?
Can you tell me about the set-up of the BCU/Sector?
Prompts:
Personnel
Resources
Response/NPTs
What is the demographic nature of the BCU/Sector?
What are some of the specific issues facing your Sector?
Prompts:
Crime and Disorder Issues 
Vulnerable Areas 
Council Issues
What would you say are your BCU/Sector Priorities?
Prompts:
Crime
PACTS
How much autonomy do you have in your position?
Prompts:
Setting priorities/tasks
Section 2: Key Research Themes from a Sector/BCU Perspective 
Measurement/Performance Assessment
How are you measured at the Sector level?
Prompts:
Issues around performance 
APACS
Specific benefits/challenges
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Tasking
How does Tasking work within the BCU/Sector?
How does tasking work at the Sector level?
What are the key areas of tasking at present?
Has this changed in recent times?
Neighbourhood Policing Teams
How are they set up?
What is the specific aim/objective of NPTs?
What resources/personnel are dedicated to them?
How important is the role of your NPTs?
Has the role changed/has there been a shift in emphasis recently?
How so?
Has the resource/personnel allocation to NPT increased to any degree?
Why?
Role of PCSOs
How many do you have?
What is their remite?
Has this changed to any degree?
Community Intelligence
What do you understand by Community Intelligence?
How is it operationally defined?
How much training do officers have on collecting it, recording it, storing it, 
disseminating it?
What happens to ‘intelligence’ collected by officers?
Partnership Working/Cooperation
To what extent do you liaise with local authority/partners at the sector level?
Who do you work with, with what aim?
Section 3: Counter Terrorism Policing/Security-Specific Issues
In what ways have general concerns about terrorism filtered down to theBCU/Sector 
level?
How is counter terrorism present at the BCU/Sector level?
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Prompts:
T asking priorities/operations/Prevent?
What role do they play in day to day running of your sector?
In what ways does CTP feature in the policing of your sector?
How aware are you of counter terrorism operations/policies?
How aware do you need to be of Ops/Policies?
To what extent are they part of daily business at the sector level?
Do officers receive specific training on CTP?
In your opinion and from your experience do you believe that routine operational 
policing is becoming more concerned with security/counter terrorism policing?
OR
Are there any ways in which you can see that counter terrorism policing or increased 
concerns around security have become more mainstreamed/embedded into routine, 
operational policing?
What does the concept of ‘security’ or ‘CTP’ mean to you in the context of your job? 
Do you have any additional thoughts or comments about anything we’ve discussed?
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Appendix B 
Anonymised Fortnightly Tasking Action Plan
Owner Description Review/Outcome
AUTOCRIME
Inspector X Implement Operation [NAME] in [SECTOR]
£500 allocated. -  Evaluation submitted -  Discharged.
30/07/08
Inspector X Implement Operation [NAME] - £750 allocated. 
Evaluation submitted -  discharged.
30/07/08,
Detective Inspector 
X
Handler Package re Cash Converters -  update required. 
Intelligence picture to be reviewed and referral to IDG. 
Carried forward -  referral to IDG.
30/07/08.
VIOLENT CRIME
Chief Inspector City Centre Alcohol related crime and bladed weapons 
-  prepare referral to FT&CG.
Ongoing.
DWELLING BURGLARY
Burglary Team. Continue to target Suspects in [SECTOR] area. £250 
provisionally allocated 
Evaluation submitted -  discharged.
Forthwith
OMU. [SUSPECT NAME] - Investigate possible breach o f 
Supervision Order. Arrested -  OMU now dealing.
30/07/08
Detective Inspector Implement Operation [NAME] [£500 allocated].Carried 
forward, closed briefing].
30/07/08.
Detective Sgt Implement Operation [NAME]. Update by DI [NAME] 
-  ongoing and carried forward
30/07/08.
ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR / CRIMINAL DAMAGE
Chief Inspector Confer with NPT Insp’s/Bronze re targeting o f ASB 
Hotspots by Response units. Carried forward
30/07/08.
Inspector Develop initiative in respect o f Street Prostitution in 
[NAME} St. Operation [NAME] to be implemented -  
Carried forward.
Ongoing.
CLASS A DRUGS
Inspector Develop policy /procedure re Crack House Closures -  
Update by Insp [NAME] -  carried forward..
Ongoing.
GENERAL ACTIONS
Bronze. Insp’s. Ensure representative attends T&CG meetings Ongoing.
Bronze Insp’s. To confer and identify their priorities/patrol strategies. — 
Carried forward
Ongoing.
All Sectors. To target NAW ’s o/s for more than 12 months. 
Carried forward. New Operation to be implemented.
Ongoing.
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Appendix C 
QCA (SPSS) Codebook
Variable Name Values
Date of the FT A
Type of Crime and Disorder Occurrence 1. Autocrime
2. Violent Crime
3. Burglary Dwelling
4. Drugs
5. Anti Social Behaviour
6. Neighbourhood Policing
7. Counter Terrorism
8. General
Type of Task 1. Operation-based task
2. Intelligence
3. Prevention
4. Enforcement
5. In-house admin
6. Victim Contact
7. None
Task Number
Number of Tasks 1. 0
2. 1-4
3. 5-8
Dept/Rank Assigned to Tasks 1. CID
2. Channel Project
3. Management Rank
4. OMU
5. YOT
6. Burglary Team
7. Community Safety
8. Intelligence Unit
9. All Sectors/Depts
10. NA
Task Status 1. Update at Next FT
2. Ongoing
3. Discharged
4. ASAP
5. NA
Was Additional Money Allocated? 0. no
1. yes
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2. not applicable
3. not mentioned
How Much Money?
Additional Comments
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